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INTRODUCTION
As a student, professor, and practitioner of criminal law for more
decades than I care to admit, I have encountered a myriad of concepts,
principles, rules, and abstractions, many of which are reasonably com-
prehensible and some of which make damn little sense. In some cases,
such as in connection with my authorship of the "definitive" (or so my
publishing company claims) work on Illinois criminal law, my goal is to
sort out and explain the "elements" of criminal law theories of culpabil-
ity (e.g., accountability principles), offenses (e.g., murder), and defenses
(e.g., self defense). In the classroom, I face the constant challenge of
developing the students' analytical minds by confronting them with criti-
cal queries about this or that case, hypothetical situation, principle, or
law and, at other times, developing formulas for their benefit designed to
simplify a bundle of confusing applications of law to facts (e.g., criminal
attempt = a defendant's "substantial step" towards criminality + defen-
dant's "specific intent" to achieve a criminal goal; constitutional death
penalty = a defendant's commission of murder (not rape, etc.) + elements
of aggravation (e.g., killed a cop) + consideration of any (not just some)
mitigating circumstances). In the continuing legal education programs
with which I am regularly involved, I strive to prepare a captivating lec-
ture, a useful outline, or well researched written materials that will nei-
ther confuse nor bore the attendee. In the courtroom, I am to present the
brief, the case precedent, or the argument that wins-over her honor. In
each of these situations, the challenge is to analyze, synthesize, explain,
reason, rationalize, and/or distinguish a legal concept. After examination
and reexamination over the years, I believe (perhaps naively) that I un-
derstand quite well most criminal justice concepts, including the more
complex that may confuse even the criminal court judges I lecture (e.g.,
Fourth Amendment). Others (e.g., what really separates the "legally"
insane from those who are not) I never will.
In my opinion, one of the subjects that defies principled reasoning is
the concept of vagueness in the criminal law. Past explaining the ba-
sics-criminal laws must give "fair notice"1 and contain an "ascertain-
able standard of guilt",2 that guide the arm of enforcement-most treat-
ments of the subject, whether in treatises, commentary, or judicial opin-
ion, provide the reader with no semblance of criteria, guidelines, or stan-
dards that might assist even the trained eye with the ability to predict
1. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979).
2. See Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 545 (1971) (per curiam).
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whether a given stricture challenged on vagueness grounds will survive
constitutional attack. And, quite frankly, this is true because there exists
no criteria, guidelines, or standards that provide a meaningful measuring
stick for making such prediction. Vagueness analyses seem to me to be
devoid of objective tests. Vagueness is a concept that appears heavily
dependent on the "I know it when I see it"'3 test, where one begins with a
conclusion and thereafter works backward for rational support. Vague-
ness challenges require a highly subjective mode of analysis that in-
volves an unpredictable assortment of paths a court might take in arriv-
ing at a ruling.
Less confusing is another concern that can plague criminal legisla-
tion, namely, ambiguity. A relative of vagueness, ambiguity appears
where otherwise understandable legislation lends itself to two or more
equally plausible interpretations. When faced with ambiguity, the
reviewing court will usually (although not necessarily) plug in a doctrine
that gives the accused the advantage. In other words, whatever interpreta-
tion is most beneficial to the accused is the one that wins out. Having
said that, however, does not mean that identifying an uncertainty in legis-
lation as an ambiguity, as opposed to a problem of vagueness, is neces-
sarily a simple task. For example, at what point is it permissible to con-
clude the legislation contains sufficient specificity that it can be described
as ambiguous rather than vague? Or, at what point can there be agree-
ment that the law in question lends itself to two equally possible
interpretations?
Beyond vagueness and ambiguity, there exists what this article will
simply call uncertainty in legislation. Here, a court is not entertaining a
vagueness challenge nor convinced the legislation under consideration is
ambiguous, because the law, at first blush, appears to carry one meaning
that is more likely than any other. Instead, the court in its analysis of the
somewhat uncertain law will struggle to clarify for the benefit of both the
citizenry and law enforcement the actual scope of the law in question.
The purpose, then, of this article is not to offer a useful measuring
stick for predicting the outcome of a vagueness claim in criminal law,
but rather a description of the vehicles used by courts to justify their con-
clusions as to whether a defendant had "fair notice, ' 4 or police, prosecu-
tors, and juries had an "ascertainable standard of guilt"5 that might avoid
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Similarly, it will attempt to
identify, beyond simply referring to certain doctrinal rhetoric, how a
court goes about addressing ambiguities. Finally, legislation not chal-
lenged on vagueness grounds nor considered ambiguous may neverthe-
3. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
4. See Colautti, 439 U.S. at 390.
5. See Palmer, 402 U.S. at 545.
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less contain uncertain language that will require a court to seek out its
true meaning. Again, this article will undertake an examination of a
court's methods in such cases.
Part I examines the basics-the principle of legality and its corol-
lary concerns of fair notice and avoidance of arbitrary or discriminatory
enforcement. Part II examines the concept of ambiguity. Part HI ad-
dresses the dichotomy between overbreadth and vagueness concerns that
have often been confused in court opinions. Parts IV, V, and VI are de-
signed to examine the concerns that may explain the ultimate conclusion
that arises out of a vagueness dispute. Specifically, Part IV points out
that a legislature's statutory inclusion of (1) a detailed listing of items or
activities which a particular criminal measure seeks to restrict and (2) an
element of mens rea in a criminal enactment, while certainly not out-
come dispositive, may offer the court a basis for concluding the offense
in question offered the necessary notice. Part V offers a number of possi-
ble sources of information that may provide instruction as to the meaning
of language in a criminal proscription. Alternatively, examination of
such sources may reveal a complete lack of consensus as to how certain
words might be interpreted, thereby reinforcing a complainant's assertion
that a particular criminal law failed to offer any direction to the citizenry
as to the scope of questionable enactments or terminology within. Here,
it will be pointed out that consultation of common dictionaries, for ex-
ample, might provide a court with an "answer" as to whether the mean-
ing of a law is clear or nebulous. Part VI offers a few rules of thumb that
courts may employ to rationalize their position. For instance, it is obvi-
ous the courts will demand more specificity or precision of language if
the law in question might implicate constitutional terrain than will be
expected if it does not. Hopefully, this journey through the case law will
contribute to a better understanding of these subjects, quite appropriately,
called vagueness, ambiguity, and uncertainty.
I. THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY
The most fundamental tenet of criminal law is the principal of legal-
ity,6 which today means that criminal liability and punishment can only
be predicated on a prior legislative enactment that states what is pro-
scribed as an offense in a precise and clear manner.7 This is a concept
that is reliant on various doctrines, most significantly the "void for
vagueness" doctrine and the doctrine of "strict construction."8 The
6. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 79-80 (1968).
7. PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW § 2.2, at 74-75 (1997).
8. PACKER, supra note 6, at 93, Two classic treatments of these subjects are Anthony
Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67
(1960), and John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71
VA. L. REv. 189 (1985).
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vagueness doctrine is directed toward providing an adequate definition of
what behavior is criminal and to whom it applies.9 The doctrine of strict
construction of penal statutes, which has been described as the "junior
version of the vagueness doctrine,"' 0 requires resolution of differing in-
terpretations of language in a criminal statute to the advantage of the
accused." If a criminal stricture is sufficiently nebulous that it fails to
define that which is supposed to be illegal, then it suffers from the perils
of vagueness.12 If vague, it is void; it is unsalvageable. In contrast, if the
criminal measure, cast in relatively clear language, lends itself to two or
more equally plausible interpretations, then the enactment is merely am-
biguous.13 In this latter case, in steps the doctrine of strict construction.
This doctrine, also called the rule of lenity, which serves as a "tie-
breaker," insists the ambiguity be resolved against the government and to
the advantage of the accused. 14 Thus, as a general matter, if the statute is
deemed vague, the court has been unable to decipher where the legisla-
ture drew the line between illicit and licit behavior. It has thrown in the
towel. Alternatively, if the statute is found to be ambiguous, the court is
bent on making the determination as to where the legislature drew the
line and, to that end, plugs in the rule of lenity to bring about resolution.
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution, which guarantee that "no person shall
• ..be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law,"' 5 have been construed as requiring that citizens have notice of what
behavior is or is not illegal.' 6 To preserve this guarantee, the courts have
adopted the "void-for-vagueness doctrine."' 7 This doctrine requires that:
the terms of a penal statute... must be sufficiently explicit to inform
those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them
liable to its penalties.., and a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelli-
gence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its appli-
cation violates the first essential of due process of law.'
8
9. PACKER, supra note 6, at 93-94.
10. d. at95.
11. ROBINSON, supra note 7, at 76 (citing Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971)).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 5.04, at 47 (3d ed. 2001).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
16. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) ("No one may be required at peril
of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be
informed as to what the State commands or forbids.").
17. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (citing Vill. of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982)).
18. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (citing Int'l Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221-22 (1914)); see also Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638 (1914)
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The void-for-vagueness doctrine also requires that penal statutes be de-
fined in a manner that does not encourage "arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement" bylaw enforcement authorities.'
9
In Grayned v. City of Rockford,20 the United States Supreme Court
articulated the critical policy considerations that are at the heart of the
due process mandate requiring avoidance of statutory vagueness:
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because [this
Court] assume[s] that man is free to steer between lawful and unlaw-
ful conduct, [this Court] insist[s] that laws give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so
that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not
providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory en-
forcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for
those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and. . .. . 21
discriminatory applications.
Consequently, when a claim of unconstitutional vagueness is raised in a
court of law, there are two basic questions to be asked when determining
whether a statute is void because of its vagueness:
(1) Does this statute provide fair notice or warning to the citizens as
far as what is and is not prohibited or required by the statute?
22
(2) Does this statute provide an ascertainable standard of guilt so that
it does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement?
23
If the answer to both of these questions is in the affirmative, then the
statute will be upheld against a void-for-vagueness challenge. 24 How-
(stating that the statute in Int'l Harvester presented no standard of conduct that was possible to
know).
19. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357.
20. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
21. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09.
22. See, e.g., Kramer v. Price, 712 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1983) ("Vague statutes fail to
provide citizens with fair notice or warning of statutory prohibitions so that they may act in a lawful
manner." (citing Connally, 269 U.S. at 391)), affid on other grounds on reh'g, 723 F.2d 1164 (5th
Cir. 1984).
23. See, e.g., Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 ("Where the legislature fails to provide certain
minimal guidelines, a criminal statute may permit 'a standardless sweep [thatl allows policemen,
prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections."' (alteration in original) (quoting Smith
v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974))).
24. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92-93 (1975) (upholding a statute
prohibiting mailing pistols and "other firearms capable of being concealed on the person" because it
established a "reasonably ascertainable standard of conduct" and because it provided notice to the
citizens as to what actions are proscribed by the statute).
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ever, if a statute fails either part of the test, the statute is void because of
its vagueness.25
It is important to understand from the outset that the pursuit of a
void-for-vagueness finding is an uphill battle. An elementary, but criti-
cal, point in this type of challenge is that courts begin their analysis with
the presumption that the statute under attack is valid.26 Also, a court, if in
fairness such is possible, must give a statute a reasonable construction or
interpretation to avoid unconstitutional indefiniteness.
27
A second fundamental point regarding any vagueness challenge is
that a reviewing court is not restricted to an examination of the legisla-
tion on its face; rather, whether the statute provides fair notice and an
ascertainable standard of guilt turns on prior judicial construction or in-
terpretation. 28 An authoritative construction of a statute by a jurisdic-
tion's highest court will be considered as interpretative of the "words in
,,29the statute as definitely as if it had been so amended by the legislature.
Thus, in some cases, a narrowing construction may save the enactment
from a successful attack.30 However, in other cases, a judicial "gloss"
may narrow the scope of the act, but not enough to save it.31 In yet other
cases, what may appear is an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial ex-
pansion of narrow and precise statutory language that can only aggravate
the integrity of the law.1
2
25. See, e.g., Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 465 (1927) (finding that the Colorado
Anti-trust Act is void because it fails to provide an ascertainable standard of guilt); see also People
v. Monroe, 515 N.E.2d 42, 45 (i. 1987) (finding an Illinois drug paraphernalia prohibition void
because it failed to afford fair notice of what conduct was prohibited and also lent itself to arbitrary
enforcement).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32 (1963) (finding that
federal Robinson-Patman Act making it a crime to sell goods at "unreasonably low prices" in order
to destroy competitors not vague and that a "strong presumptive validity ... attaches to an Act of
Congress").
27. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618 n.6 (1954) (citing United States v. Del. &
Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407-08 (1909), and finding the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act not
vague).
28. Wainwright v. Stone, 414 U.S. 21, 22 (1973) (noting that, in reviewing a claim of
vagueness of a state statute, the United States Supreme Court must take the statute as though it read
precisely as the highest court of the state has interpreted it).
29. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507,514 (1948).
30. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) (finding that the prohibition
outlawing threats to the President of the United States requires proof of a "true threat" to the
President's life or limb and, thus, the statute as construed is "certainly" not void on its face).
31. See, e.g., Winters, 333 U.S. at 518-19 (holding that the state statute outlawing "obscene
prints and articles" was not saved by New York Court of Appeals determination that statute only
reached materials "so massed as to become vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes").
32. See, e.g., Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964) (finding that the South Carolina
Supreme Court violated the defendant's due process rights in applying its 1961 construction of state
statute prohibiting entry of lands of another after notice not to enter as prohibiting the act of
remaining on premises after being asked to leave, to affirm the conviction of the defendant, who in
1960 refused to leave luncheonette department of drug store after requested to leave).
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A. The "Fair Notice 03 Requirement
Providing adequate notice does not require that a defendant actually
know that his conduct constitutes a violation of the law.34 An actual no-
tice requirement would run afoul of the principle that ignorance of the
law is no excuse. Thus, as a practical matter, the requirement of "fair
notice"35 merely insists (although no court will admit it) that a defendant
have constructive notice that his act is criminal; that is, that the defendant
could have found out whether his conduct was prohibited by the statute.36
A statute is void for vagueness if it fails to draw reasonably clear lines
between lawful and unlawful conduct such that the defendant has no way
to find out whether his conduct is controlled by the statute.37 Vague stat-
utes are constitutionally unacceptable because they fail to provide citi-
zens with fair notice or warning of statutory prohibitions so that they
may act in a lawful manner.38
On various occasions, the United States Supreme Court has struck
down federal and state criminal statutes under the Due Process Clause
for not being sufficiently explicit in informing those who were subject to
the laws what conduct on their part would render them liable to criminal
penalties.39 In this connection, it has been pointed out that there are no
mechanical standards to be rigidly applied to every case; rather, the de-
gree of vagueness that may be tolerated depends on "the nature of the
33. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979).
34. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.1(d), at 441 (3d ed. 2000) (noting the
fact that ignorance of the criminal law is not a defense is based upon the early notion that the law
was "definite and knowable" and that everyone is presumed to know the law that is, of course, an
"obvious fiction").
35. Colauni, 439 U.S. at 390 (finding stricture outlawing abortion of "viable" fetus vague for
failing to provide "fair notice" regarding test for viability).
36. Cf Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50, 53 (1975) ("Even trained lawyers may find it
necessary to consult legal dictionaries, treatises, and judicial opinions before they may say with any
certainty what some statutes may compel or forbid."); see also Connally, 269 U.S. at 393 ("The
crime, and the elements constituting it, must be so clearly expressed that the ordinary person can
intelligently choose, in advance, what course it is lawful for him to pursue."); Columbia Natural
Res., Inc., v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1105 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that the United States Supreme
Court case law on vagueness "reflects the common sense understanding that the average citizen does
not read, at his leisure, every federal, state, and local statute to which he is subject"), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1158 (1996); Jeffries, supra note 8, at 207 ("[T]he kind of notice required is entirely
formal. Publication of a statute's text always suffices; the government need made no further effort to
apprise the people of the content of the law . . . .In short, the fair warning requirement of the
vagueness doctrine is not structured to achieve actual notice of the content of the penal law.").
37. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (finding that the Massachusetts flag misuse
statute outlawing "contemptuous treatment of flag" was vague because the statute failed to delineate
the kinds non-ceremonial treatment that is criminal and that which is not).
38. See Connally, 269 U.S. at 388 (finding that the Oklahoma statute requiring employees to
be paid "not less than the current rate per diem wages in the locality" was vague).
39. See Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1964) (discussing prior opinions where the
Court employed the void-for-vagueness doctrine).
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enactment." 4 First, the Court has suggested that the need for notice is
greater when the statute imposes penalties on individual behavior than
when it regulates the economic behavior of businesses inasmuch as the
"subject matter" under regulation "is often more narrow ...because
businesses, which face economic demands to plan behavior carefully,
can be expected to consult relevant legislation in advance of action," and
because these entities "may have the ability to clarify the meaning of the
regulation by [their] own inquiry, or by resort to an administrative proc-
ess. ' 41 Second, greater latitude is given when the enactment is civil rather
than criminal because "the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively
less severe" given their differing penalty structures.42 Third, statutes
which involve a scienter requirement are more likely to withstand a
claim of vagueness where they ensure that the law punishes only those
who are aware that their conduct is unlawful.43 Fourth, in cases where the
statute under consideration may affect constitutionally protected conduct,
particularly First Amendment speech, the reviewing court is less likely to
find that constructive notice exists than in cases where the statute could
not possibly infringe upon such constitutional freedoms. 44 A study of the
case law in this area prompted one commentator to observe that as a
practical matter, the courts actually measure vagueness claims by con-
sideration of: (1) the significance of the legislative enactment, i.e., its
importance in the larger social scheme; 45 (2) the necessity of the statutory
ambiguity in achieving the underlying goal;46 and (3) the impact of the
legislation "on protected or desirable conduct. ' '47 Moreover, judges
40. See Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498.
41. Id.at498.
42. Id. at 498-99.
43. Id. at 499. A requirement of specific intent that is interpreted as the intentional
commission of an act which is (or just happens to be) criminal obviously does not give rise to a
presumption of fair notice in the same way as where the specific intent is interpreted as the willful
commission of an act knowing the act to be wrong. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101-02
(1945) (plurality opinion); see also Colautti, 439 U.S. at 394-95 (finding lack of criminal mens rea
aggravated ambiguity in Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act); Goguen, 415 U.S. at 579-80 (finding
Massachusetts flag misuse prohibition that outlawed treating the flag in a "contemptuous" manner
did not clarify whether contempt had to be intentional or could be inadvertent and, as such, statute
was vague).
44. Viii. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498-99. These decisions may be based on the
assertion the statute is violative of due process. E.g., Goguen, 415 U.S. at 566 (finding
Massachusetts flag misuse prohibition that outlaws "contemptuous treatment" of the flag is void for
vagueness in violation of due process). Other decisions are claimed to be a violation of the First
Amendment. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,432-33 (1963) (finding Virginia prohibition
against solicitation of legal business which made it a crime for a person to advise another that his
legal rights may have been infringed and to refer him to a particular attorney or group of attorneys
was vague and in violation of the First Amendment).
45. See Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal Statutes-Balancing Acts,
5 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 1, 10 (1997).
46. See Batey, supra note 45, at 2.
47. Id. at 2; see also Jeffries, supra note 8, at 215-16 (pointing out that the vagueness doctrine
"is so often invoked against street cleaning statutes-local ordinances directed against some form of
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"veil" these analytical considerations lest they appear less like judges and
more like legislators.48
For example, in Johnson v. Athens-Clarke County,49 the Georgia
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a local anti-loitering
statute. In that case, the defendant was arrested after being observed on
the same street corner on which police had observed him four times over
the two days prior to his arrest, and on all four previous occasions the
defendant was told by the police to move along.50 The defendant was
prosecuted under a county municipal ordinance outlawing "loitering or
prowling.'
Although in previous cases the Georgia Supreme Court had upheld
the State's loitering statute against vagueness challenges,52 the court was
troubled with this particular municipal loitering ordinance because of the
final clause of the ordinance, which proscribed as illegal a person's pres-
ence "under circumstances which cause a justifiable and reasonable
alarm or immediate concern that such person is involved in unlawful
drug activity. 53 The court noted that:
an innocent person unfamiliar with the drug culture could stand or sit
in a 'known drug area' without knowing the area had such a designa-
tion, and could return to the area for a legitimate reason, or for no
reason at all, and, as the facts of this case show, be subject to arrest
and conviction.
54
The court found no language in the ordinance that would put an innocent
person, such as the defendant, on notice that his behavior was forbid-
den.55 The court distinguished this ordinance from the ordinance that it
had previously reviewed in Bell v. State.56 In Bell, the Georgia Supreme
Court had upheld a State anti-loitering statute that prohibited conduct
that created a "reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of
public nuisance, typically involving trivial misconduct, usually with no specifically identifiable
victim, and carrying minor penalties").
48. See Batey, supra note 45, at 2.
49. 529 S.E.2d 613 (Ga. 2000).
50. Johnson, 529 S.E.2d at 614.
51. Id. ("A person commits the offense of loitering or prowling when he is in a place at a time
or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant a justifiable
and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity or
under circumstances which cause a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate concern that such
person is involved in unlawful drug activity." (quoting ATHENS-CLARKE COUNTY MON.
ORDINANCE § 3-5-23 (1993))).
52. See State v. Burch, 443 S.E.2d 483 (Ga. 1994); Bell v. State, 313 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1984).
53. Johnson, 529 S.E.2d at 615.
54. Id. at 616.
55. Id.
56. 313 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1984).
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persons or property in the vicinity." 57 While the court in Bell had deter-
mined that a person of average intelligence could understand what con-
duct created a "reasonable alarm or immediate concern of the safety for
persons or property in the vicinity," the court in Johnson concluded that
a person of average intelligence could not necessarily understand what
activity would "cause a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate
concern that such person is involved in unlawful drug activity. 58
The court examined the criteria that were used by the arresting offi-
cer in the present case to determine whether the defendant was in viola-
tion of the statute.59 Here, the officer had arrested the defendant because
the area that he was in was a known drug area and the defendant's con-
duct in returning to the same spot repeatedly was characteristic of drug
related activities. 60 The court pointed out that the determination of
whether or not the defendant was in violation of the statute was based on
the officer's law enforcement experience in that area, not on general
knowledge and common experience of a person of ordinary intelli-
gence.61 The court held that because the statute failed to provide fair
warning to persons of ordinary intelligence as to what the language at
issue that was contained in the ordinance actually prohibited, the statute
was "void for vagueness., 62 Here, then, the court seemed to hang its hat
on the concern over application of the statute to wholly innocent conduct.
In addition, the statute was directed at the behavior of an individual,
rather than a business, and was criminal, rather than civil, which made
the nebulous language more problematic. Although not mentioned by the
court, government proof of scienter was not required. Finally, loitering
constitutes no significant threat to life, limb, or property.
Of course, the United States Supreme Court has had occasion to
review a statute and conclude it failed to provide fair notice as to what
was proscribed. An oft-cited case in this area is Winters v. New York,63
where a defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor offense of possess-
ing with intent to sell certain magazines "devoted... principally... [to]
criminal news, police reports, and accounts of criminal deeds, and pic-
tures and stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust and crime" contrary to the
New York Penal Code.64 On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals
interpreted this statute to apply to only those "collections of criminal
deeds of bloodshed or lust [which] 'can be so massed as to become vehi-
cles for inciting violent and depraved crimes against the person"' and





62. Id. at 617.
63. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
64. Winters, 333 U.S. at 508 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW, ch. 39 § 1141(2) (McKinney 1944)).
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upheld the defendant's conviction. 65 However, the United States Su-
preme Court reversed.66 The Court first noted basic First Amendment
protections of free speech and press were implicated by this stricture.
67
"[E]ven considering the gloss" the New York Court of Appeals had put
on this statute in order to narrow its scope to not include "detective tales
and treatises on criminology," for example, it remained highly uncertain
as to what type of materials might still "be interdicted because of the
utter impossibility of the actor or the trier to know where this new stan-
dard of guilt would draw the line between the allowable and the forbid-
den publications. 68 Also, no criminal intent or purpose was required in
order to convict an alleged offender. 69 Moreover, this measure reflected
"no indecency or obscenity in any sense heretofore known to the law."70
It carried "no technical or common law meaning., 71 In addition, the stat-
ute had the capacity to reach, for example, "[c]ollections of tales of war
horrors" and criminalize other "innocent" activity.72 The statute set nei-
ther guidelines for the distributor of questionable materials nor a useful
measuring stick for courts or juries.73 Because the "standards of certainty
in statutes punishing for offenses is higher than in those depending pri-
marily upon civil sanction for enforcement," this proscription that was
devoid of "fair notice" was contrary to due process of law and thus void-
for-vagueness.74
Winters, like the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Johnson,
reflects the type of measure that is most vulnerable to a vagueness at-
tack.75 Innocent, as well as constitutionally protected, behavior was im-
plicated.76 Proof of scienter was lacking.77 The penalty was criminal, not
civil.78 The defendant was an individual, not a collective entity.79 Finally,
no demonstrable threat to person or property was involved.80
65. Id. at 512-13 (quoting People v. Winters, 63 N.E.2d 98, 100 (N.Y. 1945)).
66. Id. at 520.
67. id. at 518-19.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 519.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 520.
73. Id. at 519-20.
74. Id. at 509-10, 515.
75. Id. at 509-10; Johnson, 529 S.E.2d at 615.
76. Johnson, 529 S.E.2d at 616.
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B. The "Ascertainable Standard of Guilt"81 Requirement
Although an analysis of a vagueness claim focuses both on the ade-
quacy of the notice to citizens and concern over arbitrary enforcement,
the United States Supreme Court has recognized that the more important
aspect of the vagueness doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other prin-
cipal element of the doctrine - the requirement that a legislature establish
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement. ''82 "The absence of a
determinate standard" in a given legal proscription "gives police officers,
prosecutors, and the triers of fact unfettered discretion to apply the law
and, thus there is a danger of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement"
of such a law. 83 Consequently, the void-for-vagueness doctrine demands
that these measures provide "officials with explicit guidelines in order to
avoid [such] arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." 84 They must
reflect what the Court has described as an "ascertainable standard[] of
guilt. '85 The Court has long recognized that "[i]t would certainly be dan-
gerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be
rightfully detained, and who should be set at large., 86 To that end, laws
are invalidated if they are "wholly lacking in 'terms susceptible of objec-
tive measurement."' 87 It has been observed that "[l]aws that have failed
to meet this [vagueness] standard are, almost without exception, those
which turn on language calling for the exercise of subjective judgment
[of the enforcer] unaided by objective norms. 88
Beyond concerns relating to providing guidance to police, "[I]t is
established that a law [also] fails to meet the requirements of the Due
Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves ... judges
and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is
prohibited and what is not in each particular case., 89 An act's criminality
cannot depend upon, as a general rule, whether a jury may think one's
81. See Palmer, 402 U.S. at 545.
82. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (quoting Goguen, 415 U.S. at 574).
83. Kramer, 712 F.2d at 176 (holding that a Texas harassment statute outlawing
communications which "annoy" or "alarm" another is vague).
84. Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding that
the definition of "educational" contained in a federal treasury regulation governing tax exemptions
for charitable and educational organization was vague).
85. Palmer, 402 U.S. at 545 (holding municipal "suspicious persons" ordinance vague);
Winters, 333 U.S. at 515 (holding state Obscene and Prints Article Act vague); Cline v. Frink Dairy
Co., 274 U.S. 445, 459-60 (1927) (holding Colorado Anti-Trust Act vague).
86. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875).
87. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) (quoting Cramp v. Bd. of Pub.
Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 286 (1961)).
88. NAACP, 371 U.S. at 466 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
89. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966) (emphasis added).
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conduct is unreasonable, improper, or immoral. 90 Rather, there must be
some definiteness and certainty written into the law.9' The Court has
made clear that "[t]he dividing line between what is lawful and unlawful
cannot be left to conjecture.,, 92 "The citizen cannot be held to answer
charges based upon penal statutes whose mandates are so uncertain that
they will reasonably admit of different constructions" by the fact finder.
93
When a law fails to provide an ascertainable standard of guilt, "[i]t
leaves open ... the widest conceivable inquiry, the scope of which no
one can ... foreshadow or adequately guard against."
94
One example of a statute being struck down for vagueness because
of its potential for arbitrary enforcement appeared in Papachristou v.
City of Jacksonville.95 In this consolidated case, nine defendants were
arrested for violating Jacksonville's vagrancy ordinance.96 The first four
defendants, Papachristou, Calloway, Melton, and Johnson 97 were riding
in Calloway's car on a main thoroughfare in Jacksonville, Florida, on the
way to a nightclub.98 They were arrested because "the defendants had
stopped near a used-car lot that had been broken into several times.' 99
These four individuals were charged with "prowling by auto.
'' 00
Two other defendants, Smith and Henry, were waiting for a friend
in downtown Jacksonville.10' It was a cold day and Smith did not have a
jacket. 0 2 The two entered a dry cleaning shop to continue their wait but
90. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (citing Tozer v. United States, 52 F. 917,
919 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1892)).
91. Nash, 229 U.S. at 377,
92. Connally, 269 U.S. at 393.
93. Id.
94. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921).
95. 405 U.S. 156, 171 (1972).
96. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 156. The Florida ordinance provided in part:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common gamblers,
person who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night
walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and
lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, person
wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object,
habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually
spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places were
alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living upon
the earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon
conviction in the Municipal Court shall be punished as provided for Class D offenses.
JACKSONVILLE, FLA., CODE § 26-57.
97. Papachristou and Calloway were white females; Melton and Johnson were black males.
Papachistou, 405 U.S. at 158.
98. Id. at 158-59.
99. Id. at 159. The Court pointed out that there was no evidence of any breaking or entering




2002] VAGUENESS, AMBIGUITY, AND OTHER UNCERTAINTY 255
were asked to leave.10 3 After they left, they walked up and down a two
block area two or three times, whereupon the observing storeowners con-
tacted the police.' °4 The police officers arrested Smith and Henry be-
cause they did not have any identification and because the police officers
did not believe the defendants' story. 105
The seventh defendant, Heath, was arrested after he and his com-
panion drove down his girlfriend's driveway, where they noticed police
officers arresting a third party, whereupon the two proceeded to back
out.1°6 At this point, police arrested Heath and his companions. Heath
was charged with being a "common thief' because he had a reputation of
being a thief. 10 7 Heath's companion was arrested for "loitering" in the
driveway.
0 8
The eighth defendant, Campbell was arrested when he arrived home
in the very early morning hours."°9 Police officers stopped him for speed-
ing, but no speeding charge was ever issued against him. 10
The ninth defendant, Brown, was arrested when police officers
called him over to their car.1 ' The police officers began to search him
and, when Brown started to resist, the officers discovered two packets of
heroin in his pocket." 2 However, Brown was charged with "disorderly
loitering on the street, and disorderly conduct - resisting arrest with vio-
lence."
1 13
In reviewing the charges, the United States Supreme Court stated
that the activities codified in the Jacksonville ordinance involved "nor-
mally innocent" behavior.' 14 These activities included "night walking,"
"loafing," "wandering or strolling," and "habitually ... frequenting...
places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served."' 1 5 The Court used
the writings of Walt Whitman, Vachel Lindsay, and Henry David Tho-
reau to illustrate:
The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the ameni-
ties of life as we have known them. They are not mentioned in the











113. Id. at 160-61.
114. Id. at 163.
115. Id. at 163-64.
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been in part responsible for giving our people the feeling of inde-
pendence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity.
... They are embedded in Walt Whitman's writings, especially
in his 'Song of the Open Road.' They are reflected too, in the spirit of
Vachel Lindsay's 'I Want to Go Wandering,' and by Henry D. Tho-
116reau.
The Court determined that the Jacksonville ordinance cast a net too large
such that the crimes it defined were "so all-inclusive and generalized...
[that] those convicted may be punished for no more than vindicating
affronts to police authority."'1 7 Additionally, law enforcement had "un-
fettered discretion" in determining when an individual was violating the
ordinance." 8 The Court concluded that the statutory "scheme permits and
encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law."' 19
The Court, therefore, held that the Jacksonville ordinance was unconsti-
tutionally vague. 1
20
Another case that predicated a claim of vagueness on inordinate
police discretion was Kolender v. Lawson,'2' wherein the United States
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a California statute
22
that the California appellate court had interpreted as requiring persons
who wander on the streets to provide "credible and reliable" identifica-
tion and "to account for his presence" when requested by a peace officer
under circumstances that would justify a valid stop.' 23 While the Califor-
nia Court of Appeals had construed the statutory mandate that an indi-
vidual provide "credible and reliable" identification when requested by a
police officer as requiring a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
sufficient to justify a Terry stop,124 "credible and reliable" identifications
had been defined by the appellate court as identification "carrying rea-
sonable assurance that the identification is authentic and providing
116. Id. at 164.,
117. Id. at 166-67.
118. Id. at 168.
119. Id. at 170.
120. Id. at 171.
121. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 353-54.
122. Id. at 354 n. I ("Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly
conduct, a misdemeanor: .. .(e) Who loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place
without apparent reason or business and who refuses to identify himself and to account for his
presence when requested by any peace officer to do so, if the surrounding circumstances are such as
to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety demands such identification." (quoting CAL.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 647(e) (West 1970))).
123. Id. at 355-56 (quoting People v. Solomon, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867, 872-73 (Cal. Ct. App.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974)).
124. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26 (1968) (providing that the police may conduct a brief
investigatory detention of a suspect where the officer has a reasonable suspicion that an individual
may have committed, or is about to commit, an offense).
256 [Vol. 80:2
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means for later getting in touch with the person who has identified him-
self."
125
The Court noted that the statute and case law interpreting it con-
tained "no standard for determining what a suspect has to do in order to
satisfy the requirement to provide a 'credible and reliable' identifica-
tion."1 26 Thus, a suspect would be held to have violated this statute unless
"the officer [was] satisfied that the identification [was] reliable. 1 27 The
statute was construed by the Court as vesting "virtually complete discre-
tion in the hands of the police to determine whether the suspect has satis-
fied the statute and must be permitted to go on his way."'' 28 The Court
saw the result of the statute as entrusting lawmaking "to the moment-to-
moment judgment of the policeman on his beat."' 29 In addition, the Court
noted that this statute furnished "a convenient tool for 'harsh and dis-
criminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against particular
groups deemed to merit their displeasure,""130 and conferred "on police a
virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a viola-
tion."' 31 Here, the Court held that this statute was unconstitutionally
vague because it allowed "arbitrary enforcement by failing to describe
with sufficient particularity" what a citizen must do in order to comply
with the statute.
1 32
Similar to the decision in Papachristou, the United States Supreme
Court struck down a Chicago gang loitering ordinance because it failed
to set forth an ascertainable standard of guilt in City of Chicago v.
Morales.133 In Morales, the United States Supreme Court reviewed Chi-
cago's Gang Congregation Ordinance, which prohibited "criminal street
gang member[s]" from "loitering" with one another in any public
place. 34 For three years, the Chicago police enforced this ordinance,
125. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 356 (quoting Solomon, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73).
126. Id. at 358.
127. Id. at 360.
128. Id. at 358.
129. Id. at 360 (quoting Goguen, 415 U.S. at 575 (quoting Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394
U.S. 111, 120 (1969))).
130. Id. (quoting Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 170 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
97-98 (1940))).
131. Id. (quoting Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).
132. Id. at 361.
133. 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999).
134. Morales, 527 U.S. at 47 n.2 (1999) (quoting CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015
(1992)).
(a) Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he reasonably believes to
be a criminal street gang member loitering in any public place with one or more
other persons, he shall order all such persons to disperse and remove themselves
from the area. Any person who does not promptly obey such an order is in
violation of this section.
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issuing over 89,000 dispersal orders and arresting approximately 42,000
people for violating the ordinance.135 When the ordinance was challenged
in the Illinois appellate court, it ruled the ordinance was vague and over-
broad and, thus, struck the ordinance down.' 36 After the Illinois Supreme
Court affirmed, 137 the United States Supreme Court inquired into whether
the statute was "invalid on its face."' 138 The Court noted there were two
separate doctrines under which an ordinance may be found unconstitu-
tional. 39 "First, the overbreadth doctrine permits the facial invalidation
of laws that inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights if the
impermissible applications of the law are substantial when 'judged in
relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep."",140 Second, the Court
pointed out that where a proscription "does not reach a substantial
amount of constitutionally protected conduct, it may be impermissibly
vague because it fails to establish standards for the police and public that
are sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty
interests."' 41 The Court decided the First Amendment overbreadth claim
advanced in this case did not provide a sufficient basis to invalidate the
ordinance because no free speech or right of association was infringed by
the anti-loitering ordinance.142 Moving to the Due Process Clause, the
Court stated in dictum:
(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to an alleged violation of this section that no
person who was observed loitering was in fact a member of a criminal street gang.
(c) As used in this Section:
(1) 'Loiter' means to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose.
(2) 'Criminal street gang' means any ongoing organization, association in fact
or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one
of its substantial activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts
enumerated in paragraph (3), and whose members individually or collectively
engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity . . .
(5) 'Public place' means the public way and any other location open to the
public, whether publicly or privately ow~ied.
CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (1992).
135. Morales, 527 U.S. at 49.
136. Id. at 50 (citing City of Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34, 38, 41-42 (ill. Ct. App.
1995)). The Illinois Appellate Court concluded that the "ordinance impaired the freedom of
assembly of nongang members in violation of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution and
Article I of the Illinois Constitution, that it was unconstitutionally vague, that it improperly
criminalized status rather than conduct, and that it jeopardized rights guaranteed under the Fourth
Amendment." Id.
137. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court determined "that the gang loitering ordinance violate[d]
due process of law in that it [was] impermissibly vague on its face and an arbitrary restriction on
personal liberties." Id. (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 59 (1ii. 1997)).
138. id. at 52.
139. Id.
140. Id. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612-15 (1973)).
141. Id. at 52 (citing Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358).
142. Id. at 52-53.
While we, like the Illinois courts, conclude that the ordinance is invalid on its face,
we do not rely on the overbreadth doctrine. We agree with the city's submission
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[A]s the United States recognizes, the freedom to loiter for innocent
purposes is part of the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. We have expressly identified this
"right to remove from one place to another according to inclination"
as "an attribute of personal liberty" protected by the Constitution. In-
deed, it is apparent that an individual's decision to remain in a public
place of his choice is as much a part of his liberty as the freedom of
movement inside frontiers that is "a part of our heritage," or the right
to move "to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct" iden-
tified in Blackstone's Commentaries.143
However, the Court stated it was unnecessary to decide "whether the
impact of the Chicago ordinance on constitutionally protected liberty
alone would suffice to support a facial challenge under the overbreadth
doctrine" inasmuch as a facial vagueness challenge appropriately ad-
dressed the claim that the law was invalid.' 44 The Court noted that the
ordinance did not "simply regulate[] business behavior."'145 Rather, this
ordinance was a criminal statute that contained no mens rea.146 Also, it
"infringe[d] on constitutionally protected rights" and, as such, was sub-
ject to a facial vagueness attack.
147
Applying the vagueness standard to the ordinance, the Court rea-
soned that a criminal statute could be void for vagueness under two sepa-
rate rationales. 148 "First, it may fail to provide the kind of notice that will
enable ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits; second, it
may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory con-
duct."' 49 In this case, the Chicago ordinance prohibited individuals from
"loitering," which the enactment itself defined in the following terms: "to
remain in any one place with no apparent purpose.' ' 150 Under this broad
definition, the Court reasoned that "any citizen of the city of Chicago"
that the law does not have a sufficiently substantial impact on conduct protected by
the First Amendment to render it unconstitutional. The ordinance does not prohibit
speech. Because the term "loiter" is defined as remaining in one place "with no
apparent purpose," it is also clear that it does not prohibit any form of conduct that
is apparently intended to convey a message. By its terms, the ordinance is
inapplicable to assemblies that are designed to demonstrate a group's support of, or
opposition to, a particular point of view. [citations omitted] Its impact on the social
contact between gang members and others does not impair the First Amendment
"right of association" that our cases have recognized.
Id. (citations omitted).
143. Id. at 53-54 (quoting Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900); Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116, 126 (1958); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
* 130).
144. Id. at 55.
145. Id. (quoting Vil. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 56.
149. Id.
150. Id.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
would have extreme difficulty in ascertaining whether "he or she had an
apparent purpose" while standing in a public place.151 The Court sug-
gested that individuals simply engaged in conversation with one another
might wonder if they had no "apparent purpose." 152 Because citizens
might not be aware that they were impermissibly loitering, they would
not be receiving fair notice of what conduct the ordinance prohibited in
order to conform their behavior prior to receiving notice from a police
order to disperse. 53 The Court pointed out that if the loitering was
"harmless and innocent," then the police dispersal order would constitute
an "unjustified impairment of liberty."'154 Here, if the police were able to
arbitrarily decide who was guilty of loitering and who was not, then the
law was not providing "advance notice that [would] protect the putative
loiterer from being ordered to disperse. Such an order cannot retroac-
tively give adequate warning of the boundary between the permissible
and the impermissible applications of the law."' 55 Additionally, individu-
als subject to dispersal orders were not afforded clear instructions as to
how comply with the police order. 56 The Court illustrated this problem
with the following questions: "[H]ow long must the loiterers remain
apart? How far must they move? If each loiterer walks around the block
and they meet again at the same location, are they subject to arrest or
merely to being ordered to disperse again?' 57 Because the answers to the
Court's questions could not be ascertained from the ordinance, the Court
concluded that "the entire ordinance fail[ed] to give the ordinary citizen
adequate notice of what [was] forbidden and what [was] permitted."'
' 58
The Court held that the ordinance was vague because "no standard of
conduct is specified at all.'
159
II. AMBIGUITY AND VAGUENESS DICHOTOMY
The dividing line between statutory vagueness, which renders an
enactment void, and statutory ambiguity, which means a law is fixable
by judicial interpretation, is not entirely clear.' 6° Nevertheless, it is im-
portant to not only attempt an explanation of vagueness, as in the previ-
ous section, but also one of ambiguity. Scholars have, of course, man-
aged to see a difference by pointing out that while a vague statute does
151. Id. at 56-57.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 58-59 ("No one may be required at peril of life, liberty, or property to speculate as to
the meaning of penal statutes." (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451,453 (1939))).
154. Id. at 58.
155. Id. at 59.
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 60.
159. Id. (quoting Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611,614 (1971)).
160. LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 2.2(d), at 86, § 2.3(b), at 100-01.
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not satisfactorily define the proscribed conduct, one that does define pro-
hibited conduct with some precision, but is subject to two or more differ-
ent interpretations, is ambiguous. 161
For instance, an expression is ambiguous when a criminal statute
outlaws conduct "P" and "P" can alternatively be read to encompass ei-
ther conduct "a" or conduct "b" and it is beyond dispute that the defen-
dant engaged only in conduct "a.', 162 To illustrate, using Chomsky's lin-
guistic literature, "the sentence, 'flying planes can be dangerous' can
mean either 'it can be dangerous to fly planes' or 'planes that are aloft
can be dangerous.' 163 While a vague statute is void as unconstitutional,
an ambiguous statute may be saved by using a variety of techniques to
determine the legislature's intent. 64 To interpret an ambiguous statute,
courts may employ three techniques: (1) utilizing rules for interpreting
the statute's actual language; (2) using rules directing a court to look
outside of the statutory language; and (3) in criminal cases only, relying
on the rule of strict construction, which commands an ambiguity to be
resolved in the defendant's favor. 65 This latter rule is the rule of len-
ity.
166
To interpret the statute's actual language, the courts have recog-
nized five basic principles: (1) a statute that uses different language in
different sections is presumed to have a different meaning in each of the
different sections; (2) catch-all phrases are limited by the rule of ejusdem
generis (Latin for "of the same kind") which limits interpretation to a
common theme or factor; (3) statutes that set forth a list of exceptions
implicitly exclude other exceptions by utilizing the rule of expressio
unius est exclusion alterius (Latin for "the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another"); (4) where two statutes conflict, the specific stat-
ute has priority over the general; and (5) where two statutes conflict, the
later enacted statute has priority over the earlier. 67 If these rules do not
help the court to resolve the ambiguity or conflict, the court may look
beyond the actual statute at the legislative history or another authoritative
interpretation. 1
68
In addition, because criminal statutes are held to a higher standard
of precision and clarity, courts apply the rule of lenity, which one noted
161. ROBINSON, supra note 7, at 76; LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 2-3(b), at 100-01.
162. Lawrence M. Solan, Law, Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57,62 (1998).
163. Id. (quoting NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX § 4, at 21 (1965)).
164. ROBINSON, supra note 7, § 2.2, at 76.
165. Id. § 2.3, at 90.
166. See, e.g., Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (citing Bell v. United States,
349 U.S. 81, 83 (1995), and finding Travel Act vague and therefore no violation by out-of-state
gamblers frequenting a gambling operation).
167. ROBINSON, supra note 7, § 2.3, at 90-91.
168. Id. § 2.3, at 92.
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scholar aptly called the "junior version of the vagueness doctrine."' 69
Although it is not constitutionally required, 170 this rule directs that an
ambiguity in a statute be resolved in the defendant's favor. 17 1 It should be
understood that "[t]he motivating purpose of the rule is to provide ade-
quate notice to defendants (due process), and to reinforce the notion that
only the legislature has the power to define what conduct is criminal and
what conduct is not (separation of powers).' 72
This rule has been endorsed by the United States Supreme Court in
their interpretation of federal law. 173 Although the rule had an established
history in English law, the first United States Supreme Court decision to
apply it appeared in 1820.74 In United States v. Wiltberger,75 the Court
was faced with the question of whether a federal statute that proscribed
manslaughter "on the high seas" could apply to a homicide that occurred
on an American merchant marine vessel on a river in the interior of a
foreign country. 176 While one section of the Crimes Act of 1790 simply
referred to commission of manslaughter "on the high seas," another sec-
tion of the Act, which addressed murder and other felonies committed on
water, specifically referred to commission of such acts "upon the high
seas, or in any river, haven, basin or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any
particular [American] State."'177 The government asserted if consideration
was given to the "construction of the whole act," one could logically
conclude the "obvious intent of the legislature" was to define manslaugh-
ter on the high seas as including such a homicide on a foreign river.
17 8
169. PACKER, supra note 6, at 95.
170. DRESSLER, supra note 14, § 5.04, at 47-48.
171. Rewis, 401 U.S. at 812 (citing Bell, 349 U.S. at 83).
172. Solan, supra note 162, at 58. This rationale appears in United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336,
347-48 (1971).
173. See, e.g., McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987) ("The Court has often
stated that when there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we
are to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language."). Here,
mail fraud does not encompass schemes to defraud people of their right to honest government;
rather, it is interpreted as applying only to schemes to defraud one's property rights. Id.; see also
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425, 426, 428, 433-34 (1985) (holding rule of lenity
commands offense of unlawful acquiring and possessing food stamps requires mens rea of
knowledge); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435-36 (1978) (holding rule
of lenity requires interpretation of federal Sherman Antitrust Act as requiring intent); Bass, 404 U.S.
at 347-48 (holding rule of lenity requires that offense of receipt, possession or transportation of
firearms by a felon in interstate commerce require proof that receipt and possession as well as
transportation be in interstate commerce).
174. See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76 (1820); see also Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and
Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 357, 358 (1994).
175. 18 U.S. 76.
176. Id. at 93-96.
177. Id. at 92-96, 98-99.
178. Id. at 94-95.
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However, the Court responded, "The rule that penal laws are to be
construed strictly . . . is founded on the tenderness of the law for the
rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of pun-
ishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department.'
' 79
The Court added, "The intention of the legislature is to be collected from
the words they employ [and] [w]here there is no ambiguity in the words,
there is no room for construction."' 80 Here, the plain language of the
manslaughter statute outlawed a killing "on the high seas," nothing
more. 81 This indictment, for the commission of manslaughter that oc-
curred on a river, then, was not based on a "cognizable" offense of the
laws of the United States.'
82
In Jones v. United States,183 the Court relied, in part, on the rule of
lenity in finding that the commission of "arson of an owner-occupied
dwelling" fell outside the scope of federal criminal law. 84 In this case,
the defendant was convicted of a federal offense for damage or destruc-
tion "by means of fire or an explosive, [of] any ... property used in in-
terstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or
foreign commerce."' 85 Upon examination of the defendant's claim that
an owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose did
not qualify as property "used in" commerce or "affecting" commerce, the
Court said the proper inquiry involved considering the function of the
building itself and how, if at all, that function could be considered com-
merce-related. 86 The government had claimed the defendant's arson
involved "use" of interstate commerce in three ways: (1) the homeowner
"used" the dwelling as collateral to get a loan from an out-of-state lender;
(2) the homeowner "used" the residence to obtain a casualty insurance
policy from an insurer in another state; and (3) the homeowner "used"
the dwelling to receive natural gas from another state.1 87 However, the
Court responded that "[i]t surely is not the common perception that a
private, owner-occupied residence is 'used' in the 'activity' of receiving
natural gas, a mortgage, or an insurance policy."' 88 The Court felt that
''active employment" in commerce was what needed to be established,
while in this case the only "active employment" was the "everyday liv-
ing" of the residents of the damaged premises. 189 Applying the rule of
179. Id. at 95.
180. Id. at 95-96.
181. Id. at 104-05.
182. Id. at 105.
183. 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
184. Jones, 529 U.S. at 858.
185. Id. at 850 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994)).
186. Id. at 854 (citing United States v. Ryan, 9 F.3d 660, 675 (8th Cir. 1993) (Arnold, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
187. Id. at 855.
188. Id. at 856.
189. Id.
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lenity to the "choice... between two readings of what conduct Congress
has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alterna-
tive, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is
clear and definite."190 This Congress had failed to do and, thus, the de-
fendant was given the benefit of the ambiguity.'
9'
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the federal rule of
lenity only applies where a court determines that a "grievous ambiguity
or uncertainty" exists.192 The Court limits the use of lenity since "most
statutes are ambiguous to some degree."' 193 In addition, a statute does not
suffer the infirmity of ambiguity unless, "'after seizing everything from
which aid can be derived,' [the Court] can make 'no more than a guess as
to what Congress intended."' 194 Thus, if the Court understands what
Congress intended in choosing a particular word or phrase in a criminal
statute, there is neither ambiguity nor need to resort to the rule of len-
ity. 195
Also, "the fact that a statute can be 'applied in situations not ex-
pressly anticipated by Congress does not"' establish ambiguity but rather
breadth. 96 In other words, merely because a statute is all-encompassing
does not establish ambiguity. When the rule does apply, the law in ques-
tion should not be interpreted in a manner which defies common sense
nor should the law be given a "forced, narrow or overstrict construc-
tion.' 9 7
190. Id. at 858 (quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22
(1952)).
191. Id. at 859.
192. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 n.17 (1994) (quoting Chapman v. United
States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991)). In Staples, for example, the Court found it unnecessary to employ
the rule of lenity in concluding that a conviction for possessing an unregistered machine gun
required proof of scienter. Id. The Court established that crimes without a mens rea have a most
disfavored status in criminal law. Id. at 605-06. In addition, the Court had not previously held that
"statutes silent with respect to mens rea are ambiguous." Id. at 619.
193. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998).
194. Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995) (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 239
(1993); Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958)). Reno held that a prisoner who spent
time at a community treatment center while "released" on bail was not in "official detention"
entitling him to sentence credit. Id.
195. See, e.g., Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 138-39 (holding that where Congress clearly intended to
use a broad definition of "carry" for purposes of outlawing the carrying of a firearm during a drug
transaction, there existed no need to consider rule of lenity); United States v. Walton, 514 F.2d 201,
204 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding that where Congress clearly intended to outlaw all forms of marijuana,
there was no ambiguity in a federal statute that only referenced one species of marijuana).
196. Pa. Dep't of Corrs. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 212-13 (1998) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.
Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 .(1985)). Yeskey held that the American Disabilities Act
"unambiguously extends to state prison inmates." Id.
197. LAFAVE, supra note 34, § 2.2(d), at 84.
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While the federal courts and many state courts 198 rely on the rule of
lenity, other states have abolished the rule.' 99 At the core of this move-
ment to eliminate the rule lies the notion that its implementation often-
times runs contrary to legislative intent.200 The Model Penal Code rejects
the rule of lenity and states:
The provisions of the Code shall be construed according to the fair
import of their terms but when the language is susceptible of differing
constructions it shall be interpreted to further the general purposes
stated in this Section and the special purposes of the particular provi-
sion involved. The discretionary powers conferred by the Code shall
be exercised in accordance with the criteria stated in the Code and,
insofar as such criteria are not decisive, to further the general pur-
poses stated in this Section.
20 1
This fair import rule is considered less "strict" because it allows for in-
terpretation in a way that does not frustrate the legislative purpose.20 2 The
rule seeks to ensure that some reasonable notice of the offense is possi-
ble.2 °3 This strikes a compromise between the principles of legality and
countervailing interests.204 However, it is not clear that the rule of lenity
and the rule of fair import generate a significant difference in applica-
tion.20 5 Arguably, the fair import rule allows a court more leeway to fol-
low legislative intent that conflicts with a literal reading, but this is mere
speculation.0 6 The difference may lie in the use of judicial discretion in
the fair import rule.20 7 This may be the reason some courts prefer the rule
of strict construction since it permits discretion yet appears mechanical••• 208
and thereby leaves a decision less open to cnticism.
HI. OVERBREADTH AND VAGUENESS DICHOTOMY
The concepts of overbreadth and vagueness are, in some sense, dis-
tinct and yet, in other regards, inseparable. As mentioned previously, "[a]
198. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 766 N.E.2d 641,644, 647 (Ill. 2002) (stating in dicta that rule of
lenity would compel a finding that a pellet gun is not a "dangerous weapon" within meaning of
Illinois armed violence statute).
199. DRESSLER, supra note 14, § 5.04. Compare Kahan, supra note 174, at 346 (criticizing the
doctrine), with Solan, supra note 162, at 59-60 (defending the rule of lenity).
200. ROBINSON, supra note 7, § 2.3, at 93 ("The rule can frustrate a legislature's obvious intent
on what can be an important issue and risks bringing the criminal justice system into disrepute,
subjecting it to criticism that it is a game governed by technicalities having little reference to fairness
or justice."); DRESSLER, supra note 14, § 5.04, at 47 ("A statute should be interpreted to further, not
frustrate, the legislative policies behind the specific law in question.").
201. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(3) (1962).
202. ROBINSON, supra note 7, at 94.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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statute is void for vagueness if it fails to give adequate notice to people
of ordinary intelligence concerning the conduct it proscribes or if it in-
vites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement., 20 9 If a party challenges
an enactment based on the assertion that one cannot determine whether
the regulation intrudes upon otherwise "innocent terrain," then the com-
plaint is one of vagueness. t° On the other hand, if a challenge is based
on an objection that the regulation does, in fact, intrude into territory
where it does not belong, then the claim is one of overbreadth. t1
While a statute may often be found both vague and overbroad at the
same time, the two concepts are distinct. A statute is too vague when
it fails to give fair notice of what it prohibits. It is overbroad when its
language, given its normal meaning, is so broad that the sanctions
may apply to conduct which the state is not entitled to regulate.
212
Nevertheless, it has been recognized that the possible "vagueness of a
law affects overbreadth analysis. 2 t3 When a court looks at a claim of
overbreadth and considers whether "a substantial amount of constitution-
ally protected conduct" is involved, it must examine both the uncertain
and the clear reach of the proscription in order to decide whether the
nebulous aspect of the proscription may be discouraging the citizenry
214from engaging in protected speech or behavior.
In any event, some discussions of vagueness confuse the concepts of
"vagueness" and "overbreadth." In some sense, this is a product of seem-
ingly inconsistent statements and analyses which appear in the case law.
This section will first discuss overbreadth, followed by discussions of
"facial vagueness" and "vagueness as applied."
A. First Amendment (or Facial) Overbreadth
The overbreadth doctrine is atypical of ordinary constitutional adju-
dication because it does not insist on the traditional requirements of
standing.2 t5 The United States Supreme Court "has altered its traditional
209. Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1984).
210. Viii. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 n.9 (1982)
(stating that if the respondent's objection to the statute is based on the question of "whether the
ordinance regulates items with some lawful uses, then it is complaining of vagueness").
211. Viii. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497 n.9; see also Schwartzniller, 752 F.2d at 1346
("A law is overbroad if it prohibits not only acts the legislature may forbid, but also constitutionally
protected conduct.").
212. Ariz. ex rel. Purcell v. Superior Court, 535 P.2d 1299, 1301 (Ariz. 1975).
213. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 n.6.
214. Id. at 494.
215. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-12 (1973) (reiterating that under the
traditional rule of standing which governs constitutional adjudication, it is impermissible for a
person to challenge a statute on the grounds that the statute infringes upon other persons'
constitutional rights; but in regards to First Amendment overbreadth challenges, there exists no
standing requirement); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767-68 (1982) (declaring that the
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rules of standing to permit -- in the First Amendment area -- 'attacks on
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a stat-
ute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity. ' ' 21 6 Therefore, an indi-
vidual may allege that a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and de-
prives either himself or another person of his or her First Amendment
rights.217 The Court's reasoning for this deviation from the traditional
standing requirement rests upon "a judicial prediction or assumption that
the statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to re-
frain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. 218
The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine prevents any enforce-
ment of a law that interferes with free speech "until and unless a limiting
construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seem-
ing threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression., 2 9 In-
asmuch as the effect of this doctrine is so dramatic, by allowing pre-
enforcement challenges without any showing of traditional standing, this
"strong medicine" has historically "been employed by the Court spar-
ingly and only as a matter of last resort., 22 0 Furthermore, these claims,
"if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary




Thus, where a Jehovah's Witness was convicted of a common law breach
of the peace for playing a phonograph record attacking the Catholic
Church in the presence of two Catholics, the Court reversed the defen-
dant's conviction but refused to void the offense "in toto because it was
capable of some unconstitutional applications. 2 22
traditional rule of standing "reflects two cardinal principles of our constitutional order: the personal
nature of constitutional rights and prudential limitations on constitutional adjudication" and that the
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is an exception to this principle).
216. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612 (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,486 (1965)).
217. Id. at 611-12.
218. Id. at612.
219. Id. at 613.
220. Id. However, the Court is not disinclined to use this doctrine. For example, after stating
that the Communications Decency Act's "coverage is wholly unprecedented," the Court ruled it to
be facially overbroad. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877-82 (1997) (striking down the
Communications Decency Act which prohibited transmission of obscene or indecent
communications by means of telecommunication to persons under 18, or sending patently offensive
communications through use of interactive computer service to persons under 18, because the Act
was contrary to the First Amendment); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234,
258 (2002) (holding that the ban on "virtual child pornography" contained in Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996 was overbroad and contrary to the First Amendment).
221. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 614.
222. Id. at 613-14 (discussing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308, 311 (1940)).
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This concept of overbreadth, also referred to as "facial over-
breadth,,223 clearly arises where a criminal statute seeks to regulate "only
spoken words" protected by the First Amendment.224 In addition, these
challenges have been allowed where a broadly worded statute might bur-
den innocent associations,225 "regulate the time, place, and manner of
expressive or communicative conduct, ' 226 or give "standardless discre-
tionary power to local functionaries" to refuse such expressive conduct in
advance, thereby creating "unreviewable prior restraints on First Amend-
ment rights., 227 As stated, overbreadth challenges have "been limited
with respect to conduct-related regulation. 228 When a defendant alleges
that a statute is overbroad and vague, the reviewing court first focuses on
whether the statute "reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally pro-
tected conduct., 229 The substantial overbreadth requirement applies to
challenges to legislation that "arise in defense of a criminal prosecution
as well as civil enforcement or actions seeking a declaratory
judgment., 230 In making this evaluation, a court must measure the am-
biguous as well as the unambiguous scope of the law in an effort to de-
termine if it is deterring innocent citizens from engaging in licit speech
or conduct.23' When ruling on an overbreadth challenge, a court must
initially attempt to interpret the enactment in a fashion that avoids a find-
ing of unconstitutionality. 232 If the statute does not implicate a substantial
amount of constitutionally protected conduct, then the statute is not
233 h oroverbroad. Next, the court must examine the facial vagueness chal-
lenge (discussed more fully below). Assuming the stricture impedes no
constitutionally protected conduct, the court should sustain a challenge
only if the law "is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. 234 In
223. Id. at 612; see also Byrum v. Texas, 762 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (stating
that a claim of "facial overbreadth" may arise where a statute either intrudes on the First Amendment
or impedes some other "fundamental interest" that restricts one's "conduct").
224. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612 (quoting Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972)).
225. Id. (citing cases such as Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967), where the
Court granted injunctive relief while striking down a New York Statute which made treasonable or
seditious acts grounds for removal from state employment).
226. Id. at 612-13 (citing cases such as Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940), where a
statute forbidding loitering and picketing was successfully challenged on overbreadth grounds
because the law also restricted "nearly every practicable, effective means" of educating the public
about a labor dispute).
227. Id. at 613 (citing cases such as Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), where the Court
found as overbroad a general breach of the peace statute which punished people for expressing
unpopular views that might agitate others).
228. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 766.
229. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 (quoted in State v. Dixon, 998 P.2d 544, 547
(Mont. 2000)).
230. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 772-73 (emphasis added).
231. Viii. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 n.6.
232. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769 n.24.
233. Viii. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494 (quoted in Dixon, 998 P.2d at 547).
234. Id. at 494-95.
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contrast to the First Amendment overbreadth challenge, a vagueness
challenge, not involving First Amendment freedoms but mere conduct,
does not allow an individual to challenge the possible inappropriate ap-
plication of the law to others.235
In Lewis v. City of New Orleans,236 the United States Supreme Court
invoked the overbreadth doctrine to strike down a municipal ordinance
restricting "opprobrious language." In that case, the defendant had been
found guilty of an offense that made it unlawful and a breach of the
peace for any person "wantonly to curse or revile or to use obscene or
opprobrious language toward or with reference to any member of the city
police while in the actual performance of his duty. '237 The charge arose
out of a verbal confrontation between the defendant and a police officer
that included utterances of profanity directed at the officer.238 In its
analysis, the Court ultimately concluded "opprobrious" language em-
braced words that did not inflict injury or "incite an immediate breach of
the peace. In addition, it observed that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments protect speech, including that which might be deemed
"vulgar or offensive." 24° Because the ordinance punished "only spoken
words" and was "susceptible of application to protected speech," it was
"constitutionally overbroad and therefore.. . facially invalid." 241
Just as the Court has employed the overbreadth doctrine to void
legislation where a defendant has raised it in defense of a criminal
charge,242 it has relied on it to undo an enactment in a pre-enforcement
action.243 For example, in Dombrowski v. Pfister,244 the plaintiffs sought
an injunction, under provisions contained in two federal civil rights stat-
utes, restraining various Louisiana officials from prosecution or other
enforcement of the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Con-
trol Law and the Communist Propaganda Control Law.246 The plaintiffs
235. Id. at 495.
236. 415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974).
237. Lewis, 415 U.S. at 132 (quoting NEW ORLEANS, LA., ORDINANCE 828 M.C.S. § 49-7).
238. Id. at 132 n.1.
239. Id. at 133 (quoting Gooding, 405 U.S. at 525).
240. Id. at 134.
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., Plummer v. City of Columbus, 414 U.S. 2, 2 (1973) (per curiam) (holding
municipal ordinance outlawing use of "menacing, insulting, slanderous, or profane language" was
invalid on its face); Gooding, 405 U.S. at 519-21 (holding Georgia statute outlawing use of
"opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace" was on its face
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad under the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
243. See, e.g., Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 241-43 (affirming pre-enforcement challenge of prohibition
against "virtual child pornography" contained in federal Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
on First Amendment overbreadth grounds).
244. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
245. Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 484 n.2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964); 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1964)).
246. Id. at 481-82.
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were several civil rights activists who were concerned about the State of
Louisiana's possible use of this legislation to curtail the activities of
those asserting or vindicating the rights of African-American citizens.
247
The Court began its consideration of the plaintiffs' claim by noting that
concerns of federalism normally required postponement of consideration
of federal issues that might arise in a state prosecution until state court
248processes had run their course. 8 However, the Court observed that alle-
gations in the complaint in this case "depict a situation in which defense
of the State's criminal prosecution will not assure adequate vindication
of constitutional rights. 249 Specifically, it was suggested that "substan-
tial loss or impairment of freedoms of expression" violative of appel-
lants' First Amendment rights would occur in the interim between com-
mencement of prosecution by the state and federal review of any adverse
determination.250 When faced with such a claim, due to "the sensitive
nature of constitutionally protected expression," the Court stated "we
have not required that all of those subject to overbroad regulations risk
prosecution to test their rights., 251 To hold otherwise, "free expression -
of transcendent value to all society, and not merely to those exercising
their rights - might be the loser. 252 Indeed, the Court stated it had "con-
sistently allowed attacks on overly broad statutes" without insisting that
the complainant "demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regu-
lated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.25 3 This
exception to the usual rules of standing was developed, in the context of
the First Amendment, to insure against "the existence of a penal statute
susceptible of sweeping and improper application. 254 Such an exception
avoids the spector of "case by case" review of the applicability of an
enactment "tested only by those hardy enough to risk criminal prosecu-
tion" in order to challenge its integrity while free expression hangs in the
balance awaiting "the outcome of protracted litigation. 255
In the instant case, several of the plaintiffs had been arrested by
Louisiana state and local police, had their offices raided and records
seized-all of which was voided by subsequent court rulings. 56 Never-
theless, state officials continued to threaten prosecution, while repeatedly
247. Id. at 482.
248. Id. at 483-85.
249. Id. at 485.
250. Id. at 486.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. (citing Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 97-98; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963);
Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515-17 (1964); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21-
22 (1960)).
254. Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 487 (quoting NAACP, 371 U.S. at 433).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 487-89.
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announcing their belief that the plaintiffs' organization was a "subversive
or Communist-front organization., 257 The consequence was the paralyza-
tion of the plaintiffs' efforts to vindicate minority civil rights.258 As a
result, the Court concluded that the individual plaintiffs' refusals to com-
ply with the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control
Law by not registering as members of a Communist-front organization-
which had given rise to the plaintiffs' criminal indictments-was pro-
tected by the plaintiffs' due process rights inasmuch as what constituted
"a subversive organization" was "unduly vague, uncertain and broad." 25 9
Accordingly, plaintiffs' "failure to register as member[s] of a Commu-
nist-front organization" was not actionable by the State and thus ruled
invalid.2 60 These enactments challenged by the plaintiffs, said the Court,
were "void on their face. 261
Yet another case where the Court entertained an overbreadth chal-
lenge was Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffinan Estates,
Inc.,262 wherein the Court reviewed and upheld a drug paraphernalia or-
dinance. The municipal ordinance in question made it "unlawful for any
person 'to sell any items, effect, paraphernalia, accessory or thing which
is designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs, as defined
by Illinois Revised Statutes, without obtaining a license therefor.'
263
Plaintiff Flipside, in "a pre-enforcement facial challenge," alleged that
the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad as well as vague.26 The
Court began its analysis by stating that "[in a facial challenge to the
overbreadth and vagueness of a law, a court's first task is to determine
whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally
protected conduct. If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must
fail. ' 265 The Court noted that in this context, a facial challenge of a stat-
ute "means a claim that the law is 'invalid in toto - and therefore incapa-
ble of any valid application.'
266
To determine whether the drug paraphernalia ordinance was over-
broad, the Court examined whether the ordinance violated "Flipside's
First Amendment rights or [was] overbroad because it [inhibited] the
,,267hedtathoriFirst Amendment rights of other parties. The Court held that the ordi
nance was not overbroad because it did not infringe on the "noncommer-
257. Id. at 488.
258. Id. at 488-89.
259. Id. at 493-94.
260. Id. at 494-95.
261. Id. at 497.
262. 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
263. Viii. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 492 (citing VILL. OF HOFFMAN ESTATES, ILL., MUN.
CODE § 8-7-16 (1978)).
264. Id. at 491-93.
265. Id. at 494.
266. Id. at 495 n.5 (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,474 (1974)).
267. Id. at 495.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
cial speech of Flipside or other parties" inasmuch as it only regulated and
licensed "the sale of items displayed 'with' or 'within proximity of lit-
erature encouraging illegal use of cannabis or illegal drugs.' ' 268 The
Court ruled that, even assuming commercial speech was implicated by
the ordinance, "it is irrelevant whether the ordinance has an overbroad
scope encompassing protected commercial speech of other persons, be-
cause the overbreadth challenge does not apply to commercial
speech.,269 Thereafter, the Court also rejected Flipside's claim that the
ordinance was overbroad in that it outlawed "innocent" or "lawful" be-
havior and that it was unconstitutionally vague.
In New York v. Ferber,27 2 the United States Supreme Court ex-
pounded at great length on what it described as the "First Amendment
overbreadth doctrine" when it evaluated the troublesome subject of child
pornography. 273 In Ferber, the Court reviewed a New York statute274 that
criminalized "promoting a sexual performance by a child. 275 In this
case, the defendant was a proprietor of a bookstore located in Manhattan,
New York.276 The defendant's bookstore specialized in "sexually orien-
tated products." 277 After the defendant sold to an undercover police offi-
cer two films "depicting young boys masturbating, 2 78 the defendant was
prosecuted and convicted of violating section 263.15 of the New York
Penal Law, which read that "[a] person is guilty of promoting a sexual
performance by a child when, knowing the character and content thereof,
he produces, directs or promotes any performance which includes sexual
conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age., 279 "Sexual perform-
ance" was defined as including any "sexual conduct by a child less than
sixteen years of age., 280 Following the defendant's conviction in the trial
court, the New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction after de-
ciding that section 263.15 was "overbroad because it prohibited the dis-
tribution of materials produced outside the State, as well as materials,
such as medical books and educational sources, which 'deal with adoles-
268. Id. at 496 (quoting VILL. OF HOFFMAN ESTATES, ILL., LICENSE GUIDELINES FOR ITEMS,
EFFECr, PARAPHERNALIA, ACCESSORY OR THING WHICH Is DESIGNED OR MARKETED FOR USE
WITH ILLEGAL CANNABIS OR DRUGS (1978)).
269. Id. at 496-97.
270. Id. at 497 n.9.
271. Id. at 505.
272. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
273. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 768.
274. Id. at 750 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 263.00 to .25 (McKinney 1981)).
275. Id. at 751 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (McKinney 1981)).
276. Id. at 751-52.
277. Id. at 752.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 751 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.15 (McKinney 1981)).
280. Id. (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 263.00(1) (McKinney 1981), and citing N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 263.00(3) (McKinney 1981) (defining "sexual conduct")).
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cent sex in a realistic but nonobscene manner."' 28 1 However, the United
States Supreme Court reversed the New York Court of Appeals decision,
holding that section 263.15 was not overbroad.
After concluding this enactment did not restrict the production and
distribution of material protected by the First Amendment, 282 the Court
turned to a consideration of whether the statute was unconstitutionally
overbroad because it curtailed "the distribution of material with serious
literary, scientific, or educational value or material which [would] not
threaten the harms" the state sought to combat.28 3 While noting that
"[t]he traditional rule is that a person to whom a statute may constitu-
tionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it
may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in situations not
before the Court,"'284 it explicitly ruled that "[w]hat has come to be
known as the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is one of the few
exceptions to this principle. 285 The Court observed that this "doctrine is
predicated on the sensitive nature of protected expression: 'persons
whose expression is constitutionally protected may well refrain from
exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions by a statute suscepti-
ble of application to protected expression.' 28 6 The Court then reiterated
its prior pronouncements on the subject:
The scope of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, like most
exceptions to established principles, must be carefully tied to the cir-
cumstances in which facial invalidation of a statute is truly warranted.
Because of the wide-reaching effects of striking down a statute on its
face at the request of one whose own conduct may be punished de-
spite the First Amendment, we have recognized that the overbreadth
doctrine is "strong medicine" and have employed it with hesitation,
and then "only as a last resort." [This Court has held] that the over-
breadth involved be 'substantial' before the statute involved will be
invalidated on its face.
287
The Court next pointed out that it had previously explained the basis for
this requirement:
[T]he plain import of our cases is ... that facial overbreadth adjudica-
tion is an exception to [the] traditional rules of practice and that its
function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise un-
protected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from
"pure speech" toward conduct and that conduct - even if expressive -
281. Id. at 752-53 (quoting Ferber, 422 N.E.2d at 526).
282. Id. at 765-66.
283. Id. at 766 (emphasis added).
284. Id. at 767.
285. Id. at 768.
286. Id. (citing Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980)).
287. Id. at 769 (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613, 615).
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falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect le-
gitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Although such laws, if
too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown
extent, there comes a point where that effect - at best a prediction -
cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and
so prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that
is admittedly within its power to proscribe.
288
The Court then turned to an explanation as to the reason overbreadth
"must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the
statute's plainly legitimate sweep" where conduct, and not mere speech,
is at issue.289
The requirement of substantial overbreadth is directly derived
from the purpose and nature of the doctrine. While a sweeping stat-
ute, or one incapable of limitation, has the potential to repeatedly chill
the exercise of expressive activity by many individuals, the extent of
deterrence of protected speech can be expected to decrease with the
declining reach of the regulation. This observation appears equally
applicable to the publication of books and films as it is to activities,
such as picketing or participation in election campaigns, which have
previously been categories as involving conduct plus speech....
Indeed, the Court's practice when confronted with ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied against protected conduct
is not to invalidate the law in toto, but rather to reverse the particular
conviction.
... [Tihe fact that a criminal prohibition is involved does not
obviate the need for the inquiry or a priori warrant a finding of sub-
stantial overbreadth.
290
In addition, the Court stated that the nature of the penalty to be imposed
for violating a statute was "relevant in determining whether demonstra-
ble overbreadth [was] substantial. 29'
Applying the above principle to the statute at issue, the Court held
that section 263.15 was "not substantially overbroad" because the statute
could only be impermissibly applied in a "tiny fraction of the materials
within the statute's reach., 292 The Court concluded by stating that "what-
ever overbreadth may exist should be cured through case-by-case analy-
288. Id. at 770 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615).
289. Id. (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615).
290. Id. at 772-73.
291. ld. at 773.
292. Id.
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sis of the fact situations to which its sanctions, assertedly, may not be
applied. 293
B. Facial Vagueness
Although a statute may be found not to be overbroad because it does
not reach constitutionally protected conduct, it may nevertheless be held
to be vague on its "face" or "as applied. 294 As earlier stated, a facial
challenge is a challenge that the law is totally invalid and incapable of
any constitutional application.295 When considering whether a statute is
facially invalid, a court must "consider any limiting construction that a
9296state court or enforcement agency has proffered."
In Young v. American Mini-Theaters,297 the United States Supreme
Court extended the "substantial" deterrent effect requirement, which it
had developed in connection with facial overbreadth claims, to the analy-
sis of whether a statute was facially vague.29 8 The Court indicated that
where a statute's arguable vagueness was "real and substantial," and not
"readily subject to a narrowing construction," a defendant whose own
speech might be unprotected could challenge the statute if "the very exis-
tence of [the] statute[) may cause persons not before the Court to refrain
from engaging in constitutionally protected speech or expression" due to
the "overriding importance of maintaining a free and open market for the
interchange of ideas. 299
Facial vagueness challenges have been approved in two circum-
stances. First, a statute may be challenged on its face when it has the
capacity "to chill constitutionally protected conduct, especially conduct
protected by the First Amendment. ' '300 Thus, the Tenth Circuit has con-
cluded:
[A court will] allow a person who is prosecuted for conduct which the
state may constitutionally forbid to challenge the statute as vague on
its face, rather than restricting him to challenging it as applied to his
conduct, because those who will refrain from speech will never have
a chance to make their claims in court. In this way the claims of those
293. Id. at 773-74 (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-16).
294. Dixon, 998 P.2d at 547; Viii. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497.
295. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n.5; Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 474
(1974).
296. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495 n.5 (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 110 (1972)).
297. 427 U.S. 50(1976).
298. Young, 427 U.S. at 59-60 (citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611-12, 615).
299. Id. at 60 (citing Erznozik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205,216 (1975)).
300. United States v. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U.S. 379, 390-91, 394, 396 (1979); Lauzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939)).
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who would be silenced are heard. Vagueness and overbreadth chal-
lenges are similar in this respect.
301
Second, pre-enforcement challenges are also appropriate where the chal-
lenger attacks the statute as "vague in all its applications," which neces-
sarily means that the statute is void on its face.
302
The 1971 case of Coates v. City of Cincinnati30 3 offers an illustra-
tion of the Court's willingness to find a statute vague on its face, contrary
to due process, and violative of the First Amendment. In Coates, several
defendants had been convicted under a Cincinnati ordinance which made
it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble, except at a public meet-
ing of citizens, on any of the sidewalks, .... and there conduct themselves
in a manner annoying to persons passing by, or occupants of adjacent
buildings. ' 3° In its consideration of the defendants' appeal, the Court
concluded that the ordinance was vague, not in the sense that it required
compliance with an "imprecise but comprehensible normative standard,
but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all."305
An examination of this statute suggested its enforcement could entirely
turn on "whether or not a policeman [was] annoyed" by a particular
assembly. 3°6 Furthermore, the Court observed more than due process
vagueness was involved in that the ordinance was at odds with First
Amendment rights of free assembly and association.30 7 The Court de-
clared that the First and Fourteenth Amendments could not be dependent
on whether a particular assembly was annoying to "some people. 308 This
ordinance provided a recipe for discriminatory enforcement against as-
semblages of groups whose "ideas ... lifestyle, or ... physical appear-
ance" engender resentment by "the majority of their fellow citizens."
3°9
In this case, where the Court ultimately reversed defendants' conviction
on vagueness grounds, it was obvious to the Court that this ordinance
had the capacity to limit the exercise of First Amendment freedoms, and
at the same time, result in quasi-criminal sanctions.310 Moreover, while
not explicitly discussed in the opinion, an additional problem with this
ordinance was that a conviction could be predicated on the conduct of the
group without regard to any mens rea.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 360-61.
303. 402 U.S. 611,614-15 (1971).






309. Id. at 616.
310. Id. at 614-16.
[Vol. 80:2
20021 VAGUENESS, AMBIGUITY, AND OTHER UNCERTAINTY 277
The case of Colautti v. Franklin311 provides another example of a
statute that was determined to be void on its face. In this case, the Court
reviewed the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act, which contained a sec-
tion that required persons, including physicians, to exercise the same
standard of care to preserve a fetus' life and health as would be required
in the case of a fetus intended to be born alive if the fetus was "viable" or
if there was "sufficient reason to believe that the fetus may be viable."
312
Inasmuch as the "may be viable" language set out either a subjective or
mixed subjective and objective standard test for viability, the Court ruled
in this pre-enforcement action brought by a group of physicians that a
person of ordinary intelligence would not have fair notice of its scope.
313
In addition, the required "standard of care" provision was deemed
equally vague.314 The Court's concern regarding the language in question
was aggravated by the fact that the measure included criminal penalties,
contained no scienter, and carried the potential of inhibiting the exercise
of constitutionally protected rights.315
Notwithstanding Coates and Coluatti, it should be recognized that
claims of facial vagueness that prove successful are the exception rather
than the rule. The difficulties inherent in advancing a facial challenge are
illustrated in the following two cases. In United States v. Gaudreau,
316
the defendants were prosecuted under the Colorado commercial bribery
statute, which was used as a component of a federal RICO indictment." 7
The state commercial bribery statute was challenged as vague on the
ground that its prohibition of a "knowing violation of a duty of fidelity"
to a corporation by an officer of the corporation was vague.31 8 The fed-
eral district court agreed and dismissed the RICO counts of the indict-
ment as both facially vague and vague as applied.319 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed.320 Here, the Tenth Cir-
cuit, in rejecting the facial vagueness claim, stated that the Colorado
statute did not threaten to chill constitutionally protected conduct and,
inasmuch as it had been applied to the defendants, it would be necessary
to conduct an examination of the statute as applied for vagueness, in
light of the conduct for which the defendants had been charged.32 ' After
consulting various treatises, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the defen-
dants had fair notice of the meaning of the language they had challenged
311. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
312. Coulautti, 439 U.S. at 380-81 n.1 (quoting PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 6605(a) (West 1977)).
313. Id. at 388-97.
314. Id. at 397.
315. Id. at 391, 394-96.
316. 860 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1988).
317. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d at 359.
318. Id. at 358 (quoting CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5-401(1)(a), (d) (1986)).
319. Id. at 358-59.
320. Id. at 358.
321. Id. at 361.
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and that the statute did not lend itself to arbitrary enforcement stan-
dards.322
Another case where a facial vagueness claim failed was Village of
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc.,323 part of which was
324discussed in the previous section. In that case, which reflects both an
in-depth discussion of facial overbreadth and facial vagueness, the
United States Supreme Court pointed out that in cases involving a facial
challenge to the overbreadth and vagueness of a statute, the reviewing
court must initially ascertain if the statute is overbroad by examining
whether the statute touches "a substantial amount of constitutionally pro-
tected conduct." 325 If the statute fails to do so, the reviewing court should
then proceed to the facial vagueness challenge and, if it finds the statute
does not cover constitutionally protected conduct, it must "uphold the
challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of its appli-
,,326cations.
The Court explained that a complainant who commits some acts that
are "clearly proscribed" in the enactment "cannot complain of the vague-
ness of the law as applied to the conduct of others. 327 In other words, a
reviewing court should "examine the complainant's conduct before ana-
lyzing other hypothetical applications of the law., 328 Also, when evaluat-
ing any facial challenge, the Court in Flipside noted a reviewing court
must consider any "limiting construction" that a lower court or enforce-
ment agency has provided.329 Moreover, when the reviewing court ap-
plies the tests of whether the statute under consideration (1) provides the
citizenry with fair warning of what it prohibits and (2) contains explicit
standards that avoid arbitrary and discriminatory application, the court
should not insist that these "standards ... be applied mechanically.
330
Rather, the "degree of vagueness that the Constitution tolerates - as well
as the relative importance of fair notice and fair enforcement - depends
in part on the nature of the enactment., 331 A greater tolerance has been
expressed with "civil rather than criminal penalties because the conse-
quences of imprecision are qualitatively less severe. 332 If the stricture
requires government proof of scienter, this mental state requirement
322. Id. at 362-64.
323. 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
324. See supra notes 262-71 and accompanying text.
325. Viii. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494.
326. Id. at 494-95.
327. Id. at 495.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 495 n.5.
330. Id. at 498.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 498-99.
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"may mitigate a law's vagueness." 333 The most important factor, how-
ever, "affecting the clarity that the Constitution demands of a law is
whether it threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights. If, for example, the law interferes with the right of free speech or
of association, a more stringent vagueness test should apply."
334
Following the Court's rejection of the complainant's pre-
enforcement overbreadth challenge,335 the Court subjected the drug para-
phernalia ordinance to a vagueness analysis.336 The Court determined
that the ordinance simply regulated the complainant's "business behav-
ior" and observed that it required proof of scienter with respect to the
alternative "marketed for use" standard. 337 Also, this ordinance carried a
nominal civil sanction.338 Although the Village conceded that the ordi-
nance was "'quasi-criminal,' and its prohibitory and stigmatizing effect
[would consequently] warrant a relatively strict test, ' 339 the Court con-
cluded that this facial vagueness challenge could not succeed inasmuch
as whatever analysis might be used to examine "either a quasi-criminal
or a criminal law, the ordinance [was] sufficiently clear as applied to
Flipside.,
340
First, Flipside's suggestion that the language outlawing distribution
of paraphernalia "designed for use" or "marketed for use" with cannabis
or drugs could not withstand a facial challenge, which implied that the
statute was vague in all its applications, was contradicted by the facts
that the language covered "at least some of the items that Flipside sold"
and Flipside's co-operator admitted that the business sold items "princi-
pally used for illegal purposes. ' 341 And second, the scienter requirement
belied the notion that one might be entangled innocently in the web of
the enactment.342 Thus, one could not seriously assert that this measure
offered this complainant insufficient "fair warning" as to its reach.343
Additionally, regarding the arbitrary and discriminatory application
claim, the absence of such evidence at this juncture militated the conclu-
sion that this concern be best addressed when any such problem actually
arise. 34
333. Id. at 499.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 496-97; see supra notes 262-71 and accompanying text.
336. Viii. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497-501.
337. Id. at 499.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 500.
341. See id. at 500, 502.
342. See id. at 502.
343. See id. at 498, 502.
344. Id. at 503-04.
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Gaudreau and Flipside together reflect the substantial barriers that
sit in the path of a facial vagueness challenge. First, if the enactment
does not somehow have the potential for intrusion into constitutionally
protected terrain, as turned out to be the case with Gaudreau, then the
claim comes to an abrupt halt.345 Second, even when the defendant's
assertion proceeds beyond the first obstacle just mentioned, if the com-
plainant is unable to convince the reviewing court that the statute is
vague "in all its applications," as occurred in Flipside, it fails. 346 As one
court stated, "facial vagueness review is not common because ordinary
concerns of judicial restraint do not permit a party whose particular con-
duct is adequately described by a criminal statute 'to attack [the statute]
because the language would not give similar fair warning with respect to
other conduct which might be within its broad and literal ambit."'
3T
C. Vagueness As Applied
A defendant may bring an "as applied" vagueness challenge on the
grounds that a statute failed to clearly define the criminally proscribed
conduct with which he has been charged.348 Unlike a facial challenge,
which allows an attack on the entire enactment, an "as applied" challenge
focuses only on whether the statute was inappropriately applied to the
complainant's conduct., 349 In an "as applied" challenge, the court exam-
ines the statute in light of the facts of the case at bar.350 In other words,
an "as applied" vagueness challenge must be decided on its own facts.35'
"In scrutinizing a statute for intolerable vagueness as applied to spe-
cific conduct," a reviewing court must interpret it consistently with any
judicial construction preferred by the jurisdiction's highest court.352 The
question, therefore, is whether the challenged statute, as well as judicial
345. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d at 360.
346. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 497.
347. Schwartzmiller, 752 F.2d at 1346 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974)).
348. See id. at 1348-49 (holding Idaho statute outlawing "lewd and lascivious" acts on a child
was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant where defendant's conduct involved anal
intercourse with a child and masturbation with a child).
349. See id. at 1348 (holding Idaho statute prohibiting "lewd and lascivious" acts on a child did
not impinge on or chill any constitutionally protected conduct, so that defendant convicted of this
offense could not attack statute "on its face, but only as applied to his conduct"); see also Holland v.
Tacoma, 954 P.2d 290, 293-96 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (holding complainant's action barring
enforcement of ordinance, which limited volume of sound projected from car sound system,
involved conduct not associated with First Amendment expression and, as such, ordinance was not
vulnerable to a facial challenge; furthermore, ordinance had "clear guidelines," in that a person of
ordinary intelligence would know what it means for sound to be "audible" at more than 50 feet away
and, therefore, was not vague as applied).
350. Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 467 (1991) (holding what constitutes a "mixture
or substance" containing LSD as proscribed in federal narcotics offense was not vague).
351. Johnson v. Athens-Clarke County, 529 S.E.2d 613, 615-16 (Ga. 2000) (holding municipal
"loitering or prowling" ordinance vague as applied).
352. Schwartzmiller, 752 F.2d at 1348.
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interpretations thereof, "provided sufficient notice, under the circum-
stances of [the particular] case, [such] that a person in [the defendant's]
situation would know whether his conduct was criminal. 353 Thus, even
if the statute could be considered vague "as applied" to some activity, if
the defendant's conduct in the case at bar was clearly within the limits of
the statute, that defendant cannot sustain an "as applied" vagueness chal-
lenge.354
For example, in the case of Davis v. State,355 the Indiana Court of
Appeals considered an "as applied" challenge to a statute that prohibited
neglect of a dependent.356 The defendants were convicted of violating
this child neglect statute by abandoning their child, who was only a few
hours old, by the side of a gravel road in rural Indiana.357 The defendants
challenged the "places the dependent in a situation that may endanger his
life or limb" language, stating that the statute failed to explicitly inform
the public and law enforcement officers of the specific conduct that was
prohibited.358 They argued that the statute was so broad that it could be
said parents who allow their child to "engage in interscholastic and con-
tact sports 'may endanger' the child's life or health. 359
In reviewing the statute, the appellate court stated that it was "well
established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve
First Amendment freedoms must be examined in light of the facts of the
case at hand.,,360 The court noted that in a vagueness "as applied" chal-
lenge, defendants are not permitted to devise a hypothetical situation
which would demonstrate vagueness. 36' Rather, the court emphasized
that the question to be analyzed in a vagueness challenge is "whether an
individual of ordinary intelligence would reasonably understand that his
contemplated conduct is proscribed., 362 Here, the court held that "[n]o
reasonable person of ordinary intelligence" would have difficulty
determining that abandoning a child that is only a few hours old along
the side of a gravel road constituted a violation of a statute that
prohibited the "neglect" of a dependent.363
353. Johnson, 529 S.E.2d at 615.
354. See Davis v. State, 476 N.E.2d 127, 130-31 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
355. 476 N.E.2d 127.
356. Id. at 130 n.1 ("A person having the care, custody, or control of a dependent who
knowingly or intentionally: (1) places the dependent in a situation that may endanger his life or
health; (2) abandons or cruelly confines the dependent; (3) deprives the dependent of necessary
support; or (4) deprives the dependent of education as required by law; commits neglect of a




360. Id. (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)).
361. Id. at 130-31.
362. Id. at 131 (emphasis added) (citing Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 553).
363. Id. at 130-31.
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Where an individual engages in conduct without any reasonable re-
alization that it falls within the reach of a legal prohibition, that person
may succeed with an as applied challenge.364 In Shuttlesworth v. City of
Birmingham,365 the United States Supreme Court reviewed the convic-
tion of a defendant who had been found guilty of violating (1) a munici-
pal ordinance which made it an offense for any person who (a) was
blocking free passage on a sidewalk, or (b) was standing or loitering on a
sidewalk, to fail to heed a police request to move on;366 and (2) another
ordinance that made it an offense for any person to refuse or fail to com-
ply with a police order.367 According to the prosecution, the defendant
was observed by a police officer on a sidewalk with ten or twelve com-
panions outside a department store, whereupon the officer approached
the group and told them to clear the sidewalk.368 "After some, but not all,
of the group" dispersed, the defendant asked the officer, "You mean to
say we can't stand here on the sidewalk? ' 369 After repeating the request,
during which time everyone but the defendant began walking off, the
officer arrested defendant.37°
In its review, the Court noted that the first ordinance the defendant
had allegedly violated actually contained two strictures: one prohibiting
obstructing free passage on a sidewalk and another prohibiting standing
or loitering on a sidewalk.37t The Court found that the Alabama Court of
Appeals had given this ordinance a limiting construction in a separate
unrelated case, to-wit, that the second stricture only restricted standing or
loitering that obstructed free passage, but that such construction had been
provided only after the defendant had been charged and convicted under
the ordinance.3 72 Given the Alabama appellate court construction, while
also considering the fact that the Alabama trial judge did not have the
benefit of this judicial narrowing of the statute while deciding the defen-
dant's fate, the Court ruled, "As so construed, we cannot say that the
364. See, e.g., Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 544-46 (1971) (explaining municipal
"suspicious person" ordinance vague as applied).
365. 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
366. Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 88 ("It shall be unlawful for any person or any number of
persons to so stand, loiter or walk upon any street or sidewalk in the city as to obstruct free passage
over, on or along said street or sidewalk. It shall also be unlawful for any person to stand or loiter
upon any street or sidewalk of the city after having been requested by any police officer to move
on." (quoting BIRMtNGtAM, ALA., GENERAL Cry CODE § 1142 (1944))).
367. Id. ("It shall be unlawful for any person to refuse or fail to comply with any lawful order,
signal or direction of a police officer." (quoting BIRMINGHAM, ALA., GENERAL CITY CODE § 1231
(1944))).
368. Id. at 89.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 90 (citing BIRMINGHAM, ALA., GENERAL CrrY CODE § 1142 (1944)).
372. Id. at 91-92 (citing Middlebrooks v. City of Birmingham, 170 So. 2d 424, 426 (Ala. App.
Ct. 1964)).
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ordinance is unconstitutional, though it requires no great feat of imagina-
tion to envisage situations in which such an ordinance might be unconsti-
tutionally applied. 373 Further, because the Court was "unable to say that
the Alabama courts in this case did not judge the petitioner by an uncon-
stitutional construction," the Court decided it had no choice but to re-
verse defendant's conviction on the first ordinance charge.374
As to the second count of the complaint, the Court noted that the
underlying ordinance on its face simply made it illegal "to refuse or fail
to comply with any lawful order, signal or direction of a police offi-
cer." 375 Standing alone, said the Court, "the literal terms of this ordinance
-,0376are so broad as to evoke constitutional doubts of the utmost gravity.
Nevertheless, like the first ordinance, it too had been given a limiting
instruction, namely, the refusal had to be in conjunction with a police
order directing vehicular traffic.3 77 As such, it became clear that the or-
dinance could not be applied to the defendant.378 The arresting officer
was not directing traffic when he asked the defendant to move on, and
the defendant was a pedestrian, "not in, on, or around any vehicle at the
time he was directed to move on or at the time he was arrested." 
3 79
In Watts v. United States, 380 the Court ruled that although a federal
statute that made "criminal a form of pure speech" was constitutional on
its face, it was not applicable to a defendant who had been convicted for
a violation of the statute.381 In this case, the defendant had been charged
with the felony offense of "knowingly and willfully . . . [making] any
threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of
the United States." 382 At a public rally on the grounds of the Washington
Monument, the defendant mentioned to several individuals present that
he was eligible to be drafted into the military and that he had received his
notice to report for his physical examination the following Monday
383 Tedfmorning. The defendant then added, "I am not going. If they ever
make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.,"
referring to then President Lyndon Johnson. 84 At trial, the defendant's
counsel moved for judgment of acquittal, while insisting the defendant's
373. Id. at 91.
374. Id. at 92.
375. Id. at 93 (quoting BIRMINGHAM, ALA., GENERAL CrrY CODE § 1231 (1944)).
376. Id.
377. Id. (citing Phifer v. City of Birmingham, 160 So. 2d 898, 901 (Ala. Ct. App. 1963)).
378. Id. at 93-94.
379. Id. at 95.
380. 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam).
381. Watts, 394 U.S. at 707, 708. It is not clear if the Court was examining the statute against a
vagueness claim. See id. at 712 (Fortas, J., dissenting) ("The Court holds ... that this statute is
constitutional and that it is here wrongly applied.").
382. Id. at 706 (alteration in original) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1948)).
383. Id. at 705-06.
384. Id. at 706.
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comments did not amount to a threat to the life of the President.385 In its
review of the defendant's conviction, the Court first examined the statute
itself. The Court stated that this statute was "[c]ertainly" constitutional,
given the nation's "overwhelming interest in protecting the safety of its
Chief Executive and in allowing him to perform his duties without inter-
ference from threats of physical violence," but nevertheless it had to "be
interpreted with the commands of the First Amendment clearly in
mind. 3 86 In the opinion of the Court, this statute could only apply to
speech if the government proved the existence of a "true 'threat. ' ' 3" 7 The
Court did "not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by
petitioner fit within that statutory term. '388 Given the "expressly condi-
tional nature of the statement," this law could not reasonably be deemed
applicable to the defendant's utterance.389
IV. APPROACHES DESIGNED TO PROVIDE NOTICE AND ENFORCEMENT
STANDARDS
There exist mechanisms that may assure the citizenry has adequate
notice of what a criminal prohibition outlaws. These will be explored at
this juncture.
A. Listing Prohibited Items and Conduct
One way to ensure that citizens are provided adequate notice of
what is proscribed by a particular statute is to provide a list of what items
or activities are prohibited. 390 This approach is typically followed in in-
stances where a statute proscribes items that may have the potential for
both legitimate and illegitimate uses. One example of the use of the list-
ing approach is the Illinois Drug Paraphernalia Control Act.3 91 The Act
defines "drug paraphernalia" as follows:
"Drug paraphernalia" means all equipment, products and materials of
any kind which are peculiar to and marketed for use in planting,
385. Id. at 706-07.
386. Id. at 707.
387. Id. at 708.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. See, e.g., United States v. Kairouz, 751 F.2d 467, 468 (1st Cir. 1985) (where defendant
claimed he did not realize he possessed heroin because he thought it was cocaine, court responded
"both cocaine and heroin are controlled substances within the meaning of schedules I and 11 of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) sched. I
(b)(10) (listing heroin as a controlled substance)." (emphasis added)). This is not suggesting the
failure to list proscribed items or conduct invariably leads to a finding of vagueness. See, e.g., Ward
v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 781 (1977) (rejecting claim that Illinois obscenity statute is necessarily
vague because it failed to include "exhaustive list" of type of sexual acts that are outlawed by the
act).
391. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 600/1-f7 (2002).
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propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, com-
pounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, ana-
lyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, concealing, in-
jecting, ingesting, inhaling or otherwise introducing into the human
body cannabis or a controlled substance in violation of the "Cannabis
Control Act" or the "Illinois Controlled Substances Act" .... It in-
cludes, but is not limited to:
(1) Kits peculiar to and marketed for use in manufacturing, com-
pounding, converting, producing, processing or preparing cannabis or
a controlled substance;
(2) Isomerization devices peculiar to and marketed for use in increas-
ing the potency of any species of plant which is cannabis or a con-
trolled substance;
(3) Testing equipment peculiar to and marketed for private home use
in identifying or in analyzing the strength, effectiveness or purity of
cannabis or controlled substances;
(4) Diluents and adulterants peculiar to and marketed for cutting can-
nabis or a controlled substance by private persons;
(5) Objects peculiar to and marketed for use in ingesting, inhaling, or
otherwise introducing cannabis, cocaine, hashish, or hashish oil into
the human body including, where applicable, the following items:
(A) water pipes;
(B) carburetion tubes and devices;
(C) smoking and carburetion masks;






(J) ice pipes or chillers;
(6) Any item whose purpose, as announced or described by the seller,
is for use in violation of this Act.
392
392. Id. at 600/2(d).
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Following the enactment of the Illinois Drug Paraphernalia statute,
it was challenged as unconstitutionally vague in the case of Adams Apple
Distributing Co. v. Zagel.393 In Adams Apple, the Illinois Appellate Court
found that the enactment, which fully defined what constituted drug
paraphernalia "in six ways and specifically list[ed] 10 items that [had]
been determined to constitute drug paraphernalia," provided adequate
notice to those subject to the law and, as such, was not unconstitutionally
vague.
394
An example of legislation that has relied on the "listing" of activity
to avoid a vagueness attack is child pornography. New York v. Ferber,
395
discussed at length above,396 relied in part on this approach in upholding
New York's child pornography prohibition. 397 Inasmuch as any legisla-
tion outlawing distribution of visual materials, including portrayals of
children engaged in sexual activity, would have to withstand a First
Amendment challenge, it was necessary that such legislation be written
in a manner that clearly delineated that activity which was proscribed.
Realizing that a depiction, for example, of a baby in his or her birthday
suit could never be sanctioned, the New York legislature described in
precise, if not graphic, detail what was contemplated: a "sexual perform-
ance" involving a child below the age of 16 engaged in "sexual conduct,"
with the latter being defined as "actual or simulated sexual intercourse,
deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-
masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the genitals. 398 In analyzing the
legislation, the Court commented that "[t]he forbidden acts to be de-
picted are listed with sufficient precision" that one could not seriously
assert lack of notice of what activity involving children was included. 399
B. Inclusion of Mens Rea
Sometimes a statute, which may otherwise be void-for-vagueness,
may survive a vagueness challenge because of the statute's inclusion of a
mens rea element.4°° For example, in the earlier mentioned case of
393. 501 N.E.2d 302,304 (111. App. Ct. 1986).
394. Adams Apple, 501 N.E.2d at 305 (emphasis added) (referring to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56
1/2, para. 2102 (1985), subsequently codified at 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 600/2 (2002)). It should be
noted that in People v. Monroe the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that while the definition section of
the statute which specified what constituted "drug paraphernalia" was satisfactory, the "penalty"
section that permitted a conviction where a person had no actual knowledge that that which he was
selling was drug paraphernalia was unconstitutional in that it lacked a necessary scienter. People v.
Monroe, 515 N.E.2d 42, 43-45 (III. 1987).
395. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
396. See supra notes 272-93 and accompanying text.
397. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765.
398. Id. at 750 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 263.00(1), 263.00(3) (McKinney 1980)).
399. Id. at 765 (emphasis added).
400. See, e.g., Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 502
(1982) (upholding municipal drug paraphernalia ordinance); United States v. Nat'l Dairy Prods.
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United States v. Gaudreau,401 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit considered the validity of a Colorado commercial bribery
statute when used as a component of a federal prosecution under the
Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).40 2 The Col-
Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 34-35 (1963) (holding federal Robinson-Patman Act making it a crime to sell
goods at "unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying or eliminating competition" was not
vague; element of "predatory intent" required by Act "provides further definition of the prohibited
conduct"); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 (1952) (holding federal
regulation requiring truckers to avoid "congested thoroughfares" and the like when transporting
explosive substances was not vague, because "statute punishes only those who knowingly violate the
Regulation"); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 103-04 (1945) (plurality opinion) (holding
federal law which prohibits, under color of law, the "willful" deprivation of a citizen's federal
constitutional or other legal rights was not vague given construction that the word "willful" means
government must establish accused had the specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right);
Hygrade Provision Co., Inc. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502 (1925) (holding that a "specific intent to
defraud," saved an otherwise vague statute which outlawed sale of meat falsely represented to be
"kosher"); United States v. Collins, 272 F.3d 984, 989 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding, because of scienter
requirement in federal controlled substances legislation, the defendant "bears an especially heavy
burden in raising his vagueness challenge" (quoting United States v. Cherry, 938 F.2d 748, 754 (7th
Cir. 1991))); United States v. Biro, 143 F.3d 1421, 1428 (1 th Cir. 1998) (holding "[w]e are
persuaded that an ordinary person would understand" a federal statute prohibiting a person from
"selling a device to a customer designed by the manufacturer primarily for the purpose of the
surreptitious interception of communications," where the statute explicitly requires proof that
accused sent or sold such a device "knowing or having reason to know that the design of such device
renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic
communication"); Poole v. Wood, 45 F.3d 246, 249 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding Minnesota statutes
proscribing sexual contact or sexual penetration accomplished by means of a false representation
was not vague, because statutes required element of false representation and sexual contact is
defined as being "committed with sexual or aggressive intent"), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1134 (1995);
Comm. in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador v. FBI, 770 F.2d 468, 476 (5th Cir. 1985)
(holding statute which made it a crime to coerce, threaten, intimidate, harass, or obstruct certain
foreign officials or their guests was not vague because all proscribed acts had to be carried out
"willfully"); Murphy v. Matheson, 742 F.2d 564, 573-74 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding Utah drug
paraphernalia law that required proof of vendors' intent to market an item they know to be drug
paraphernalia not vague); M.S. News Co. v. Casado, 721 F.2d 1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding
Wichita ordinance outlawing promotion of sexually orientated materials to minors was not vague
where distributor must know the content of the material and its nature and character); United States
v. Salazar, 720 F.2d 1482, 1485-86 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding federal offense of acquisition and
unlawful possession of food stamps was not vague where statute requires proof of scienter), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1110 (1983); Levas & Levas v. Antioch, 684 F.2d 446, 452-54 (7th Cir. 1982)
(holding municipal drug paraphernalia ordinance was not vague in view of "intent requirement");
City of Chicago v. Powell, 735 N.E.2d 119, 130 (11. App. Ct. 2000) (holding municipal ordinance
outlawing "soliciting unlawful business" was not vague where ordinance required proof of
purposeful solicitation); Byrum v. Texas, 762 S.W.2d 685, 688 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (holding Texas
crime of public lewdness by sexual contact was not vague because law requires "a specific culpable
mental state, a factor which tends to defeat a vagueness challenge"); cf Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379, 390 (1979) (holding Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act which required physician's
preservation of life of fetus where fetus "may be viable" was vague because it subjected physician to
criminal liability without regard to fault; the ambiguous viability-determination requirement "is
aggravated by the absence of a scienter requirement").
401. 860 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1988); see supra notes 317-322 and accompanying text.
402. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d at 358 ("A person commits a class 6 felony if he solicits, accepts, or
agrees to accept any benefit as consideration for knowingly violating or agreeing to violate a duty of
fidelity to which he is subject as: (a) Agent or employee; or ... (d) Officer ... of an incorporated
association." (quoting COLO. REV. STAT § 18-5-401 (1)(a), (d) (1986))).
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rado statute at issue prohibited soliciting or accepting money "as consid-
eration for knowingly violating or agreeing to violate a duty of fidel-
ity.''4°3 In this case, the defendants were indicted for violation of RICO,
which was based in part on violation of the Colorado statute for agreeing
to accept money in exchange for awarding Public Service Company of
Colorado contracts to certain suppliers. 4°4 The defendants were charged
with conspiracy to violate the statute by enticing a public service execu-
tive named Oscar Lee to violate his duty of fidelity to the public service
corporation.4°5 The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on the
grounds that the Colorado statute was unconstitutionally vague in regards
to what constituted a breach of a "duty of fidelity."4°6 The defendants
argued that "the statute did not give them fair notice that their conduct
was prohibited because they could have discovered that Mr. Lee's duty
of loyalty forbade him from taking bribes only by consulting cases, other
statutes and treatises. The defendants also argued that "while the stat-
ute may give notice to an ordinary lawyer, it does not give notice to an
ordinary layman. ' °8 The federal district court had held that the chal-
lenged sections of the Colorado commercial bribery statute were void for
vagueness, both facially and as applied in this case and, therefore, dis-
missed the indictments under this statute.4 9 The government then ap-
pealed to the Tenth Circuit, which addressed the issues of whether the
statute was both facially vague and vague as applied in this case.410 The
Tenth Circuit quickly dismissed the facial vagueness challenge as inap-
propriate. 41 1 The court noted that there are only two instances when a
facial vagueness challenge is permissible.412 The first occurs where an
enactment "threatens to chill constitutionally protected conduct," and the
second arises when the statute is being challenged in a declaratory judg-
ment action requesting pre-enforcement review.413 Neither of these situa-
tions were applicable in this instance.414 The court then turned to the
vagueness as applied challenge to the statute.415 The court determined
that the statute provided adequate notice to those who were subject to the
statute because the statute had a "scienter requirement. ' 416 The court




407. Id. at 362.
408. Id.
409. Id. at 359.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 361.
412. Id. at 360.
413. Id. at 360-61.
414. Id. at 361.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 363.
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noted that the statute prohibited "knowingly violating or agreeing to vio-
late a duty of fidelity., 417 The court held that the "type of scienter which
the prosecution must prove [was] precisely the type that overcomes the
objection that the Colorado statute may punish without fair warning to
the accused., 418 The court interpreted the statute to require that "the
prosecution . . . prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant]
knew his duty of fidelity and knew he was violating it."'419 Because the
defendant must have actually known of the duty of fidelity that he was
inducing another to violate, the court held that the statute provided ade-
quate notice of what was proscribed and, therefore, the statute was not
void for vagueness.4 z°
In People v. Monroe,42' the absence of a satisfactory mens rea ele-
ment spelled doom for a state drug paraphernalia prohibition.422 In this
case, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the Illinois drug paraphernalia
law contained two distinct sections: a "definition" provision and a "pen-
423alty" provision. The definitional language, which appears in the previ-
424ous section of this paper n, specified that "drug paraphernalia" meant
any devices or materials which are "peculiar to and marketed for use" in
connection with illicit drug activity.425 Meanwhile, the penalty language
prohibited commercial sale of such items where a vendor "knows, or
under all of the circumstances reasonably should have known" he was
marketing drug paraphernalia.426 The court observed that the language in
the definitional section was very similar to that contained in the munici-
pal drug paraphernalia ordinance that was approved by the United States
Supreme Court in Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Es-
42742tates, Inc., discussed earlier.428 In Flipside, the Court had ruled the
"designed or marketed for use with illegal cannabis or drugs" language
in the Hoffman Estates ordinance encompassed a scienter requirement
inasmuch as "a retailer could scarcely 'market' items 'for' a particular
use without intending that use., 429 The Illinois Supreme Court pointed
out that the Flipside decision relied heavily on the principle that scienter
417. Id. (emphasis added) (citing CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5-401(1) (1986)).
418. Id. at 363.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. 515 N.E.2d42 (IIl. 1987).
422. See Monroe, 515 N.E.2d at 42.
423. Id. at 43.
424. See supra note 394 and accompanying text.
425. Monroe, 515 N.E.2d at 43 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 2102 (1985),
subsequently codified as 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 600/2 (2002)).
426. Id. (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 56 1/2, para. 2103, subsequently codified as 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 600/3 (2002)).
427. 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
428. See supra notes 262-71, 323-44 and accompanying text.
429. Monroe, 515 N.E.2d at 43-44 (quoting Viii. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 502).
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may "mitigate a law's vagueness. ' '430 Although the definitional section of
the Illinois statute posed no problem in the mind of the Illinois Court, it
was troubled by the language in the penalty section that would base a
conviction on the fact that a vendor "reasonably should have known" he
was dealing in drug paraphernalia. 43' This meant a conviction would rest
on "constructive knowledge" rather than actual knowledge, a proposi-
tion, the court concluded, which forced it to rule the penalty section un-
constitutionally vague for failing to confer "fair notice., 432 Monroe, then,
illustrates how lack of scienter may trigger a finding of vagueness.
New York v. Ferber,433 discussed earlier,434 is an illustration of the
United States Supreme Court's apparent insistence that a law that carries
the potential of somehow limiting First Amendment protections must
contain a criminal mens rea.435 In that case, the Court commented in its
review of the state child pornography stricture, "[a]s with obscenity laws,
criminal responsibility [for child pornography] may not be imposed
without some element of scienter on the part of the defendant. 436 After
noting that the statute at issue "expressly includes a scienter require-
ment," the Court ruled that the proscription passed constitutional mus-
ter.437
It must be understood that a penal enactment that does include a
mens rea element will not necessarily survive a vagueness challenge. In
Kramer v. Price,438 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit entertained a vagueness challenge to a Texas harassment statute.439
This legal dispute arose out of the defendant's mailing of a postcard to a
man with whom she previously lived, who had later married another
woman and subsequently become the father of the latter woman's
child.440 The post card read, "Baby Problem Solved," followed by an
advertisement regarding a child burial vault.441 Following the defendant's
prosecution and conviction for violation of the state harassment law, the
Fifth Circuit in a habeas corpus challenge considered the Texas statute,
430. Id. at 44 (quoting Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499).
431. Id. at 44-45.
432. Id. at 45.
433. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
434. See supra notes 272-93, 395-99 and accompanying text.
435. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764-65.
436. /d. at 765.
437. Id.
438. 712 F. 2d 174 (5th Cir. 1983), aff'don other grounds on reh'g, 723 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir.
1984) (en banc).
439. Kramer, 712 F.2d at 176 ("A person commits an offense if he intentionally
communicates by telephone or in writing in vulgar, profane, obscene, or indecent language or in a
coarse and offensive manner and by this action intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly annoys or
alarms the recipient." (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07 (Vernon 1983))).
440. Id. at 175.
441. Id.
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which made it illegal to "annoy" or "alarm" another by some written or
telephone communication, terms which the defendant claimed were
vague. 42 The State of Texas argued that the statute's requirement of in-
tent defused the vagueness assertion. 443 The Fifth Circuit first noted that
the Texas courts had never made an "attempt to construe the terms 'an-
noy' and 'alarm' in a manner which lessens their inherent vagueness.
' 4 4
Further, the Texas courts had "refused to construe the statute to indicate
whose sensibilities must be offended." 4 5 Thus, even though the statute
mandated proof of intentional annoyance or alarm, it was not clear what
"underlying conduct" was proscribed by these two words and, as such,
the statute was deemed vague.
446
V. SOURCES OF NOTICE AND ENFORCEMENT STANDARDS
As discussed above, vagueness can arise in two situations: (1) un-
certainty as to whom a statute applies and (2) uncertainty as to what con-
duct the statute proscribes, that is, whether the statute provides an ascer-
tainable standard of guilt. A reviewing court will ordinarily resort to
every reasonable construction in order to declare the statute constitu-
tional and defeat the vagueness challenge." 7 As the United States Su-
preme Court stated in Winters v. New York:
448
This Court goes far to uphold state statutes [and federal statutes] that
deal with offenses, difficult to define, when they are not entwined
with limitations on free expression .... Only a definite conviction by
a majority of this Court that the conviction violates the Fourteenth
Amendment justifies reversal of the court primarily charged with re-
sponsibility to protect persons from conviction under a vague state
statute.
449
In contrast, if a statute is ambiguous, the court will normally apply the
rule of strict construction, giving the defendant the benefit of the doubt,
to ascertain the meaning of questionable statutory language. 450 However,
442. Id. at 176.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 178.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 177-78 (emphasis added).
447. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 517-18 (1948).
448. 333 U.S. 507 (1948); see supra notes 63-74 and accompanying text for the earlier
discussion of this case.
449. Winters, 333 U.S. at 517.
450. See, e.g., Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (resolving in the defendants'
favor statutory ambiguity as to whether federal Travel Act applied to defendants who ran a lottery
frequented by out-of-state visitors but where there was no showing that defendants themselves
crossed state line to commit an offense); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971)
(holding, where ambiguity existed raising questions as to whether prohibition against a felon's
receipt, possession or transportation of a firearm in interstate commerce is to be interpreted in a
manner whereby government must establish receiving and possessing as well as transporting be in
interstate commerce, rule of lenity so required such proof).
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as stated earlier, many jurisdictions reject this doctrine of strict construc-
tion, with courts often avoiding it by simply finding that the statutory
uncertainty does not involve an ambiguity. 451 Thus, the courts tend to
give considerable deference to the legislature in an effort to uphold the
laws the people have created. In order to accomplish this goal, courts
resort to various measures to declare that a statute provided notice to the
citizenry regarding what a law prohibits. In effect, the courts look to
various sources for guidance as to the meaning of various words,
phrases, and other language contained in the statutes being challenged.
These interpretive aids vary widely from referencing common law, plain
language, dictionaries, and even the Bible. The courts routinely imple-
ment various techniques to find that the citizenry enjoyed a workable
definition of what was outlawed by the stricture. In many cases, a court
will look to numerous sources to demonstrate that the defendant had
adequate notice. For example, in Muscarello v. United States, 452 the
United States Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether
having a firearm in the glove box or the trunk of a car during the com-
mission of a drug offense constituted "carrying a firearm.' ' 4 5 3 The Court
looked to the plain language of the statute,454 five different dictionar-
ies,455 the Bible,456 several works of literature,457 previous decisions by
the Court using the word "carry,' '458 newspapers, 459 and legislative his-
tory460 in order to finally determine that having a gun in one's glove
451. See supra notes 198-208 and accompanying text.
452. 524 U.S. 125 (1998). This decision does not explicitly address a vagueness claim.
However, the analysis the Court used was similar to that it would have utilized had it encountered
such a challenge.
453. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 126 (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1997), which imposes a
five-year mandatory prison term upon anyone who "uses or carries a firearm" during an illegal drug
transaction). Since the accused was not actively using the weapon at the time, the issue was whether
he was "carrying" a weapon during the commission of the offense. Id. at 127-28.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 128 (citing 2 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 919 (2d ed. 1989); WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 343 (1986); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 319 (2d ed. 1987); BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 146 (1988);
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 148 (C. Onions ed., 1966)).
456. Id. at 129 (citing 2 Kings 9:28; Isaiah 30:6).
457. Id. (citing DANIEL DEFOE, ROBINSON CRUSOE 174 (J. Crowley ed., 1972); HERMAN
MELVILLE, MOBY DICK 43 (U. Chi. Press 1952)).
458. Id. (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572-73 (1991); Florida v. Jimeno, 500
U.S. 248, 249 (1991)).
459. Id. The Court conducted a search of the New York Times database in Lexis/Nexis and the
"US News" database in Westlaw looking for articles in which the words "carry," "vehicle," and
"weapon" all appeared. Id. The Court concluded that nearly one third of the articles found used the
word "carry" to mean "the carrying of guns in a car." Id.
460. Id. at 132.
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compartment or trunk did constitute "carrying" a firearm within the
meaning of the statute.461
It is also important to note that the particular source or concern that
the reviewing court places the most emphasis on, quite often, will deter-
mine the outcome of the ruling.462 For example, in Keeler v. Superior
Court,463 the California Supreme Court faced the question of whether the
death of a fetus constitutes a murder.464 The majority opinion focused
most of its attention on the common law definition of murder and of a
"human being" in order to determine that a fetus was not a "human be-
ing" within the meaning of the statute.465 The dissent, on the other hand,
focused mainly on the purpose of the law, that is, to prevent killing.466
The dissent concluded that the purpose or "fair import" of the statute was
best fulfilled by applying the statute to all deaths, including the death of a
viable fetus.467 This smorgasbord approach to vagueness analysis con-
tributes to what some see as the reality that "courts' construction of
criminal statutes is typically ad hoc, sacrificing broader legal principles
for the sake of a desired result in a particular case." 468 In any event, the
remainder of this section will discuss the variety of those sources and
guidelines to which courts routinely look to address a void-for-vagueness
challenge, ambiguity, or other indefinite legislation. It should be noted
that in some instances, a case will be examined which did not explicitly
involve a vagueness challenge or ambiguity, but which reflects a court's
struggle as it decides the meaning of somewhat nebulous language in a
criminal law. These latter cases involving statutory uncertainty are never-
theless useful in understanding the resolution of vagueness and ambigu-
ity arguments in that the court's analysis often closely resembles the
analysis it would utilize if it was addressing such an issue.
A. Common Usage of Terms
Often, courts simply look to the common usage of terms or lan-
guage to decipher the meaning of a criminal statute.469 Judicial opinions
461. It should be noted the majority refused to apply the rule of lenity because it saw no
"grievous ambiguity." Id. at 138-39. But see id. at 148 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (arguing statute was
sufficiently ambiguous to apply rule of lenity).
462. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court of Amador County, 470 P.2d 617, 618 (Cal. 1970).
463. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 618.
464. Id. at 618.
465. Id. at619-30.
466. Id. at 630 (Burke, J., dissenting).
467. Id. at 634 (Burke, J., dissenting).
468. Robert Batey, Vagueness and the Construction of Criminal Statutes-Balancing Acts, 5
VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 1, 39 (1997).
469. See, e.g, Chapman v. United States, 500 US 453, 462 (1991) (holding that the words
"mixture" and "substance" as used in federal statute outlawing distribution of a "mixture or
substance" containing LSD was not vague given "ordinary meaning" of the words); Rose v. Locke,
423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975) (holding the phrase "crimes against nature," as outlawed by Tennessee
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routinely state that "when a statute contains language with an ordinary
and popularly understood meaning, courts will assume that this is the
meaning intended by the legislature., '470 For example, in Bailey v. United
States, the United States Supreme Court considered the word "use" in
connection with a drug trafficking charge.472 Specifically, two different
defendants had been convicted of a federal drug offense that carried en-
hanced penalties where the perpetrator "during and in relation to any...
drug trafficking crime... use[s] or carries a firearm., 47 3 The first defen-
dant, upon his arrest following a traffic stop, was found to have a sub-
stantial amount of cocaine, as well as a loaded 9-mm. pistol in the trunk
of his car.474 The second defendant, after selling drugs in her apartment
to an undercover officer, was found to have additional drugs and a .22-
caliber pistol in a locked trunk in her bedroom. 475 Both offenders were
convicted of the more serious trafficking charges on the theory that they
had "used" their firearms "in relation" to their illicit drug activity.476
statute, was not vague in that "[tihe phrase has been in use among English-speaking people for many
centuries"); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 112 (1972) (holding municipal anti-noise
ordinance barring noise which "disturbs" adjacent school was not vague because the ordinance
"clearly 'delineates its reach in words of common understanding"' (quoting Cameron v. Johnson,
390 U.S. 611, 616 (1968))); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 620, 624 (1954) (holding the
term "lobbying' as used in Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act "should be construed to refer only to
'lobbying in its commonly accepted sense"' and that statute satisfied constitutional requirement of
"definiteness"))); United States v Gaudreau, 860 F.2d 357, 363 (10th Cir. 1988) ("The statute
prohibits bribery, a concept well-understood by the ordinary person."); Comm. in Solidarity with
People of El Salvador v. FBI, 770 F.2d 468, 477 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding federal statute prohibiting
intentional threatening, harassing or intimidating foreign officials or their guests was not vague,
because "lilt is not necessary for the lawmaker.., to define words in common usage if the statute
use them according to their everyday meaning" (quoting Kramer v. Price, 712 F.2d 174, 179 (5th
Cir. 1983))); People v. Bailey, 657 N.E.2d 953, 962 (Dl. 1995) (holding state anti-stalking statute,
which prevents "following" victim plus directing threats to the victim, was not vague and "[in
absence of a statutory definition, courts will assume that statutory words have their ordinary and
popularly understood meanings"); People v. Reynolds, 689 N.E.2d 335, 342 (111. App. Ct. 1997)
(holding aggravated criminal sexual assault stricture that outlawed a person from taking advantage
of his "position of trust, authority, or supervision" by having sexual contact with a minor was not
vague; statute reliant on "plain language"); State v. Fisher, 631 P.2d 239, 246 (Kan. 1981) (holding
statute outlawing "endangering a child" was not vague considering "commonsense reading of the
statute"); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1325 (Mass. 1994) (holding, after determining
the "ordinary meaning" of the word "person" is synonymous with "human being," vehicular
homicide statute was not vague because it lent itself to conclusion that a fetus was a "person" within
the vehicular homicide prohibition); City of Mankato v. Fetchenhier, 363 N.W. 2d 76, 79 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985) (holding statute outlawing "lewd" and "indecent" conduct was not vague because
"[tihese terms... have a reliable and sufficiently definite meaning to the ordinary citizen").
470. People v. Haywood, 515 N.E.2d 45, 51 (1987) (holding phrase "bodily harm," used in
offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault, was not vague).
471. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
472. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 138-39.
473. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1997)).
474. Id.
475. Id. at 140.
476. Id. at 139-41.
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In its review of these cases, the Court stated, "We start, as we must,
with the language of the statute. 4 77 Here, "[t]he word 'use' .. must be
given its 'ordinary or natural meaning.' '478 Noting that this word carried
definitions in earlier judicial opinions as well as ordinary dictionaries
which "imply action and implementation"479 and "connote activity be-
yond simple possession, ''480 the Court observed that neither of the defen-
dants had actively used their firearms in relation to their drug trafficking
and, as such, their convictions could not stand.48'
Another decision from the Court centered on the definition of the
482commonly used word "carry." In Muscarello v. United States, which
was mentioned earlier,483 the issue before the United States Supreme
Court was whether the phrase "'carries a firearm' is limited to the carry-
ing of firearms on the person. 484 This issue arose from two independent
cases, consolidated together for analysis. In the first case, defendant
Muscarello unlawfully sold marijuana from his truck. 85 Upon arrest, law
enforcement officers searched the defendant's truck and found a handgun
locked in the glove compartment.486 This defendant argued that the fed-
eral statute with which he was charged, which carried an enhanced pen-
alty if the drug trafficker was carrying a firearm, did not apply to his
having the gun in the glove compartment of his vehicle.487 In the second
case, two other defendants "placed several guns in a bag, put the bag in
the trunk of their car, and then... [drove] to a proposed drug-sale point,
where they intended to steal drugs from their sellers." 88 Federal agents at
the scene where the drug transaction was to occur stopped the two defen-
dants, searched the car, and found the guns and drugs.489 All three defen-
dants appealed their respective convictions, arguing that they had not
"carried" guns within the meaning of the statute.
The United States Supreme Court began its examination of the
phrase "carries a firearm" by considering the statutory language itself.
490
477. Id. at 144.
478. Id. at 145 (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993)).
479. Id.
480. Id. (quoting United States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 467 (1st Cir. 1994) (Breyer, C.J.,
dissenting)).
481. ld. at 148-51.
482. 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
483. See supra notes 452-61 and accompanying text.
484. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 126.
485. Id. at 127.
486. Id.
487. Id. at 125-27; see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1997) (mandating a five-year prison term for
any person who "uses or carries" a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime).
488. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 127.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 126-28.
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The Court noted that the word "carry" had two meanings relevant to the
issue at hand.49'
When one uses the word in the first, or primary, meaning, one can, as
a matter of ordinary English, "carry firearms" in a wagon, car, truck,
or other vehicle that one accompanies. When one uses the word in a
different, rather special, way, to mean, for example, "bearing," or (in
slang) "packing" (as in "packing a gun"), the matter is less clear....
[W]e believe Congress intended to use the word in its primary sense
and not in this latter, special way.492
The Court deferred to the ordinary English language usage of the word
"carries," while operating on the premise that Congress intended the
word "to convey its ordinary, and not some special legal, meaning. 'A93 In
answering the "purely legal question of whether Congress intended to
use the word 'carry' in its ordinary sense, or whether it intended to limit
the scope of the phrase to instances in which a gun [was] carried 'on the
person,"' 94 the Court looked to the statute's "basic purpose," which they
surmised was to "combat the 'dangerous combination' of 'drugs and
guns. ' ' '495 The Court stated that it would not make sense for the statute:
to penalize one who walks with a gun in a bag to the site of a drug
sale, but to ignore a similar individual who ... travels to a similar site
with a similar gun in a similar bag, but instead of walking, drives
there with the gun in his car.
49 6
Thus, the Court concluded that the "'generally accepted contemporary
meaning' of the word 'carry' include[d] the carrying of a firearm in a
vehicle. 497 The Court then affirmed the lower courts' decisions that each
of the defendants' conduct fell within the scope of the enactment.498
491. Id. at 128.
492. Id.
493. Id. at 128-29 (The Court referred to various dictionaries to define the word "carry." The
Court noted that the OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY defines carry as "convey, originally by cart or
wagon, hence in any vehicle, by ship or horseback, etc." (quoting OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
919 (2d ed. 1989)). The King James Bible uses the word "carry," finding passages such as, "[H]is
Servants carried him in a chariot to Jerusalem." (quoting 2 Kings 9:28 (King James)). The Court also
noted the use of the word in literature including its use in ROBINSON CRUSOE: "[wlith my boat, I
carry'd away every Thing." (quoting DANIEL DEFOE, ROBINSON CRUSOE 174 (J. Crowley ed.
1972)). The Court also looked to its previous decisions, acknowledging that "[tihis Court, too, has
spoken of the 'carrying' of drugs in a car or in its 'trunk."' (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565, 572-73 (1993); Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249 (1991))).
494. Id. at 132.
495. Id. (quoting Smith, 508 U.S. at 240).
496. Id. at 133.
497. Id. at 139.
498. Id.
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Another example of reliance on the common usage of terms ap-
peared in United States v. Powell,499 in which the defendant challenged a
statute that made it a crime to knowingly mail "firearms capable of being
concealed on the person.,,500 Following her conviction for violation of
this offense arising out of the mailing of a sawed-off shotgun, the defen-
dant argued that the "firearms capable of being concealed on the person"
terminology was vague and therefore unconstitutional. 50 1 The [United
States] Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit questioned whether the
"person" referred to in the statute was to be "the person mailing the fire-
arm, the person receiving the firearm, or perhaps, an average person,
male or female, wearing whatever garb might be reasonably appropriate
whatever the season. 5 °2 Unclear about the statute's meaning, the Ninth
Circuit found it vague.50 3 However, the United States Supreme Court
disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's ruling and instead attributed to Con-
gress the "commonsense meaning that such a person would be an aver-
age person garbed in a manner to aid, rather than hinder, concealment of
the weapons.,,504 The Court stated that "[s]uch straining to inject doubt as
to the meaning of the words where no doubt would be felt by the normal
reader is not required by the 'void for vagueness' doctrine, and we will
not indulge in it. '50 5 The Court, therefore, reversed the appellate decision
by the simple process of examining the common meaning of the statutory
language at issue.506
Coates v. City of Cincinnati,5°7 another United States Supreme
Court decision, is an example where a lack of a common meaning that
might be ascribed to a specific term undermined a particular criminal
statute. In Coates, the defendants were convicted of violating a Cincin-
nati ordinance which made it a crime "for three or more persons to as-
semble ... on any of the sidewalks... and there conduct themselves in a
manner annoying to persons passing by. 508 The issue before the Court
was whether the statute was unconstitutional because it was unclear as to
what constituted "annoying" conduct.5°9 Prior to the Court's review, the
Ohio Supreme Court had stated that "[t]he word 'annoying' is a widely
used and well understood word; it is not necessary to guess its mean-
499. 423 U.S. 87 (1975).
500. Powell, 423 U.S. at 89 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1715 (1970)).
501. Id. at 89-90.
502. Id. at 93 (quoting United States v. Powell, 501 F.2d 1136, 1137 (9th Cir. 1974)).
503. Id. at 88.
504. Id. at 93.
505. Id.
506. Id. at 94.
507. 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
508. Coates, 402 U.S. at 611 (quoting CINCINNATI, OH., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 901-L6
(1956)).
509. Id. at 613.
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ing." 5 '0 Therefore, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the ordinance
"clearly and precisely delineates its reach in words of common under-
standing., 511 However, the United States Supreme Court determined that
although "annoying" was a commonly used word, the statute was uncon-
stitutionally vague because it did not indicate upon "whose sensitivity a
violation does depend - the sensitivity of the judge or jury, the sensitivity
of the arresting officer, or the sensitivity of a hypothetical reasonable
man.' 51 2 The Court noted, for example, that a reading of the statute might
lead to the conclusion that where individuals might "meet together on a
sidewalk or street comer, they must conduct themselves so as not to an-
noy any police officer or other person who happens to pass by. 513 Con-
sidering this and other possible inappropriate applications, the Court
found the statute to be "unconstitutionally vague because it subjecte[d]
. .. [individuals' right to freedom] of assembly to an unascertainable
standard. 514 The Court further stated that the ordinance was vague not
because "it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but
comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no stan-
dard of conduct is specified at all. 515
Bailey, Muscarello, Powell, and Coates are illustrative of the proc-
esses courts employ in reviewing statutes that have been challenged as
being vague or uncertain. Clearly, a court presumes the validity of a state
or federal criminal statute.516 Thus, in an effort to uphold a statute, the
court will apply common understanding or commonsense usage of terms
and assume a person of common intelligence could understand the mean-
ing of the statute and the conduct it prohibits. As one court said, "It can-
not be presumed that the [legislature], in legislating, intended obscurity,
or 'to override common sense.'
517
B. Common Understanding Within a Discrete Group
Sometimes, a court in attempting to determine the precise meaning
of a statute will look to the way that a term or phrase is commonly un-
derstood in a discrete group, trade, profession, or geographical area.
518
510. Id. at 612 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Coates, 255 N.E.2d 247, 249 (Ohio 1970)).
511. Id. at 613 (quoting Coates, 255 N.E.2d at 249).
512. Id.
513. Id. at 614.
514. Id.
515. Id.
516. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 98 (1945) (plurality opinion) (presuming
validity of federal statute); see also People v. Haywood, 515 N.E.2d 45, 49 (II. 1987) (presuming
validity of state statute).
517. Haywood, 515 N.E.2d at 48 (quoting United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25 (1948)).
518. See, e.g., Connelly v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (discussing decisions
of the court that have upheld statutes as not vague which include those "rested upon the conclusion
that the employed word or phrases have a technical or other special meaning, well enough known to
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Obviously, many criminal statutes are directed at certain conduct in
which only a fraction of the general population engages and, as such,
these statutes are in reality targeted at specific groups of people. Thus,
the question becomes whether affected persons within such a group un-
derstood the meaning of certain statutory language. For example, in
Omaechevarria v. Idaho,519 the United States Supreme Court examined
such a law. Here, the territorial legislature had passed in 1875 the Two
Mile Limit Law to "avert clashes between sheep herdsmen and cattle
farmers" because the "cattle [would] not graze... [or] thrive on ranges
where sheep were allowed to graze extensively. 52° Specifically, the Two
Mile Limit Law prohibited "any person having charge of sheep from
allowing the sheep to graze on a range previously occupied by cattle. 52'
Thus, the Two Mile Limit law was enacted by the legislature to protect
the cattle farmers and their industry from the sheep herdsmen's behavior
of permitting their sheep to destroy those pastures that would otherwise
be suitable for cattle grazing.
In Omaechevarria, the criminal statute was challenged on Four-
teenth Amendment indefiniteness grounds in that it failed to identify the
particular boundaries or ranges that were off limits to the sheep herds-
men and also failed to identify a time frame for which the lands were off
limits. 52z The United States Supreme Court relied on what could be de-
scribed as the "common understanding within a discrete group" approach
in upholding the Two Mile Limit Law. The Court held that the statute
was not vague or indefinite because "men familiar with range conditions
and desirous of observing the law [would] have little difficulty in deter-
mining what is prohibited by [the statute] .,523 Here, the law pertained to
two groups of individuals, sheep herdsmen and cattle farmers. Thus, in-
dividuals involved in sheep herding or cattle farming would understand
the type of conduct prohibited by the law. The fact that
enable whose within their reach to correctly apply them"); see also Village of Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 502 (1982) (holding that the business co-operator's
admission that he sold "roach clips," commonly associated with cannabis consumption, belied his
argument that he had no notice of what constituted "drug paraphernalia" outlawed by municipal
ordinance); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502 (1925) (holding that New York
law prohibiting sale of meat falsely represented to be "kosher" was not vague because "the term
'kosher' has a meaning well enough defined to enable one engaged in the trade to correctly apply
it"); United States v. Easter, 981 F.2d 1549, 1558 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that "[wihen Congress
has used technical or terms of art, the term must be given its technical or scientific meaning," and
here, what constitutes cocaine "base" is not vague). But see Winters, 333 U.S. at 519 (holding that
state "obscene prints and articles" law punishing dissemination of certain materials carried no
"technical... meaning" that might have put vendors on notice as to what law prohibited).
519. 246 U.S. 343 (1918).
520. Omaechevarria, 246 U.S. at 344-45.
521. Id. at 345.
522: Id. at 348.
523. Id.
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a person outside the sheep herding or cattle farming industry would not
understand the law or how it applies has no bearing as to whether the law
is constitutional because the law targets conduct of particular individuals
for a particular purpose within a particular situation. Anyone in the par-
ticular industry would commonly understand the meaning of the Two
Mile Limit Law. Furthermore, "[s]imilar expressions [that pertain to a
particular group or groups] are common in criminal statutes of other
states. 524 Therefore, the Court upheld the Two Mile Limit Law.525
Meanwhile, in Connally v. General Construction Co.,526 the United
States Supreme Court examined a criminal statute in Oklahoma that pro-
hibited a government employer from paying his or her employees "less
than the current rate of per diem wages in the locality. 527 In this case,
certain state and county officials brought an action to prevent enforce-
ment of this act on the theory that the standard specified in the statute
was vague. When the matter reached the Court, it ruled that while stat-
utes employing language having "technical or other special meaning"
would be upheld if "those within their reach" would have understood the
language at issue,528 this legislation did not meet that standard.5 29 First,
"current rate of wages" lacked an ascertainable meaning in that it was
unclear as to whether this language meant the minimum, the maximum,
or some other intermediate amount, such as the average.53° Second, it
was unclear as to what was meant by "locality. 5 31 Here, the Court lik-
ened the term of that of a "neighborhood," which carries different mean-
ings to different people.532 Thus, the absence of any special understand-
ing of the statute's terminology by those directly affected by the law re-
sulted in the Court finding the statute void for uncertainty.
C. Dictionary Definitions
Frequently, a court examining statutory vagueness, ambiguity, or
uncertainty will look to a common dictionary to determine the meaning
of words in a statute. 533 In Chapman v. United States, 534 a United States
524. Id.
525. Id.
526. 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
527. Connally, 269 U.S. at 388 (quoting OKLA. COMP. STAT. § 7255 (1921)).
528. Id. at 391.
529. Id. at 393-95.
530. Id. at 394.
531. Id. at 394-95.
532. Id. at 395.
533. See, e.g., Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128 (referring to several dictionaries to determine the
meaning of the word "carry"); Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 501 (looking to dictionary to
decipher the meaning of the word "design," as used in municipal drug paraphernalia ordinance
which outlawed devices "designed" for use in connection with consumption of illicit drugs);
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 525 (1972) (referring to the dictionary to determine what
constitutes "fighting words" while finding Georgia breach of the peace statute vague and overbroad);
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Supreme Court opinion, the defendants had been convicted in federal
court for distribution of LSD. The statute under which they were con-
victed carried enhanced penalties if the offense involved more than one
gram of a "mixture or substance containing [a] detectable amount" of
LSD.535 The defendants challenged the "mixture or substance" language
as ambiguous.5 36 They contended the "blotter paper" that was impreg-
nated with the LSD could not be included in calculating the weight of the
illicit drug.537 However, after consideration of the dictionary definition of
"mixture," 538 the Court concluded that the statutory language reached the
situation at issue in this case; namely, the blending of the chemical LSD
into the blotter or carrier paper entitled the paper to be included in the
calculated weight. 539 Thus, the dictionary proved to be a useful source in
establishing that the statutory language was neither ambiguous nor
vague. 54
Meanwhile, in some cases, referencing a dictionary may offer a
definition that belies the government's claim that a statute clearly applies
to certain conduct. For instance, in the case of State v. Blowers,5  de-
cided by the Utah Supreme Court, the defendant was charged with driv-
ing under the influence of alcohol in violation of Utah law.542 This statute
Kramer v. Price, 712 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1983) (considering that the dictionary definition of the
word "annoy" leads to the conclusion that the meaning of this word which appears in Texas
harassment law was so broad that it did not delineate what type of conduct was proscribed), affd on
other grounds on reh'g, 723 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc); People v. Bailey, 657 N.E.2d 953,
962-63 (il. 1995) (referring to dictionary to determine the meaning to "follow" and "to further"
within the Illinois stalking law which was determined not to be vague); People v. Nitz, 747 N.E.2d
38, 47 (Il. App. Ct. 2001) (citing People v. La Pointe, 431 N.E.2d 344, 353 (iII. 1981) (quoting
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1050 (1971), in effort to determine meaning
of "heinous" and "brutal" conduct as used in Illinois natural life imprisonment sentencing law));
People v. Selby, 698 N.E.2d 1102, 1108 (ill. App. Ct. 1998) (examining dictionary definition of
word "socializing" where defendants, Illinois Department of Correction employees, claimed "official
misconduct" charges were invalid because charges were based on allegations they had engaged in
sexual intercourse with inmates contrary to prison regulation barring employee socializing with
inmates); People v. Reynolds, 689 N.E.2d 335, 340-42 (Dll. App. Ct. 1997) (referring to dictionary to
determine the proper meaning of "trust," "authority," and "supervision," where aggravated criminal
assault conviction was predicated on defendant's taking advantage of his superior position with
minor); People v. Higginbotham, 686 N.E.2d 720, 722 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (looking to the dictionary
in order to determine whether the defendant's conduct amounting to illegally "touching" as outlawed
in aggravated criminal sexual abuse statute); Davis v. State, 476 N.E.2d 127, 130 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App.
1985) (referring to the dictionary in order to determine meaning of "endanger" contained in child
neglect statute).
534. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
535. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 456-57 (quoting 21 U. S. C. § 841 (b)(1) (1988)).
536. Id. at 458.
537. Id. at 456.
538. Id. at 462 (referring to WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 921 (2d. ed.
1989)).
539. Id. at 462-63.
540. Id. at 461-68.
541. 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986).
542. Blowers, 717 P.2d at 1322 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44(1) (1953)).
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provided that "it is unlawful... for any person with a blood alcohol con-
tent of .08% or greater ... to drive or be in actual physical control of a
vehicle within the state. 543 In this particular case, when the defendant
was arrested, he was not driving a motor vehicle, instead, he was riding a
horse.544 Therefore, the issue in this case was whether a horse could be
considered a "vehicle" as defined in another Utah statute. "Vehicle" was
defined in another Utah statute as "every device in, upon, or by which
any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a high-
way, 545 After examining that definition, the question the court asked
was whether a horse could be considered a "device" as it was meant in
the statute.5 46 The court noted that "[n]o dictionary we have examined
defines 'device' to encompass an animal. 547 As such, the court con-
cluded that the due process requirement of fair notice precluded the court
from torturing the definition of a "vehicle" to include a horse.
5 48
In some instances, the courts may resort to numerous dictionaries in
an attempt to ascertain a consensus of meanings. 549 This was the case in
Lanzetta v. New Jersey,550 where the United States Supreme Court con-
sidered the constitutionality of a statute making it illegal to be a "gang-
ster., 551 A New Jersey statute stated as follows:
Any person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to be a
member of any gang consisting of two or more persons, who has been
convicted at least three times of being a disorderly person, or who has
been convicted of any crime in this or in any other State, is declared
to be a gangster.
552
The defendant had been charged with violating this statute and, upon
conviction, he challenged the conviction by arguing that the statute vio-
lated his right to due process because it was vague and uncertain.553 Spe-
cifically, the defendant challenged the usage of the word "gang" in the
statute.554 In attempting to determine the meaning of the word gang, the
Court looked to several dictionaries.555 Indeed, the Court studied the
definitions of the word "gang" from no less than five different dictionar-
543. Id. (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (1) (1953)).
544. Id.




549. See, e.g., Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128 (examining five dictionaries in an effort to define
"carrying a firearm").
550. 306U.S. 451 (1939).
551. Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 452.
552. Id. (quoting N. J. REV. STAT. 1937, 2:136-4, ch.155, Law (1934)).
553. Id.
554. Id. at 453-54.
555. Id. at 454.
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ies. 6 The Court concluded that no clear meaning of the word "gang"
could be ascertained from a review of the various dictionaries that were
consulted because their definitions varied so widely. 7 In addition, the
Court looked to other potential sources, such as common law and various
historical and sociological writings; however, these were also not helpful
as to the meaning of the term.558 The Court concluded that the term
"gang," as used in the New Jersey statute, was vague and, therefore, the
defendant's conviction was deemed a violation of due process. 9
D. Common Law
Another source that the courts will look to in order to determine the
meaning of a particular statute is the common law. 560 For instance, in
People v. Haywood,561 the Illinois Supreme Court examined a vagueness
claim arising out of a newly enacted "criminal sexual assault" prohibition
that had replaced the jurisdiction's "rape" and "deviate sexual assault"
legislation. Specifically, this new offense specified that any sexual pene-
tration accomplished by "force" or the threat of "force" was criminal.562
The defendants asserted that the word "force," as it appeared in this en-
actment, could "be construed in its broadest sense possible and include
every notion of force imaginable. 5 63 As such, they argued that the stat-
556. Id. at n.3 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d. ed.); FUNK &
WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY (1915); CENTURY DICTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA (1903);
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1933); WYLD'S UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1932)).
557. Id. at 454.
558. Id. at 454-55.
559. Id. at 458.
560. See, e.g., Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 50 (1975) (looking to the common law and
specifically to 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *216, for an understanding of what
constitutes a "crime against nature"); Lanzetta, 306 U.S. 451 (discussing how common law reflected
no definition of what constitutes a "gang," which contributed to defendant's successful vagueness
claim); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (looking to the common law to determine
what constituted a "conspiracy and combination in restraint of trade" contrary to federal Sherman
Act); Gaudreau, 860 F.2d at 362 (referring to the common law to determine the meaning of the
phrase "duty of fidelity" within the Colorado commercial bribery statute); People v. Haywood, 515
N.E.2d 45, 48 (111. 1987) (looking to the common law offense of rape to determine the meaning of
the word "force" within the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute); People v. Greer, 402 NE.2d
203, 207 (111. 980) (looking to the common law to determine whether an eight and one-half-month
old fetus constituted an "individual" within the state murder prohibition (citing 3 EDWARD COKE,
INSTITUTES *50; 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129-30; 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE
CROWN 433 (London, T. Payne 1800))); State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Minn. 1985) (utilizing
common law rules of construction to determine whether an unborn fetus constituted a "human
being" under the Minnesota vehicular homicide statute); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324,
1326 (Mass. 1984) (looking to the common law to determine whether a fetus can be considered a
victim of homicide and concluding that it could; therefore, viable fetus was considered a "person"
for purposes of vehicular homicide statute).
561. 515 N.E.2d 45 (111. 1987).
562. Haywood, 515 N.E.2d at 47 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-12(d), 12-13(a)(1)
(1985)).
563. Id. at 48.
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ute contained no standard whatsoever in deciphering what constitutes
"force" and, consequently, that the legislation had to be ruled vague.
564
However, the Illinois Supreme Court noted the criminal sexual assault
measure was designed to replace the offenses of "rape" and "deviant
sexual assault," both of which outlawed forcible sexual acts.565 More-
over, the common law of Illinois had developed a clear understanding of
what constituted "force" for purposes of these earlier offenses and, in the
case at hand, it was quite reasonable to assume the legislature in enacting
the new law intended to adopt the earlier meaning of the term unless the
legislation indicated otherwise.566 The court stated, "It is an axiom of
statutory construction that a statute alleged to be in derogation of the
common law should not be construed as changing the common law be-
yond what is expressed by the words in the statute or is necessarily im-
plied from it."'567 Here, there was nothing in the language of the act
which indicated a new definition of "force" was intended and, thus, the
"common law definition of force found in both of the repealed offenses"
governed the definition in the new law.568 Thus, the defendants' claim of
vagueness failed.569
Meanwhile, the common law may act as a barometer for courts,
providing a reading that translates into a conclusion that a criminal
charge, given existing legislation, is unwarranted. For example, in Keeler
v. Superior Court of Amador County,570 the California Supreme Court
considered whether an eight and a-half month fetus constituted a "human
being" within the meaning of the California statute defining murder.57' In
this case, the defendant attacked and physically assaulted his wife while
a final divorce decree was pending. Realizing she was visibly pregnant
by another man, he kneed her in the stomach, while saying, "I'm going to
stomp it out of you. '572 Her fetus was later delivered stillborn. 573 There-
after, the defendant was charged with the murder of the fetus.57 4 Prior to
trial, the defendant sought a writ of prohibition seeking to have the
charge of murder dismissed on the theory that the death of a fetus did not
constitute the death of a "human being" and, as such, could not give rise
to murder.575 A pathologist testified at a preliminary examination that the
564. Id.
565. Id. at 49 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-1, 11-3 (1983) (repealed)).
566. Id. at 48-49.
567. Id. at 49.
568. Id. at 50.
569. Id.
570. 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970).
571. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 618 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1970)).
572. Id.
573. Id.
574. Id. at 619.
575. Id.
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cause of death of the fetus was a skull fracture and cerebral hemorrhag-
ing resulting from "force applied to the mother's abdomen., 576 In review-
ing the defendant's petition for a writ of prohibition, the California Su-
preme Court looked to the history of California's murder statute and de-
termined that it contained the same language as did the original Califor-
nia statute defining murder in 1850, when California first became a
state.577 The court noted that the legislature in 1850 enacted its murder
statute containing the same language as was typical of common law
murder prohibitions.578 After concluding that the 1850 murder statute
should be interpreted consistently with the state of the common law at
that time, it found that the common law understanding of murder was
that an infant could not be the subject of homicide unless it had been
born alive.579 Also, the court pointed out that various other states had
made it an offense to kill a fetus; however, these offenses were classified
as either "feticide," "abortion," or "manslaughter," but not "murder.,
580
The court then concluded that murder in California was to be defined the
same way as it was at common law.581 As such, the court held that the
defendant had been provided no notice that the killing of a fetus, which
was not born alive, was contrary to the California statute defining murder
and, furthermore, that a judicial enlargement interpreting the statute
broadly would be violative of due process.582
In contrast, in Winters v. New York,583 a United States Supreme
Court decision that was discussed in an earlier section,58 the lack of
common law interpretation or definition of certain language in a criminal
enactment contributed to the Court's determination that the act was
vague. In that case, a New York statute barred dissemination of "obscene
prints and articles," which included materials "principally made up of
criminal news, police reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures,
or stories of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime., 585 The New York Court
of Appeals had given this enactment a narrowing construction, namely,
that the act only restricted such materials that were "so massed as to be-
come vehicles for inciting violent and depraved crimes against the per-
576. Id. at 618.
577. Id. at 619.
578. Id.
579. Id. at 620. The court looked to Lord Coke's Third Institutes, which asserted that abortion
was "murder only if the [fetus] is (1) quickened, (2) bom alive, (3) lives for a brief interval, and (4)
then dies." Id (quoting 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *58 (1648)). The court also cited Blackstone
and Hale to reiterate Coke's position. Id. at n.6 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*129-30; 1 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 433 (London, T. Payne 1778)).
580. Keeler, 470 P.2d at 621.
581. Id. at 622-24.
582. Id. at 630.
583. 333 U. S. 507 (1948).
584. See supra notes 63-74, 448-49 and accompanying text.
585. Winters, 333 U. S. at 508 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW, CONSOL. LAWS, ch. 40, § 1141(2)
(McKinney 1945)).
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son." 586 Notwithstanding this judicial gloss designed to save the statute
from a claim of vagueness, the United States Supreme Court ruled the
reach of the statute was "too uncertain and indefinite to justify the con-
viction of this petitioner. 587 Among other concerns articulated by the
Court, this criminal ban carried no "common law meaning" or history
from which it might be possible to glean a more precise understanding of
(1) what was forbidden and (2) if it avoided unconstitutional restrictions
on First Amendment rights.588 Here, the Court was limited to examining
the language of the statute itself and the single New York judicial con-
struction of it, which standing alone was insufficient to survive the peti-
tioner's challenge.
E. Obvious Policy Considerations
Often, a reviewing court will consider the obvious policy behind a
statute in order to determine the meaning of a particular portion of a stat-
ute.589 As one court observed, a "court should consider not only the lan-
guage of the statute but also the reason and necessity for the law, the
evils to be remedied and the objects and purposes to be obtained. '590 For
example, in the case of McLaughlin v. United States,591 the United States
586. Id. at 518-519 (quoting People v. Winters, 63 N.E.2d 98, 100 (N.Y. 1945)).
587. Id. at519.
588. Id.
589. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 91 (1975) (holding statute proscribing the
mailing of pistols, revolvers and "other firearms capable of being concealed on the person" was not
vague as applied to a 22-inch sawed-off shotgun; "[t]o narrow the meaning of the language Congress
used so as to limit it only to those weapons which could be concealed as readily as pistols or
revolvers would not comport with [the] . . . purpose" of making "it more difficult for criminals to
obtain concealable weapons"); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (deciding that
municipal anti-noise ordinance that restricts noise which has the capacity to "disturb" adjacent
school not vague because "it is apparent from the statute's announced purpose that the [scope of] the
measure is [limited to] whether normal school activity has been or is about to be disrupted"); People
v. Bailey, 657 N.E.2d 953, 960-61 (111. 1995) (holding that anti-stalking laws not vague for failure to
include language that perpetrator ,"without lawful authority" (1) followed or placed victim under
surveillance and (2) made threats against victim; here, proscription could not be said to encompass
innocent conduct inasmuch as purpose of the statutory scheme was limited to "goal of protecting
possible victims of stalking and aggravated stalking"); Haywood, 515 N.E.2d at 49 (explaining that
inasmuch as "the central purpose of the [newly enacted Criminal Sexual Assault Act] was to
recodify the sexual offenses into a comprehensive statute with uniform statutory elements that would
criminalize all sexual assaults without distinguishing between the sex of the offender or the victim
and the type of sexual act proscribed," it was obvious the meaning of the word "force" in the Act
should be interpreted in the same manner as it was in the now repealed "rape" and "deviant sexual
assault" measures and, as such, the meaning of "force" is not vague); State v. Fisher, 631 P.2d 239,
245-46 (Kan. 1981) (holding that child endangerment statute not vague in scope where "purpose" of
Act is to "protect children, and to prevent their being placed where it is reasonably certain injury will
result").
590. Haywood, 515 N.E.2d at 49 (citing People v. Steppan, 473 N.E.2d 1300, 1303 (1985)); see
also Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) ("We consider not only the bare meaning of
the word [in a statute] but also its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme.").
591. 476 U.S. 16 (1986).
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Supreme Court considered whether an unloaded gun was a "dangerous
weapon" within the meaning of the federal bank robbery statute.592 The
defendant and his companion entered a bank in Baltimore wearing gloves
and stocking masks.59 While displaying a handgun, defendant ordered
everyone at the bank to put their hands up and not to move.594 Mean-
while, the defendant's companion "vaulted the counter and placed about
$3,400 in a brown paper bag. 595 As the two left the bank they were ap-
prehended by police, who determined that the defendant's gun was not
loaded.596 Following his prosecution and conviction, the defendant ap-
pealed, arguing that an unloaded gun could not be considered "a danger-
ous weapon. 597 However, the United States Supreme Court cited three
reasons why an unloaded gun could be considered a dangerous weapon:
First, a gun is an article that is typically and characteristically danger-
ous; the use for which it is manufactured and sold is a dangerous one,
and the law reasonably may presume that such an article is always
dangerous even though it may not be armed at a particular time or
place. In addition, the display of a gun instills fear in the average citi-
zen; as a consequence, it creates an immediate danger that a violent
response will ensue. Finally, a gun can cause harm when used as a
bludgeon.
598
Based on these considerations, the Court ruled that an unloaded gun is a
"dangerous weapon" for purpose of this statute.
599
McLaughlin represents an excellent example of a strong policy con-
sideration that resolves the meaning of somewhat nebulous statutory
language. Central to law enforcement concerns is the aspect of deter-
rence. In connection with a robbery, it is certainly appropriate to penalize
the unlawful taking of property of another through threat of force-the
robbery-and to punish to an even greater extent a robbery with a dan-
gerous weapon. Obviously, McLaughlin recognized that the introduction
of what appears to be a dangerous weapon will make the robbery victim
more compliant with the robber's demands and invite a greater level of
possible danger to innocent persons, such as where a bank security guard
feels clearly justified in using deadly force against the gun-wielding as-
sailant, with the unhappy result that an innocent bank patron is shot in-
stead. Then, of course, there is the possibility of a robbery victim being
"pistol whipped." Obviously the robbery brings its own danger-the
apparent weapon even more. Finally, to rule otherwise would place the





597. Id. at 17.
598. Id. at 17-18.
599. Id. at 18.
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law in the strange position of having allowed the robber to instill real
fear in his victim, thereby creating for himself a greater prospect of suc-
cess in his criminal enterprise, while simultaneously immunizing him
from liability for the greater offense.
Another example of a court considering the obvious policy rationale
behind a statute in order to determine the meaning of a particular portion
of a statute is Commonwealth v. Sexton,600 where the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts considered whether concrete pavement could
constitute a "dangerous weapon" to support a charge of "assault and bat-
tery with a dangerous weapon."' ° In this case, the defendant was
charged with "assault and battery with a dangerous weapon" on a joint
venture theory after he and his brother attacked a man after leaving a
bar.602 During the attack, the defendant's brother slammed the victim's
head against the pavement several times.603 After being convicted of "as-
sault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon," the defendant ap-
pealed his conviction.604 The appeals court reversed the defendant's con-
viction holding that a dangerous weapon could only include an object a
person could "wield" or "arm" himself with and, as such, "concrete
pavement," being a stationary object, could not be a "dangerous
weapon.,65 The government, thereafter, appealed the reversal to the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.6°6 The court noted that the legis-
lative policy behind the statute was an intent to "invoke greater penalties
for assaults which threaten serious injury because an actor chose to em-
ploy a dangerous weapon." 6 7 While some weapons may be per se dan-
gerous--devices that are designed and constructed to kill or create great
bodily harm-other "innocuous items" may be dangerous based on how
they are used in a particular case.60 8 The court asserted that if an object,
including a stationary one, can be used in a way to inflict serious bodily
injury, then the object could qualify as a dangerous weapon.6°9 The court
further reasoned that had the defendant used a broken slab of concrete to
bludgeon his victim, that would have been, without question, defined as a
dangerous weapon. 610 The court observed that the fact that the concrete
was not a broken slab but rather a "fixed thing" did not affect the dan-
600. 680 N.E.2d 23 (Mass. 1997).




605. Id. at 24-25 (citing Commonwealth v. Sexton, 672 N.E.2d 991 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996)).
606. Id. at 24.
607. Id. at 25.
608. Id.
609. Id. at 27.
610. id. at 26.
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gerousness of the instrumentality. 61' The court concluded that "an item's
dangerous propensities 'often depend[] entirely on its use,' and not its
mobility, for '[w]hether the pitcher hits the stone or the stone hits the
pitcher, it will be bad for the pitcher."' 6 2 Thus, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts held that a person who uses concrete pavement
to intentionally inflict injury on another could be found guilty of assault
and battery by means of a "dangerous weapon."
613
As with McLaughlin, the Sexton decision correctly focused on the
general purpose behind the Massachusetts proscription against assault
and battery with a dangerous weapon in concluding the perpetrator had
fair notice. Here, the clear policy behind assault and battery strictures is
dissuading individuals from injuring or attempting to inflict injury upon
another. Introduction of an object that has the capacity to cause even
greater injury to an assault victim's life or limb is clearly an element of
aggravation. Whether that object was stationary or not is beside the
point. Here, the obvious purpose behind the Massachusetts law at issue
was discouraging assailants from using an object to create more carnage
than would have been the case without it.
Similarly, in People v. Johnson,614 the Court of Appeals of the First
District of California had to determine whether transmitting herpes dur-
ing a rape constituted the infliction of "great bodily injury" upon the vic-
tim.615 In this case, the defendant entered the car the victim was driving
"and forced her at knife point to drive" to a deserted street.616 There, the
defendant forced the victim to "kiss him and orally copulate him., 617 The
defendant then forcibly removed the victim's pants and raped her.618 Five
days later, the victim was diagnosed with herpes simplex 11.619 At the
defendant's trial on charges of kidnapping, rape, oral copulation by
force, robbery, and false imprisonment,620 the jury found the defendant
guilty of inflicting "great bodily injury" upon the victim because he had
transmitted the herpes virus to the victim. 62 1 The effect of such a finding
resulted in the enhancement of the defendant's sentence. 622 In its review,
the California Court of Appeals noted that "great bodily injury" had been
defined as a "serious impairment of physical condition" or a "protracted
611. Id.
612. Id. at 27 (citing State v. Reed, 790 P.2d 551, 552 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting MIGUEL DE
CERVANTES, DON QUIXOTE, Part 11, ch. 43 (John Ormsby trans., William Benton 1952))).
613. Id.
614. 225 Cal. Rptr. 251 (Cal, App. 1986).
615. Johnson, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 253.





621. Id. at 253.
622. Id. at 252.
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impairment of function of any portion of [the] body., 623 The court
pointed out that an expert had testified at the defendant's trial that herpes
is a venereal disease that cannot be cured by known means.624 When ac-
tive, herpes,
[m]anifests itself in the form of vesicles or tiny blisters in the vaginal
area. The principal symptom is intense itching and/or pain, but vari-
ous complications may arise. These include possible blindness if the
virus is accidentally transmitted to the eye and if it gets into the
bloodstream, a potential for serious infection involving meningitis,
which could result in death.
625
The expert further testified that the victim was likely to carry the herpes
virus for the rest of her life.626 The court held, therefore, that the trans-
mission of herpes during the rape inflicted "great bodily injury" upon the
victim and upheld the jury's decision in that regard.6 7 Here, then, this
court was considering the obvious policy behind the law, namely, if a
perpetrator hurts his victim in any significant manner, he ought not be
able to avoid liability based on a claim that the nature or type of substan-
tial physical harm he inflicted was not tantamount to great bodily injury.
F. Legislative Intent
Frequently, courts interpret a statute by looking to the legislative
intent in enacting the particular statute.628 The court may ascertain this
623. Id. at 253 (quoting People v. Caudillo, 580 P.2d 274, 290 (Cal. 1978), overruled on other





628. See, e.g., Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 132-34 (holding that legislative intent makes clear that
language "carries a firearm" is not limited to carrying a firearm on one's person); United States v.
Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 91 (1975) (looking to the legislative intent to determine whether a statute which
prohibits mailing "firearms capable of being concealed on the person" prohibited mailing sawed off
shotguns); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 620-21 (1954) (looking to the legislative history
behind the Federal Lobbying Act to determine precisely to whom the statute applies); Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 98-100 (1945) (plurality opinion) (looking to legislative intent behind
federal statute penalizing willful deprivation, under color of law, of an individual's federal right was
intended to provide affected citizens broad protection); Robinson v. United States, 324 U.S. 282,
283-84 (1945) (looking to the "scant legislative history" behind a portion of the kidnapping statute
that stated that the death sentence shall not be imposed on a person convicted of this offense, which
provided that the "kidnapped person has been liberated unharmed," to determine if this proviso
applied to the kidnapper who was convicted in the instant case); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S.
76, 95 (1820) (examining the legislative history behind federal law to determine if a homicide that
occurred on a river about a half mile wide in the interior of a country constituted "manslaughter at
high sea"); Comm. in Solidarity with People of El Salvador v. FBI, 770 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir.
1985) ("[The legislative history of the statute" which makes it a federal offense to coerce, threaten,
intimidate, harass or obstruct certain foreign officials and their guests "makes clear Congress'
concern for, and desire to protect rights guaranteed by the First Amendment."); People v. Bailey,
657 N.E.2d 953, 960 (Il1. 1995) (holding claim that state anti-stalking statutes reached innocent
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intent by looking to the legislature's exact word selection, in particular
the words the legislature chose to use in preference to alternative possi-
bilities,629 or by looking to the legislative record and the debates that took
place when the statute was being considered.63°
First, a court may simply look at a legislative body's word selection
to ascertain congressional intent. For example, in Bailey v. United
63163States, which was discussed earlier,632 the United States Supreme
Court considered a federal statute that imposed a five-year minimum
term of imprisonment upon a person who "during and in relation to any
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime .. .uses or caries a fire-
arm.' ' 6 33 The question posed to the Court was "whether evidence of the
proximity and accessibility of a firearm to drugs or drug proceeds is
alone sufficient to support a conviction for 'use' of a firearm during and
in relation to a drug trafficking offense" under the statute.634
In this case, the defendant was stopped for a traffic violation and
when he was asked to step out of the car, the police observed him stuff
something between the seat and the front console.63 5 A search of the pas-
senger compartment of the car revealed one round of ammunition and 27
plastic bags containing a total of 30 grams of cocaine.636 After the defen-
dant's arrest, a search of the trunk of the car revealed a gun and a large
amount of cash.637 The defendant was charged with several counts, one
of which was drug trafficking while using and carrying a firearm in vio-
lation of federal law.638 At the defendant's trial, an expert testified that
drug dealers frequently carry a firearm to protect their drugs and
money.639 Following the defendant's conviction, and on appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, the defendant argued that "use" in the stat-
ute signified active employment of a firearm.64° The government insisted
conduct because statutes did not contain language that proscribed conduct must be "without lawful
authority" which does not accord "with the legislature's intent in enacting the statutes to prevent
violent attacks by allowing the police to act before the victim was actually injured and to prevent the
terror produced by harassing actions"); People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203, 209 (111. 1980) (looking to
the legislative history of the murder statute to determine whether an eight and one-half-month old
fetus constitutes an "individual" within the meaning of the statute); Sexton, 680 N.E.2d at 25
(interpreting "dangerous weapons" to include stationary objects, such as concrete pavement, does
not contravene intent of legislature).
629. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 146 (1995).
630. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez-Salazar, 813 F.2d 1126, 1133 (11 th Cir. 1987).
631. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
632. See supra notes 471-81 and accompanying text.
633, Bailey, 516 U.S. at 138 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1997)).
634. Id. at 138-39.
635. Id. at 139.
636. Id.
637. Id.
638. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1997)).
639. Id.
640. Id. at 143.
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that "use" in the statute should be interpreted to mean availing oneself of
a gun.64' The government argued that an individual violates the statute by
putting or keeping the gun in a particular place from which it can be ac-
cessed if and when needed to facilitate a drug crime.642 The Court looked
to the word choice used by Congress when it enacted this law to decipher
the intent of Congress, concluding that "use" was meant to connote
something more than simple possession of a gun.643 The Court stated that
if Congress had "intended possession alone to trigger liability under [the
statute], it easily could have so provided."64 The Court noted that in
many other gun-related statutes, Congress had used the term "possess,"
therefore, the fact that Congress chose to employ the word "use" rather
than "possess" in this instance was significant. 645 The Court concluded
that a broad definition of the word "use," which could be "satisfied in
almost every case by evidence of mere possession[,] does not adhere to
the obvious congressional intent to require more than possession to trig-
ger the statute's application.,
646
Second, beyond simply focusing on the legislature's word choice,
which itself may reflect the legislature's intent, a court may be required
to dig deeper and look to the legislative history behind the statute to de-
termine its meaning. For example, in United States v. Hernandez-
Salazar,647 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
considered an amendment to a federal statute that dealt with currency
reporting violations. 48 Specifically, this amendment expanded the au-
thority of U.S. Customs officers to search persons and property entering
and departing the United States for currency reporting violations where
an officer had "reasonable cause to believe" a currency violation had
occurred. 649 In this case, the defendant was apprehended in the Miami
International Airport while attempting to smuggle large amounts of
money to Columbia.6 0 The defendant challenged the search of his bag-
641. Id. at 141.
642. Id. (referring to United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
643. Id. at 143.
644. Id.
645. Id.
646. Id. at 144.
647. 813 F.2d 1126 (11th Cir. 1987), superceded by 31 U.S.C. § 5317(b) (amended 1986).
648. Hernandez-Salazar, 813 F.2d at 1128, 1132 n.23. As amended in 1984, 31 U.S.C. §
5317(b) provided:
A customs officer may stop and search, without a search warrant, a vehicle, vessel,
aircraft, or other conveyance, envelope or other container, or person entering or
departing from the United States with respect to which or whom the officer has
reasonable cause to believe there is a monetary instrument being transported in
violation of [federal currency reporting requirements] of this title.
31 U.S.C. § 5317(b) (1984).
649. Hernandez-Salazar, 813 F.2d at 1132 n.23.
650. Id. at 1131.
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gage as an illegal search contrary to the Fourth Amendment and also
challenged the "reasonable cause to believe" language as void-for-
vagueness.
651
In order to rule on the issue regarding the legitimacy of the search,
the Eleventh Circuit had to first determine the meaning of "reasonable
cause." 652 The defendant claimed that the statute was unconstitutional
under the void-for-vagueness doctrine because the statute amounted to an
unrestricted delegation of power to Customs officers.653 In addition, the
defendant argued that the phrase "reasonable cause" did not provide a
reasonable person with notice of the precise standard of suspicion that
authorities needed to conduct the search.654 Upon review, the court
looked to the "legislative history" behind the amendment to determine
the meaning of this phrase.655 The court stated that the legislative history
indicated that the section clearly intended to authorize searches on the
basis of less than probable cause.656 Likewise, the court believed that
Congress wanted to give Customs officers the ability to perform these
warrantless searches in a manner consistent with United States Supreme
Court precedent that suggested that "new" Fourth Amendment standards
other than "probable cause" and "reasonable suspicion" were disfa-
vored.657 In doing so, the court deduced that Congress must have in-
tended that the "reasonable cause to believe" standard only required
"reasonable suspicion" for such a search because Congress had explicitly, ,,658
stated the standard was to be less than "probable cause. Thus, the
"reasonable cause" language was not vague.659 Furthermore, the statute
did authorize a search based on reasonable suspicion, rather than prob-
able cause, and because the officers had reasonable suspicion to search
the defendant in this instance, the defendant's additional challenge that
the search was violative of the Fourth Amendment was denied.66°
651. Id. at 1132.
652. Id. at 1133.
653. Id. at 1132.
654. Id.
655. Id. at 1133.
656. Id. at 1133 n.28. The court discussed S. REP. No. 98-225, at 303 (1983), which declared:
[section 5317(b)'s] on the spot authority of the Customs Service would significantly
enhance the effectiveness in monitoring and apprehending persons reasonably
believed, to be violating the currency reporting provisions of the law. The
Committee is fully convinced that such authority is not only needed, but
constitutional, under the line of cases holding that warrantless "border searches" are
reasonable even without probable cause under the Fourth Amendment.
S. REP. No. 98-225, at 303 (1983) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
657. Hernandez-Salazar, 813 F.2d at 1133 n.29 (citing United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,
473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985)).
658. Id. at 1133 n.30 (citing Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541).
659. Id. at 1133.
660. Id. at 1136-39.
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G. Prior Judicial Decisions
To determine the meaning of terms in a statute, reviewing courts
routinely look to the way the terms have been interpreted in earlier judi-
cial decisions. 66' For example, in CISPES v. FBI,662 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered the validity of a statute,
designed to protect foreign dignitaries and officials, which held crimi-
nally liable anyone who "intimidates, coerces, threatens, or harasses a
foreign official or an official guest or obstructs a foreign official in the
performance of his duties. 663 The Committee in Solidarity with the Peo-
ple of El Salvador ("CISPES") challenged this statute as both vague and
overbroad, arguing that the terms "intimidate," "harass," "coerce,"
"threaten," and "obstruct" did not sufficiently identify what conduct was
prohibited and that it permitted undue discretion on the part of enforcing
authorities.6 64
In order to determine the proper meaning of the challenged terms
and to decide whether the terms were unconstitutionally vague, the court
considered other cases that had upheld those terms against vagueness
challenges. First, the court looked to International Society for Krishna
Consciousness v. Eaves,665 an earlier decision from the circuit, wherein it
had ruled that the terms "coerce" and "obstruct" were not unconstitution-
ally vague.666 Next, the court examined Cameron v. Johnson,667 an earlier
opinion from the United States Supreme Court, which reflected the
proposition that the term "obstruct" as used in a statute prohibiting
"picketing. . . in such a manner as to obstruct or unreasonably interfere
with free ingress or egress to or from any ... courthouse" was not un-
661. See, e.g., United States v. Sturgis, 48 F.3d 784, 787-88 (4th Cir. 1995) (looking to prior
judicial decisions to determine whether an HIV positive inmate's teeth used to bite correctional
officers constitute a "deadly weapon"), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 833 (1995); Schwartzmiller v.
Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1348-49 (9th Cir. 1984) (looking to prior judicial decisions to determine
whether the defendant's conduct constituted a "lewd" and "lascivious" sexual acts on a child);
People v. Haywood, 515 N.E.2d 45, 49, 51 (f11. 1987) (looking to prior judicial decisions to
determine the meaning of "force" and "bodily harm" for purposes of state criminal sexual assault
prohibitions); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1325-26 (Mass. 1994) (looking to prior
judicial decisions to determine whether a fetus constitutes a "person" within the vehicular homicide
statute); State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 628-29 (Minn. 1985) (looking to prior judicial decisions to
determine whether an eight and one-half-month old fetus was a "human being" within the vehicular
homicide statute); People v. McCullum, 706 N.Y.S. 2d 616, 617-19 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2000) (looking
to prior judicial decisions involving inoperable guns to determine whether a can of mace not proved
operable could constitute a "dangerous weapon").
662. 770 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1985).
663. Comm. in Solidarity with People of El Salvador, 770 F.2d at 470-71 n.2 (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 112(b)(1) (1982)). 18 U.S.C. § 112(b)(2) contained similar language which was challenged.
664. Comm. in Solidarity with People of El Salvador, 770 F.2d at 475.
665. Id. at 476 (citing International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809
(5th Cir. 1979)).
666. Id. (quoting Eaves, 601 F.2d at 831).
667. Id. (citing Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968)).
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constitutionally vague.668 Next, the court looked to Watts v. United
States,669 another decision from the United States Supreme Court, in
which the Court ruled that the term "threaten," as used in a statute out-
lawing threatening the United States President, was not void for vague-
ness.670 Finally, the court considered Youngdahl v. Rainfair,67' wherein
the United States Supreme Court had upheld a law prohibiting "intimi-
672dating" and "threatening" activities by striking employees. Based on
this line of cases, the court determined that the statute as applied to
CISPES was not void for vagueness.
673
In Greshman v. Peterson,6 74 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit reviewed an Indianapolis city ordinance that barred
"aggressive panhandling, ' 675 which was defined as including any solici-
tation of money or other gratuity "in an aggressive manner," including
where the panhandling involves (1) "touching" the solicited person, (2)
approaching a person waiting in line to be admitted into a commercial
establishment, (3) blocking a person's path, (4) following a person, (5)
using profane language or a gesture which would cause a reasonable
person fear, or (6) a group of two or more panhandlers.676 The plaintiff, a
homeless person, brought an action claiming the ordinance was violative
of his First Amendment rights and unconstitutionally vague in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment.677 After rejecting the First Amendment
argument, 678 the Seventh Circuit analyzed the vagueness claim. 679 The
court noted that Indiana case law had upheld the state anti-stalking law
that bars repeated "harassment" that causes another person to feel threat-
ened.68° It pointed out its own prior decisions had upheld proscriptions
against "threats, extortion, blackmail and the like, 'despite the fact that
they criminalize utterances because of their expressive content.' ''681 The
Seventh Circuit cited as additional authority a United States Supreme
Court decision upholding the constitutionality of a law against "threats"
directed at the United States President,682 followed by another case where
668. Id. (quoting Cameron, 390 U.S. at 616).
669. Id. (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1966)).
670. Id. (quoting Watts, 394 U.S. at 707).
671. Id. (citing Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 335 U.S. 131 (1957)).
672. Id. (quoting Youngdahl, 335 U.S. at 139).
673. Id. at 477.
674. 225 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2000).
675. Gresham, 225 F.3d at 901.
676. Id. at 901-02 (quoting INDIANAPOLIS CrrY-CouNTY, IND., ORDINANCE No. 78 (1999);
REV. CODE OF INDIANAPOLIS AND MARION COUNTY § 407-102 (1999)).
677. Id. at 901.
678. Id. at 903-07.
679. Id. at 907-09.
680. Id. at 908-09 (citing Johnson v. State, 648 N.E.2d 666, 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)).
681. Id. at 909 (quoting United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241, 1259 (7th Cir. 1993) (Flaum,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1004 (1994)).
682. Id. (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 707).
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the Seventh Circuit itself held that "threats of physical violence" are not
protected by the First Amendment.683 Finally, the court noted another
case, decided by the United States Supreme Court, wherein a concurring
opinion quoted a law review article stating, "Although the First Amend-
ment broadly protects 'speech,' it does not protect the right to 'fix prices,
breach contracts, make false warranties, place bets with bookies, threaten
[or] extort.'''684 Here, the Indianapolis measure could be construed to
prohibit any word or gesture that "makes a reasonable person feel they
face danger if they refuse to donate" and, as such, could not be enjoined
from enforcement.685
H. Definitions in Other Statutes Within the Jurisdiction
Sometimes the meaning of a statute can be interpreted by reference
or comparison to another statute.686 First, a court may look to criminal
offenses that have previously appeared in the jurisdiction's penal code
for instruction as to the meaning of language that is retained in later en-
687actments. Next, a reviewing court may look to other sections of its
current criminal code to determine the proper meaning of a term as it is
used throughout the code.688 At other times, a court may look to a statute
within the same Jurisdiction but outside the penal code to interpret a
criminal statute.
683. Id. (citing United States v. Velasquez, 772 F.2d 1348, 1357 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1021 (1986))).
684. Id. (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 420 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting
Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV.
265, 270 (1981))).
685. Id.
686. See, e.g., Muscarelio, 524 U.S. at 134-39 (examining other federal statutes dealing with
guns, including those that refer to "use" of firearm and others that refer to "transporting" a firearm,
suggesting Congress intended that language "carries" a firearm in particular federal statute mean not
merely carrying on one's person but also in one's automobile); Bailey, 516 U.S. at 143 (superceded
by statute) (drawing on federal offenses that express themselves in terms of "possesses" guns to
conclude that "use" of a gun in federal law connotes active employment and not mere possession);
Comm. in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, 770 F.2d at 476-77 (ruling a federal statute
outlawing threatening, harassing and intimidating foreign officials not vague; "similar terms have
been used and applied in numerous United States statutes"); People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203, 209
(Ill. 1980) (superceded by statute) (discussing a statement in Illinois Abortion law, "killing of a fetus
aborted alive may be punished as murder," suggests that killing unborn fetus is not murder).
687. See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Ct. of Amador County, 470 P.2d 617, 622-24 (Cal. 1970)
(superceded by statute) (finding definition of "human being" in current California statute enacted in
1872 was same as prior murder statute enacted in 1850).
688. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 766 N.E.2d 641, 645 (Ill. 2002) (referring to Illinois Air Rifle
Act within Criminal Offenses Chapter for definition of "Air Rifle" so as to determine if a pellet gun,
which is considered an air rifle under Act, is also a "dangerous weapon" within meaning of Illinois
armed violence prohibition).
689. See, e.g., People v. Spencer, 731 N.E.2d 1250, 1251 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (referring to
Family Law Code definition of "harassment," used for purpose of determining if individual violated
an "order of protection," in determining if defendant committed offense of telephone harassment).
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In People v. Haywood,6 90 discussed earlier,69 1 the Illinois Supreme
Court entertained a vagueness claim directed at certain language con-
tained in prohibitions outlawing criminal sexual assault and aggravated
criminal sexual assault, offenses that had replaced Illinois' earlier rape
and deviate sexual assault legislation. 692 Specifically, the defendants, in
this consolidated appeal, had challenged the word "force" as used in the
criminal sexual assault statute and the phrase "bodily harm" as employed
in the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute.693 Regarding the word
"force," the court assumed the legislature intended to define the term in
essentially the same manner that it had in connection with the recently
repealed rape/deviate sexual assault prohibitions that were supplanted by
the new, more sophisticated Criminal Sexual Act legislation.694 Thus, for
one to claim lack of notice regarding the meaning of the word "force"
was contrary to the "common sense" conclusion that a legislative body,
in enacting a new law that relies on existing legal nomenclature, would
not be intent on the "creation of a new definition" or "obscurity" of exist-
ing language.695
Meanwhile, regarding the defendants' claim in Haywood that the
language "bodily harm," as used in the aggravated criminal sexual as-
sault legislation, was vague, the court responded that the phrase "has a
well-known legal meaning, and when a statute contains language with an
ordinary and popularly understood meaning, courts will assume that that
is the meaning intended by the legislature.' 696 Here the words "bodily
harm" had been earlier defined by the Illinois Supreme Court in the con-
text of the Illinois crime of battery as "some sort of physical pain or
damage to the body, like lacerations, bruises or abrasions, whether tem-
porary or permanent." 697 Thus, because this language carried a clear
meaning elsewhere in the existing Illinois Criminal Code, the defendants
could not assert lack of fair notice.698
As occurred in Haywood, reviewing courts routinely look to other
sections of the same statutory scheme to determine the meaning of a par-
ticular statute.6 99 For example, in People v. Aguilar,7 °° the Illinois Appel-
690. 515 N.E.2d45 (Ill. 1987).
691. See supra notes 561-69 and accompanying text.
692. Haywood, 515 N.E.2d at 46.
693. Id. at 47-48, 51 (referring to language in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-13, 12-14
(1985)).
694. Id. at 49.
695. Id. at 48.
696. Id. at 51.
697. Id. (quoting People v. Mays, 437 N.E.2d 633, 635-36 (111. 1982)).
698. Id. at 51-52.
699. See, e.g., Bailey, 516 U.S. at 146-47 (superceded by statute) (looking to other parts of the
statute leads to the conclusion that "carrying" a firearm does not constitute "use" of a firearm);
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 94-105 (1820) (looking to the construction of the "whole
act" criminalizing felonies on the "high seas" leads to conclusion that homicide on a foreign
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late Court looked to the Illinois robbery statute for guidance as it deter-
mined the reach of the more recently enacted Illinois "vehicular hijack-
ing" prohibition.0 1 In this case, the driver of an automobile stepped out
of his van after the defendant hit the driver's van with his foot. "2 After
the driver exited his van, the defendant punched the driver in his jaw
while defendant's companions threw bottles at him.70 3 At this point, the
driver fled the scene.7° When the driver abandoned his van, the defen-
dant and his companions entered the driver's van and drove it away.705
Following the defendant's apprehension, he was prosecuted and con-
victed of "vehicular hijacking," which was defined as any taking of a
motor vehicle "from the person or the immediate presence of another by
the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force. 70 6 On ap-
peal, defendant argued the vehicle was not taken by force inasmuch as
the driver had exited his automobile of his own accord.707 Also, he
claimed the beating of the driver and the bottle-throwing, which precipi-
tated the flight of the driver, were unrelated to any intent to take the ve-
hicle.70 8 However, the appellate court noted the vehicular hijacking stat-
ute contained language identical in most respects to "robbery," which is
defined in Illinois as the taking of property "from the person or presence
of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of
force.' 70 9 Moreover, the robbery statute had been previously interpreted
as only requiring "some concurrence between the defendant's threat of
force and the taking of the victim's property., 710 In other words, the force
or threat of force for purposes of robbery need not immediately precede
the taking.711 To convict one of robbery, it is not necessary to show the
force was exerted for the purpose of taking another's property or that the
perpetrator formed the intention to take another's property before the
force or threat of force occurred.712 Extrapolating from the robbery stric-
country's river does not amount to "manslaughter on the high seas"); Columbia Natural Resources v.
Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1106-09 (6th Cir. 1995) (consulting the entire federal RICO statute leads to
conclusion that the meaning of a "pattern of racketeering activity" is not vague), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 1158 (1996); People v. Monroe, 515 N.E.2d 42, 43-46 (IIl. 1987) (holding that mens rea
provision which appeared in penalty section that conflicts with mens rea provision in definitional
section of Illinois drug paraphernalia statute renders it vague).
700. 676 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
701. Aguilar, 676 N.E.2d at 327.
702. Id. at 325-26.
703. Id. at 326.
704. Id.
705. Id.
706. Id. (quoting 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/18-3(a) (1994)).
707. Id.
708. Id.
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ture, the court concluded there existed a concurrence between the defen-
dant's taking of the driver's vehicle and the use of force against him and,
as such, the defendant was properly convicted of vehicular hijacking.7 3
As stated, sometimes courts will search outside the jurisdiction's
penal code and find a statutory definition of a word or phrase elsewhere
in the jurisdiction's laws in order to demonstrate that the citizenry were
sufficiently apprised of the meaning of certain language appearing within
the penal code.7 14 This occurred in People v. Calvert,715 an Illinois Ap-
pellate Court opinion involving a defendant who had been convicted of
the offense of "harassment of a witness." 71 6 The defendant was charged
with this Illinois offense after verbally berating a witness in an earlier
trial with "language... rife with profanity and invective," which caused
the witness to cry continuously and to be intimidated and physically
shaken.717 A violation of this offense occurs where a person, "with intent
to harass or annoy" another person who had been a witness, defined as a
person who had testified in a legal proceeding, "communicates" with
such other person "in such manner as to produce mental anguish or emo-
tional distress" or conveys a threat of injury or damage to the individ-
ual's person or property.718 The defendant claimed the evidence was in-
sufficient to establish that he had the requisite intent to harass or annoy
719and that the statute was overbroad and vague. In its review, the Illinois
Appellate Court conceded that the term "harassment" was not defined in
the Illinois penal code.720 However, the court noted that there existed a
definition of "harassment" in the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of
1986,721 which is part of the Family Law chapter of the Illinois code, that
was "instructive. 722 Specifically, this definition stated that harassment
is: "Knowing conduct which is not necessary to accomplish a purpose
that is reasonable under the circumstances; would cause a reasonable
person emotional distress; and does cause emotional distress ....
Accordingly, the court concluded that harassment could arise as "the
713. Id.
714. See, e.g., State v. Dixon, 998 P.2d 544, 549 (Mont. 2000) (referring to MONT. ADMIN. R.
23-7-301 (2002) (Uniform Fire Code) in order to decipher what constitutes possession of
"explosive").
715. 629 N.E.2d 1154 (111. App. Ct. 1994).
716. Calvert, 629 N.E. at 1155 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 32-4a (1991), subsequently
codified as 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/32-4a (1993)).
717. Id. at 1156.
718. Id. (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 32-4a (1991), subsequently codified as 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/32-4a (1993)).
719. Id. at 1159.
720. Id. at 1157.
721. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2311-3(6) (1991), subsequently codified as 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 60/101 (2002)).
722. Id.
723. Id. (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, para. 2311-3(6) (1991), subsequently codified as 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103 (1999)).
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result of intentional acts which cause another person to be worried, anx-
ious, or uncomfortable and therefore can occur even if there is no overt
act of violence. 724 Here, defendant's verbal diatribe, which caused an
intense emotional reaction in the victim, and caused her to fear that some
type of repercussions might be forthcoming in the future, precluded the
defendant's assertion that he had not "harassed" the witness. 725 Thus, the
defendant's claims, including his assertion that the entire criminal statute
was vague, were rejected and his conviction was affirmed.726
L Definitions From Other Jurisdictions
Yet another source courts facing vagueness claims may look to for
guidance are definitions of terms in the law of other jurisdictions.727 In
Rose v. Locke,728 a United States Supreme Court opinion, a defendant
had been convicted under a Tennessee statute for committing a "crime
against nature., 729  In this case, the defendant entered his female
neighbor's apartment on the pretext of using her telephone.73° Once in-
side, the defendant produced a knife, forced her to partially undress, "and
compelled her to submit to his twice performing cunnilingus upon
her.",731 Following the State's successful prosecution of the defendant,
the Tennessee trial court sentenced the defendant to five to seven years'
724. Id.
725. Id. at 1157-59.
726. Id. at 1159-60.
727. See, e.g., People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203, 209 (111. 1980) ("After considering the status of
the unborn in the common law, the uniform decisions of the court of last resort in our sister States,
and the attitude toward the unborn reflected in our abortion statute, we conclude that taking the life
of a fetus is not murder under our current statute unless the fetus is born alive and subsequently
expires as a result of the injuries inflicted." (emphasis added)); State v. Fisher, 631 P.2d 239, 242-45
(Kan. 1981) (deciphering that state statute which outlawed "endangering" a child was not vague by
examining similar child endangerment laws and their interpretation in Colorado, California, New
Mexico, and Pennsylvania); State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 628-29 (Minn. 1985) (holding vehicular
homicide statute interpreted as not applicable to killing a fetus. "We have been informed ... that of
25 jurisdictions in the United States which have considered the issue... 23 have adopted the 'born
alive' rule. From the foregoing it is clear that the common law 'born alive' rule is now well-
established in the great majority of jurisdictions."); cf Rogers v. Tennessee, 121 S. Ct. 1693, 1701
(2001) (explaining that where defendant contended that he had no "fair warning" of the judicial
abolition of Tennessee's common law "year and a day rule," which precluded a prosecution for
murder where an assault victim died more than a year after he suffered the infliction of wounds
caused by a perpetrator, because "the year and a day rule has been legislatively or judicially
abolished in the vast majority of jurisdictions recently to have addressed the issue," the rule had
clearly outlived its usefulness and no longer existed so that where defendant's victim had died one
and a half years after his attack, the Tennessee Supreme Courts' retroactive abolition was not
unexpected or indefensible).
728. 423 U.S. 48 (1975) (per curiam).
729. Rose, 423 U.S. at 48 ("Crimes against nature, either with mankind or any beast, are
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than five (5) years nor more than fifteen (15)
years." (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-707 (1955))).
730. id. at 48.
731. Id.
2002] VAGUENESS, AMBIGUITY, AND OTHER UNCERTAINTY 321
imprisonment.732 "The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed
the conviction, rejecting [the defendant's] claim that the Tennessee stat-
ute's proscription of 'crimes against nature' did not encompass cunnilin-
gus, as well as his contention that the statute was unconstitutionally
vague. 733 However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit accepted the defendant's constitutional challenge, determining
that the term "'crimes against nature' could not 'in and of itself withstand
a charge of unconstitutional vagueness.' 734 The Sixth Circuit reasoned
that cunnilingus was not encompassed in the Tennessee statute because it
could not find any previous Tennessee opinion stating that the statute
applied to such sexual activity.735 Therefore, this court held that the stat-
ute failed to give the defendant "fair warning" and, on those grounds,
sustained the defendant's constitutional challenge.736
In its review, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue
whether under the Tennessee statute "crime[s] against nature" was to be
"narrowly applied to only those acts constituting the common-law of-
fense of sodomy, or [was it] to be broadly interpreted to encompass addi-
tional forms of sexual aberration. 737 In addressing this issue, the Court
first pointed out that a "substantial number of jurisdictions" maintain the
common law proscription of "crimes against nature. ,738 The Court first
referenced State v. Crawford,739 wherein the Missouri Supreme Court
rejected a claim that "its crime-against-nature statute was so devoid of
definition as to be unconstitutional, pointing out that its provision was
derived from early English law and broadly embraced sodomy, bestiality,
buggery, fellatio, and cunnilingus within its terms.,,740 The Court next
looked to Wainwright v. Stone,74 1 in which the Court previously held that
a Florida statute "proscribing 'the abominable and detestable crime
against nature' was not unconstitutionally vague, despite the fact that the
[Florida] State Supreme Court had recently changed its mind about the
statute's permissible scope. 7 42 Additionally, the Court pointed out that
in Fisher v. State,743 the Tennessee Supreme Court had previously re-
jected a claim that "'crime against nature' did not cover fellatio, repudi-
ating those jurisdictions which had taken a 'narrow restrictive definition
732. Id.
733. Id. at 48-49.
734. Id. (quoting Locke v. Rose, 514 F.2d 570, 571 (6th Cir. 1975)).
735. Id.
736. Id.
737. Id. at 50-51.
738. Id. at 50.
739. 478 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1972).
740. Rose, 423 U.S. at 51 (citing Crawford, 478 S.W.2d 314).
741. 414 U.S. 21 (1973).
742. Rose, 423 U.S. at 51 (citing Wainwright, 414 U.S. at 22).
743. 277 S.W.2d 340 (Tenn. 1955).
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of the offense. '"'744 After Fisher, the Tennessee Supreme Court, in
Sherrill v. State,745 reiterated the fact that the Tennessee "crimes against
nature" statute encompassed the broader meaning and declared that "the
prohibition brings all unnatural copulation with mankind or a beast, in-
cluding sodomy, within its scope. 746 The United States Supreme Court
then noted that a similar Maine statute, which the Tennessee court in
Sherrill had cited with approval, "had been applied to cunnilingus before
either Tennessee decision. 74 7 Finally, the Court stated that "[o]ther ju-
risdictions had already reasonably construed identical statutory language
to apply to such acts. And given the Tennessee court's clear pronounce-
ments that its statute was intended to effect broad coverage, there was
nothing to indicate, clearly or otherwise, that respondent's acts were out-
side the scope of [the Tennessee enactment]. 748 Thus, the Court reversed
the Sixth Circuit's finding of vagueness.
Another example of a judicial opinion that studied decisions from
other jurisdictions in order to determine the meaning of a statute is
Commonwealth v. Sexton.749 In Sexton, discussed in an earlier section,75°
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered whether con-
crete pavement could constitute a "dangerous weapon" to support a
charge of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon.751 In this case,
the defendant was charged with assault and battery with a dangerous
weapon on a joint venture theory after he and his brother attacked a man
after leaving a bar. During the attack, the defendant's brother slammed
the victim's head against the pavement several times. After being con-
victed of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, the Mas-
sachusetts appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction, holding
that a dangerous weapon could only include an object a person could
"wield" or "arm" himself with and, as such, "concrete pavement," being
,,752a stationary object, could not be a "dangerous weapon.
In deciding this issue of first impression, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts first looked to its former decisions,753 as well as to de-
cisions of other jurisdictions, which had found "otherwise innocent items
to fit this classification when used in a way which endangers another's
744. Rose, 423 U.S. at 52 (citing Fisher, 277 S.W.2d 340).
745. 321 S.W.2d 811 (Tenn. 1959).
746. Rose, 423 U.S. at 52 (citing Sherrill, 321 S.W.2d at 812 (quoting from State v. Cyr, 198 A.
743 (Me. 1938))).
747. Id.
748. Id. at 53.
749. 680 N.E.2d 23 (Mass. 1997).
750. See supra notes 600-13 and accompanying text.
751. Sexton, 680 N.E.2d at 24 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 15A (West 2000)).
752. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Sexton, 672 N.E.2d 991,993 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996)).
753. Id. at 25.
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safety. 754 The court observed that the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit had ruled that a walking stick used to strike someone
was a "dangerous weapon. 755 Meanwhile, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had held that a chair "brought down upon
a victim's head" was a "dangerous weapon. 7 56 The California Court of
Appeals had determined that a rock was a "dangerous weapon. ' 7  The
Maryland Supreme Court had held that a "microphone cord wrapped
,,758around a victim's neck" was a "dangerous weapon. Additionally, the
Michigan Court of Appeals had stated in dictum that an "automobile,
broomstick, flashlight, and lighter fluid" could all constitute "dangerous
weapons.'759
The court next considered the fact that "a number of other jurisdic-
tions" had held that the "stationary character" of an object did not pre-
vent it from being used as a "dangerous weapon., 760 For instance, the
court pointed out that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
55761Circuit had determined that steel cell bars were a "dangerous weapon.
Similarly, the North Carolina Supreme Court had determined that cell
,,762bars and floors were "dangerous weapons. ' 2 Moreover, the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, had held that cell bars7 6 3 and, in an-
other case, a plate glass window constituted "dangerous weapons.'
Finally, the New York Court of Appeals and the Oregon Court of Ap-
peals had both held that a sidewalk was a "dangerous weapon. ''765 While
the Massachusetts court recognized that some other jurisdictions had
taken a contrary position, it held that a person who deliberately uses con-
crete pavement as a means of inflicting serious injury could be found
guilty of assault and battery by means of a "dangerous weapon.
' 766
Beyond the above approaches to discerning notice, it is conceivable
that a particular political subdivision may gain interpretative guidance
from another governmental unit within the same jurisdiction. In City of
Chicago v. Powell,767 an Illinois Appellate Court decision, definitional
754. Id.
755. Id. at 25-26 (citing United States v. Loman, 551 F.2d 164, 169 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 912 (1977)).
756. Id. at 26 (citing United States v. Johnson, 324 F.2d 264, 266 (4th. Cir. 1963)).
757. Id. (citing People v. White, 212 Cal. App. 2d 464, 465 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963)).
758. Id. (citing Bennett v. State, 205 A.2d 393, 395 (Md. 1964)).
759. Id. (citing People v. Buford, 244 N.W.2d 351, 353 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (dictum)).
760. Id.
761. Id. (citing United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143, 147 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1135 (1995)).
762. Id. (citing State v. Brinson, 448 S.E.2d 822 (N.C. 1994)).
763. Id. (citing People v. O'Hagan, 574 N.Y.S.2d 198 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)).
764. Id. (citing People v. Coe, 564 N.Y.S.2d 255, 256 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)).
765. Id. (citing People v. Galvin, 481 N.E.2d 565, 566 (N.Y. 1985); State v. Reed, 790 P.2d
551, 551 (Or. Ct. App. 1990)).
766. Id. at 27.
767. 735 N.E.2d 119 (111. App. Ct. 2000).
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guidance regarding the scope of a municipal ordinance was extracted
from state legislation. In that case, a Chicago municipal ordinance pro-
hibiting "soliciting unlawful business" was used to prosecute a defendant
who was soliciting prospective purchasers of heroin in public.768 Other
defendants were prosecuted for soliciting for purposes of prostitution,
and yet another for soliciting the sale of false identification cards. 69
These defendants claimed the municipal law in question was vague in
regards to what constituted "solicitation" and "unlawful business.' 77 °
After a trial court granted one of the defendant's motion to dismiss, the
City appealed.771 The appellate court reversed the trial court's vagueness
findings after concluding the words "solicitation" and "unlawful busi-
ness" carried a clear meaning.772 As to "solicitation," the appellate court
pointed out that this term was defined in the Illinois Criminal Code as "to
command, authorize, urge, incite, request, or advise another to commit
an offense. 773 In addition, the Illinois penal law contained a specific
prohibition outlawing criminal "solicitation" which occurs when one is
"commanding, encouraging, or requesting another to commit a particular
offense with the intent that the offense be committed. 77 4 Moreover,
Black's Law Dictionary contained a definition,775 as did caselaw that had
upheld charges of illicit "solicitation of professional patronage,, 776 while
other caselaw had upheld a statute prohibiting "solicitation of the sale of
residential real estate once a property owner gave an agent notice that he
did not intend to sell the property. 777 Regarding the meaning of "unlaw-
ful business," the appellate court noted that the Illinois Supreme Court
778
had previously upheld very similar language.
As observed previous sections, the fact that certain language in a
specific criminal law has not been provided some definitional clarifica-
tion may contribute to a court's finding of vagueness. In Winters v. New
77 780
York,779 discussed in several previous sections, which involved exami-
nation of a prohibition criminalizing dissemination of "[o]bscene prints
and articles," the United States Supreme Court found the measure vague
768. Powell, 735 N.E.2d at 122-23 (quoting CHICAGO, IL., MUN. CODE § 10-8-515(a) (1998)).
769. Id. at 125.
770. Id. at 122-25.
771. Id. at 123.
772. Id. at 128-30.
773. Id. at 128 (quoting 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-20 (1998)).
774. Id. (quoting 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-1 (1998)).
775. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1392 (6th ed. 1990)).
776. Id. (citing Desnick v. Dep't of Prof'l Regulation, 665 N.E.2d 1346, 1361 (Ill. 1996), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 965 (1996)).
777. Id. at 129 (citing Curtis v. Thompson, 840 F.2d 1291, 1305 (7th Cir. 1988)).
778. Id. at 130 (citing People v. Williams, 551 N.E.2d 631,633 (fl. 1990)).
779. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
780. See supra notes 63-74, 448-49, 583-88 and accompanying text.
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in part due to the absence of interpretative aids in other jurisdictions.78'
The Court pointed out that "[o]nly two other state courts, whose reports
are printed appear to have construed language in their laws [dealing with
depictions of deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime in some type of periodi-
call similar to that here involved. 782
J. Treatises
Courts will often resort to consulting treatises when reviewing al-
leged statutory indefiniteness. 783 In United States v. Gadreau,784 dis-
cussed in earlier sections,785 the defendant raised a vagueness claim in a
federal Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")
786
prosecution where a Colorado commercial bribery statute that was used
as a predicate offense was challenged on due process grounds.787 Here,
the defendants were alleged to have conspired to engage in a violation of
the state commercial bribery statute by giving money to an executive in a
public service company in order to have him award contracts to a supply
company in which they had a legal interest.788 This Colorado statute pro-
vided that a violation occurs whenever a person "solicits, accepts, or
agrees to accept any benefit as consideration for knowingly violating or
agreeing to violate a duty of fidelity to which he is subject as... [a]gent
,,789or employee.., or... [o]fficer. . . of an incorporated association.
After being charged under RICO790 in federal district court, the defen-
dants argued the "knowing[ly] violat[ing] ... a duty of fidelity" language
in the Colorado statute was void for vagueness. 79' The United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit disagreed.792 The Tenth Circuit
stated that the "authorities are unanimous that an officer or agent
breaches his duty of loyalty to his corporation or principal by accepting
bribes to compromise his principal's interests. 793 After examining pas-
781. Winters, 333 U.S. at 511.
782. Id.
783. See, e.g., Gaudreau, 860 F.2d at 362 (consulting treatise to ascertain agent's duty toward
principal); cf. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 464-67 (2001) (discussing that common law
murder required victim's death to occur within a year and a day (citing FRANCIS WHARTON, LAW OF
HOMICIDE § 18, at 19-20 (3d ed. 1907)); however, this "year and a day" rule is no longer valid and
defendant could not claim lack of notice regarding change in Tennessee law).
784. 860 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1988).
785. See supra notes 317-22, 401-20 and accompanying text.
786. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1986).
787. Gaudreau, 860 F.2d at 358.
788. Id. at 358-59.
789. Id. at 359 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-5-401 (1986)).
790. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1986) (making it illegal to engage in a "pattern of
racketeering" to benefit an "enterprise" with which one is "associated")).
791. Id.at358.
792. Id.
793. Id. at 362.
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sages from Fletcher's Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations
794
and the Restatement (Second) of Agency,795 the court of appeals ruled that
the language in question carried a clear meaning.796 Here, the defendants
had conspired with the public service official to engage in a "pattern of
commercial bribery," for which they were properly charged.
797
As with other potential sources of "notice," it may turn out that ex-
amination of a respected treatise supports a vagueness claim. 798 In Bouie
v. City of Columbia,799 a United States Supreme Court decision, two
black college students conducted a "sit in" demonstration at a drug store
lunch counter in Columbia, South Carolina.8°° At first, no one ap-
proached the students to take their food order. 80 1 Then, a store employee
placed a "no trespassing" sign in the area where they were seated.80 2 Lo-
cal police were called by the store manager and asked the two students to
leave.803 When the students refused, they were arrested for several of-
fenses, including "criminal trespass.,, 8°4 This South Carolina offense was
defined as an "entry upon the lands of another ... after notice from the
owner or tenant prohibiting such entry., 80 5 Following their convictions, a
794. Id. (quoting 3 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 884, at 348, 351-52 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2002)).
795. Id. at 363 n.15 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 391 (1958)).
796. Id. at 362-63.
797. Id. at 359, 362-63.
798. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 161 n.4, 162 (1972) (noting
that "vagrancy" laws were a remnant of archaic feudal laws designed to discourage movement of
workers from their home area in search of improved work conditions (citing 3 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 203, 206, 266-75 (London, MacMillan 1883); 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *169) (municipal vagrancy ordinance unconstitutionally
vague)); Keeler v. Superior Ct. of Amador County, 470 P.2d 617, 620 nn. 4,6, & 7, 629 (Cal. 1970)
(finding common law required murder victim be born alive and not merely a fetus (citing 3 EDWARD
COKE, INSTITUTES *58, HENRY DE BRACrON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND, III, ii, 4
(np. nd.); 3 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 32 (London,
MacMillan 1883); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 129-30; 1 MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS
OF THE CROWN 433 (London, T. Payne 1778); 1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN ch. 31,
§ 16 (London, Eliz. Nut 4th ed. 1762)) (defendant lacked notice murder statute included killing a
fetus)); People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203 (DIl. 1980) (determining the common law meaning of
murder and that it had not included the killing of a fetus (referring to 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES
*50; 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 129-30; 1 MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN
433 (London, T. Payne 1800))); State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625, 628, 630 (Minn. 1985) (common
law insisted that victim of homicide be a person "born alive" and not a fetus (citing WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCoTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 530-32 (1972); 2 CHARLES E.
TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 114, at 95-96 (1979); 40 C.J.S. Homicide § 2(b) (1944))
(accused had no notice vehicular homicide statute encompassed death of fetus)).
799. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).




804. Id. at 349 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-386 (Law. Co-op. 1960)). The other arrests either
did not result in convictions or resulted in convictions reversed on appeal. Id. at 348-49.
805. Id. (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-386 (Law. Co-op. 1960)).
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due process vagueness challenge was advanced on the ground that the
two students lacked notice.80 6 These petitioners emphasized that they
received no "notice ... prohibiting such entry" either before they entered
the drug store or before they sat in the restaurant booth. 8 7 However, the
South Carolina Supreme Court ruled the statute not only covered the act
of entry after notice not to enter was given, but also the act of remaining
on the premises following notice to leave.80 8 In its review, the United
States Supreme Court stated that the two students had not been provided
with notice that the statute encompassed remaining on another's property
after being asked to leave.809 The Court noted that the South Carolina
law-which predated the South Carolina Supreme Court's interpretation
of the trespass statute, holding that remaining on another's premises was
prohibited-provided "petitioners no warning whatever that this criminal
statute would be [so] construed." 8'0 Indeed, the "clear language and con-
sistent judicial interpretation to the contrary .... incorporating a doctrine
found only in civil trespass cases" belied the government's contention
that fair notice had been provided in advance.8 1 In support of its conclu-
sion that these petitioners at best had notice that their conduct amounted
to civil trespass, but certainly not criminal trespass, the Court not only
referred Clark and Marshall's On the Law of Crimes812 in the text of their
opinion, but also cited to Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure and
Hochheimer's Law of Crimes and Criminal Procedure.8" 3 The Court
concluded these petitioners could not be held to have notice of the South
Carolina Supreme Court's post-conviction "unforeseeable and retroactive
judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory language" reflected in
the criminal trespass statute and, as such, the decisions of the lower
courts were reversed.814
K. Literature/Periodicals
Courts will even look to literature in order to determine the meaning
of a particular phrase or a word in a statute.815 An opinion illustrating the
806. Id. at 349-50.
807. Id. at 350.
808. Id.
809. Id. at 360-63.
810. Id. at 359.
811. Id.
812. Id. at 358 (citing WILLIAM L. CLARK & WILLIAM L. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF CRIMES 607 (5th ed. 1952)).
813. Id. at n.6 (citing 2 RONALD A. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 868, at 735 (1957); LEWIS HOCHHEIMER, THE LAW OF CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
INCLUDING FORMS AND PRECEDENTS §§ 360-63 (2d ed. 1904)).
814. Id. at 352, 355, 363.
815. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972) (referring to Walt
Whitman, Song of the Open Road, available at http://www.bartleby.com/142/82.html (last visited
Feb. 27, 2003); Vachel Lindsay, I want to Go Wandering, available at http://dlib.-
stanford.edu:6520/text/ampo.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2003); HENRY DAVID THOREAU,
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use of literature for interpretative guidance is Muscarello v. United
States,8 16 a decision that was discussed in several earlier sections. 8 7 In
this case, the United States Supreme Court consolidated two cases81 8 in
order to address the question of whether the words "carries a firearm" as
it appears in the federal criminal code is limited to the carrying of fire-
arms on the person.819
In the first of these two cases, defendant Muscarello was arrested
for selling marijuana, which he had carried in his truck to the location of
the sale.82° When police officers searched his truck, they found a hand-
gun locked in the glove compartment. 821 The defendant admitted during
plea provisions that he carried a gun for protection.822 However, later the
defendant retracted his statement and insisted that, in any event, having a
handgun in the truck's glove compartment did not constitute the "carry-
ing" of a firearm within the statutory meaning of the word "carries." 823 In
the second case, defendants Cleveland and Gray-Santana placed several
guns in a bag and then put the bag in the trunk of their ca824 They then
drove the car to a potential drug-selling location where they hoped to
steal drugs from drug dealers.825 At the scene, federal agents appre-
hended the two individuals and searched their car.826 The agents discov-
ered the guns and arrested the defendants.827 All of these defendants were
convicted of trafficking in illicit drugs while carrying a firearm contrary
to federal law, whereupon they appealed.828
Two different United States Courts of Appeals concluded that the
defendants were guilty of violating the federal criminal code because
they had "'carrie[d]' guns during and in relation to a drug trafficking
EXCURSIONS 251-53 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1893), while ruling municipal vagrancy ordinance
vague); Commonwealth v. Sexton, 680 N.E.2d 23, 27 (Mass. 1997) (quoting State v. Reed, 790 P.2d
551, 552 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting CERVANTES, supra note 612), while determining concrete
pavement could constitute a "dangerous weapon" for purposes of assault and battery with a
dangerous weapon and proscribed by state law).
816. 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
817. See supra notes 452-61, 482-99 and accompanying text.
818. United States v. Muscarello, 106 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Cleveland, 106
F.3d 1056 (1st Cir. 1997).
819. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 126-27. The provision of the federal criminal code, which
defendants challenged, imposes a five year mandatory incarceration term upon an individual who
"uses or carries a firearm" "during and in relation to" a "drug trafficking crime." 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)(1) (2000).
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offense." 82 9 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to de-
termine "whether the fact that the guns were found in the locked glove
compartment, or the trunk, of a car" constituted "carrying" a firearm
under the federal statute.8 3 °
Among other considerations in its analysis, the Court looked to the
use of the word "carry" in literature to determine its meaning under the
statute. 83' The Court stated:
The greatest of writers have used the word [to include conveyance in
a vehicle]. See, e.g., the King James Bible, 2 Kings 9:28 ("[H]is ser-
vants carried him in a chariot to Jerusalem"); id., Isaiah 30:6 ("[T]hey
will carry their riches upon the shoulders of young asses"). Robinson
Crusoe says "[w]ith my boat, I carry'd away every Thing." D. Defoe,
Robinson Crusoe 174 (J. Crowely ed. 1972). And the owners of Que-
equeg's ship, Melville writes, "had lent him a [wheelbarrow], in
which to carry his heavy chest to his boarding-house." H. Melville,
Moby Dick 43 (U. Chicago 1952). This Court, too, has spoken [in our
written opinions] of the "carrying" of drugs in a car or in its
"trunk."
832
The Court further acknowledged:
These examples do not speak directly about carrying guns. But there
is nothing linguistically special about the fact that weapons, rather
than drugs, are being carried. Robinson Crusoe might have carried a
gun in his boat; Queequeg might have borrowed a wheelbarrow in
which to carry not a chest, but a harpoon. And, to make certain that
there is no special ordinary English restriction (unmentioned in dic-
tionaries) upon the use of "carry" in respect to guns, we have sur-
veyed modem press usage, albeit crudely, by searching computerized
newspaper databases-both the New York Times data base in
Lexis/Nexis, and the "US News" data base in Westlaw. We looked
for sentences in which the words "carry," "vehicle," and "weapon"
(or variations thereof) all appear. We found thousands of such sen-
tences, and random sampling suggests that many, perhaps more than
one-third, are sentences used to convey the meaning at issue here, i.e.,
the carrying of guns in a car.833
829. Id.
830. Id. The Court acknowledged that there were two different meanings of the word "carry"
that might be applicable in this case. Id. at 128. One meaning used the word as to "'carry' firearms in
a wagon, car, truck, or other vehicle that one accompanies." Id. The second way the word "carry"
can be used is in a specialized way, for example, "'bearing' or (in slang) 'packing' (as in 'packing a
gun')." Id. The Court declared that the first meaning was the primary meaning of the word "carry"
and concluded that Congress intended for the statute to use that meaning. Id.
831. ld. at 128-29.
832. Id. at 129 (citing California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 572-73 (1991); Florida v. Jimeno,
500 U.S. 248, 249 (1991)).
833. Id.
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The Court then turned to ordinary newspaper usage:
The New York Times, for example, writes about "an ex-con" who
"arrives home driving a stolen car and carrying a load of handguns,"
and an "official peace officer who carries a shotgun in his boat[.]"
The Boston Globe refers to the arrest of a professional baseball player
"for carrying a semiloaded automatic weapon in his car." The Colo-
rado Springs Gazette Telegraph speaks of one "Russell" who "carries
a gun hidden in his car." The Arkansas Gazette refers to a "house"
that was "searched" in an effort to find "items that could be carried in
a car, such as ... guns." The San Diego Union-Tribune asks, "What,
do they carry guns aboard these boats now?"
834
The Court conceded that the word 'carry' had several meanings but de-
termined that the uses of the word 'carry' in the aforementioned literary
examples were the primary uses of the word "carry., 835 The Court con-
cluded that "the relevant linguistic facts are that the word 'carry' in its
ordinary sense includes carrying in a car and that the word, used in its
ordinary sense, keeps the same meaning whether one carries a gun, a
suitcase, or a banana.,
836
Another example of a court turning to literature to emphasize or
determine the meaning of a statutory word or phrase is State v. Reed,837
decided by the Oregon Court of Appeals. In this case, the defendant hit
his girlfriend using his fists, the force of which knocked her down onto
the sidewalk.838 The defendant then repeatedly hit her head against the
concrete. 839 The defendant was thereafter indicted for "unlawfully and
knowingly [causing] physical injury to [the victim] by means of a dan-
gerous weapon, to wit: concrete, by banging her head repeatedly against
the concrete., 840 After the trial court found the defendant guilty, the de-
fendant appealed. 841 The defendant argued on appeal that the concrete
sidewalk, a stationary object, could not be considered a "dangerous
weapon.842 The Oregon Court of Appeals noted that the Oregon weap-
ons statute contained a definition of "dangerous weapon" that used lan-
834. Id. at 129-30 (internal citations omitted) (noting that THE NEW YORK TIMES MANUAL OF
STYLE AND USAGE restricts "[t]imes journalists and editors to the use of proper English"); see
Foreword to THE NEW YORK TIMES MANUAL OF STYLE AND USAGE, A DESK BOOK OF GUIDELINES
FOR WRITERS AND EDITORS (L. Jordan rev. ed., 1976).
835. Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 130-31.
836. Id. at 131.
837. 790 P.2d 551 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).




842. Id. However, the defendant conceded that if he had taken a piece of concrete in his hand
and used that piece of concrete to hit his girlfriend on her head, then the concrete would be
considered a dangerous weapon. Id.
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guage referring to any object which had the capacity to kill or cause seri-
ous bodily injury. 84 3 The court reasoned that "no matter how harmless
[the concrete sidewalk] may appear when used for its customary pur-
poses, [it] becomes a dangerous weapon when used in a manner that ren-
ders it capable of causing serious physical injury."844 In this connection,
the court considered language from Cervantes' famous literary work Don
Quixote-"[w]hether the pitcher hits the stone or the stone hits the
pitcher, it will be bad for the pitcher."845 Based on this reasoning,
namely, that the key issue was whether the object in question had the
capacity to hurt another human being, the court upheld the trial court's
decision.
846
V1. OTHER RULES OF THUMB
Frequently, a court will uphold a statute against a vagueness chal-
lenge based not on the fact that the court can refer to a particular source
to hold that the defendant had adequate notice, but more on the fact that
the statute survives scrutiny when examined under the lens of what may
be described as a judicial rule of thumb. These rules of thumb include
considerations such as whether the statute proscribes an activity which is
malum in se or malum prohibitum,847 whether the statute carries the po-
tential of intruding upon a constitutional right,848 whether the defendant
enjoyed a more circumspect alternative to engaging in conduct that
treaded near the borderline of a criminal law, 849 and whether the statute
somehow punished a person because of the person's status rather than
because of the person's conduct.
850
A. Malum Prohibitum/Malum in Se?
Occasionally, courts will refer to the distinction between "malum in
se" offenses and "malum prohibitum" offenses in assessing whether a
statute is vague.851 A criminal act is considered malum in se where the
underlying conduct is inherently wrong by its very nature, based on
common morality and natural law principles.852 A malum prohibitum
stricture is "an act not inherently immoral but which becomes an offense
843. Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 161.015(1) (1989), which defines a dangerous weapon as
"any instrument, article or substance which under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to
be used or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury").
844. Id. at 551-52.
845. Id. at 552 (quoting CERVANTES, supra note 612).
846. Id.
847. See infra notes 851-70 and accompanying text.
848. See infra notes 871-92 and accompanying text.
849. See infra notes 892-919 and accompanying text.
850. See infra notes 920-47 and accompanying text.
851. See, e.g., United States v. Donahue, 948 F.2d 438, 441 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 976 (1992).
852. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAw 270 (1978).
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because its commission is expressly forbidden by positive law. '853 This
distinction is useful in the arena of vagueness inquiries in that if a law is
malum in se or, in plain language, a law that proscribes as illegal conduct
any right-minded individual should realize is wrong, the law need not be
as precise in its terms as would be the case where the law is malum pro-
hibitum in nature. A simple illustration might be in order. All must agree
murder is clearly wrong. As such, a murder statute can be cast in rather
general terms: the intentional, knowing, or grossly reckless unjustified
taking of the life of another human being. However, there is nothing in-
trinsically wrong with being in possession of an item that turns out to be
drug paraphernalia, such as a small pipe or syringe that might be useable
to smoke or inject a controlled substance. It is the association with illicit
drug use that causes a legislative body to criminalize the unauthorized
possession of the device. However, inasmuch as there is little, if any,
inherent wrongfulness involved in regards to possessing the device itself,
it is less likely the average citizen realizes possession of such a device is
wrong and, as such, more precision will be required in defining exactly
what devices are allowed and what ones are forbidden.
In United States v. Donahue,854 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit looked to this rule of thumb, which tolerates less
precise definitional language where the underlying conduct is malum in
se.855 Here, a defendant had been convicted of "bank robbery" in viola-
tion of federal law.856 The defendant argued on appeal that the bank rob-
bery statute, which read "[w]hoever, by force and violence, or by intimi-
dation, takes ... from the person or presence of another ... any...
money.., belonging to... any bank [commits this offense]," was vague
because it did not require proof of intent.857 The Eighth Circuit quickly
responded, stating that "[o]ne does not have to be a rocket scientist to
know that bank robbery is a crime; and the statute merely makes malum
prohibitum (and punishable in federal court) that which already is malum
in se.'858 Here, because the underlying conduct was malum in se, the
Eighth Circuit was able to dispose of the defendant's vagueness claim in
a single sentence.
859
853. People v. Wilkinson, 674 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Il. App. Ct. 1996) (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 865 (5th ed. 1979)). Indictments alleging a violation of Illinois "official misconduct"
prohibition, being malum prohibitum, must be cast in precise terms so as to place the accused on
notice before trial as to exactly what conduct amounted to a violation. Id. at 797 (citing People v.
Kleffman, 412 N.E.2d 1057, 1061 (111. App. Ct. 1980)).
854. 948 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1991).
855. Donahue, 948 F.2d at 441.
856. Id. at 440 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d) (1988)).
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Meanwhile, People v. Heller,860 a New York Court of Appeals deci-
sion, illustrates the greater degree of clarity a reviewing court demands
when it encounters a vagueness claim lodged against a malum prohibi-
turn measure. In that case, the defendants were convicted of violating
New York's "obscenity" law. 86' The New York law defined "obscene" as
any "material or performance" which (1) "considered as a whole, its pre-
dominant appeal is to prurient, shameful or morbid interest in nudity,
sex, excretion, sadism or masochism," (2) "goes substantially beyond
customary limits of candor in describing or presenting such matters," and
(3) lacks "redeeming social value. 86 2 The defendants claimed a motion
picture, Blue Movie, and a magazine, Screw, were not obscene as the
State had alleged and, in any event, that the New York obscenity law was
vague. 863 The New York Court of Appeals disagreed.864 The court stated
that the obscenity statute "sufficiently describes the conduct sought to be
prohibited., 86' The court added:
It takes no dictionary reference to understand what the words 'nu-
dity', 'sex', 'excretion', 'sadism' or 'masochism' mean. The last three
terms, which are descriptive of certain kinds of conduct whether por-
trayed live, printed or photographically, can be considered Malum in
se in terms of Commercial exploitation. It is ludicrous and preposter-
ous to suppose that a person dealing in such material would not un-
derstand the prohibitions here. The terms 'nudity' and 'sex' are only
Malum prohibitum, of course, since each, to varying extents, could be
commercially exploited for valid artistic, scientific, or literary ends.
But surely, applying the sense of [the obscenity statute] as a whole,
there can be no doubt as to the narrow area sought to be prohibited.
When sex and nudity, and other sorts of prohibited conduct for that
matter, are exploited substantially beyond customary limits of candor
and would, as the average man views it, be the predominant element
in the material so as to appeal, again predominantly, to lascivious
cravings, then there can be no doubt as to what is prohibited. What
we are talking about is hard-core pornography.
866
Obviously, the fact that the legislature not only carefully defined "ob-
scenity" consistent with language previously endorsed by the United
States Supreme Court8 67 but also defined other terms including "mate-
rial" and "performance 868 removed the statute from the reach of the
860. 307 N.E.2d 805 (N.Y. 1973), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 944 (1974).
861. Heller, 307 N.E.2d at 807-08 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 235.00, 235.05 (McKinney
1967)).
862. Id. at 811 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.00(1) (McKinney 1967)).
863. Id. at 807, 812-13.
864. Id. at 812-13, 815.
865. Id. at 812 (emphasis added).
866. Id. at 812-13 (emphasis added).
867. Id. at 808-11 (discussing at length Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
868. Id. at 811 (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.00(2)-(3) (McKinney 1967)).
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void-for-vagueness doctrine.869 The court concluded that "our obscenity
statute is sufficiently specific" to withstand constitutional challenge.87°
Donahue and Heller offer additional instruction on analyzing a
vagueness claim. Thus, rule of thumb number one: if a penal measure is
in the nature of malum in se, courts tend to tolerate more general lan-
guage than in the case where the law is of the malum prohibitum cate-
gory, where more detailed, narrow language is likely to be expected.
B. Constitutional Rights Involved?
Although this point was made, or alluded to, in several earlier sec-
tions, there is no question but that courts are more demanding of speci-
ficity of language in connection with laws that may touch on constitu-
tional rights compared with statutes that carry no such possibility.871 In-
deed, the United States Supreme Court has stated, "[P]erhaps the most
important factor affecting the clarity that the Constitution demands of a
law is whether it threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally pro-
tected rights. If, for example, the law interferes with the right of free
speech or of association, a more stringent vagueness test should ap-
ply. 872 Additionally, the Court has noted that "precision must be the
touchstone of legislation.., affecting basic freedoms. 873
In Cox v. Louisiana,874 the United States Supreme Court considered
charges brought against a defendant who had led a group of students who
wanted to protest segregation, discrimination, and the arrests of fellow
students. This group had assembled at the Louisiana State Capitol and
869. Id. at 814.
870. Id. (emphasis added).
871. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-91 (1979) (Insistence on "fair notice" and
avoidance of "arbitrary and erratic" enforcement "appears to be especially true where the uncertainty
induced by the statute threatens to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally protected rights." Here,
certain provisions restricting availability of abortions found to be vague. (citations omitted)); Smith
v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) ("Where a statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing state
court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the [void-
for-vagueness] doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts." Here, flag
misuse statute vague.); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963) ("Standards of permissible
statutory vagueness are strict in the area of free expression." Here, state proscription against advising
prospective litigants to seek assistance of particular attorneys violates First Amendment.); see also
Anthony Amsterdam, Note, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 67, 75 (1960) (noting "the doctrine of unconstitutional indefiniteness has been used by the
Supreme Court almost invariably for the creation of an insulating buffer zone of added protection at
the peripheries of several of the Bill of Rights freedoms").
872. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982)
(citing as examples Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (vagrancy statute
violates due process); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (anti-noise ordinance
challenged on First Amendment grounds not vague although the claim of unconstitutionality
"question is [a] close" one)).
873. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 514 (1964) (citing Button, 371 U.S. at 438).
874. 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
[Vol. 80:2
2002] VAGUENESS, AMBIGUITY, AND OTHER UNCERTAINTY 335
marched to a courthouse where "they sang, prayed and listened" to the
defendant's speech. 875 For his efforts, the defendant was arrested on sev-
eral charges including "disturbing the peace" and "obstructing public
,,876passages.' 6 Following his conviction, the United States Supreme Court
found both charges were contrary to the defendant's First Amendment
rights of free speech and assembly.877 When the Court addressed the
"disturbing the peace" charge, it not only saw First Amendment prob-
lems but also vague legislation.878 The Court noted this offense contained
two elements: "(1) congregating with others 'with intent to provoke a
breach of the peace, or under circumstances such that a breach of the
peace may be occasioned,' and (2) a refusal to move on after having been
ordered to do so by a law enforcement officer."879 Acknowledging that
the second element was "narrow and specific," the Court pointed out that
the Louisiana Supreme Court had interpreted the "breach of the peace"
language as meaning "to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to mo-
lest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet.' 880 This statute, said the Court,
"as authoritatively interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme Court, is uncon-
stitutionally vague in its overly broad scope., 88' The Court explained:
Maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion is a basic
tenet of our constitutional democracy. "A statute which upon its face,
and as authoritatively construed, is so vague and indefinite as to per-
mit the punishment of the fair use of this opportunity is repugnant to
the guaranty of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment."
882
Thus, the fact that someone might be disturbed or "agitated" by the de-
fendant's unpopular speech was clearly not a sufficient warrant for impo-
sition of the bite of the criminal law.883
Crimes which carry no potential for restriction of basic freedoms are
less likely to encounter vagueness problems due to lack of narrow and
specific language. 884 United States v. National Dairy Products Corp.885 is
875. Cox, 379 U.S. at 536.
876. Id. at 544-45, 553 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:103.1 (West 1962) (disturbing the
peace); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:100.1 (West 1962) (obstructing public passages)).
877. Id. at 552, 558,
878. Id. at 551.
879. Id.
880. Id. (quoting State v. Cox, 156 So. 2d 448, 455 (1963)).
881. Id.
882. Id. at 552 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
883. Id. at 551-52.
884. See, e.g., Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 495-96 (municipal drug paraphernalia
ordinance "does not restrict speech as such, but simply regulates the commercial marketing of items
that the labels reveal may be used for an illicit purpose. The scope of the ordinance therefore does
not embrace commercial speech"); see also Jonathan Weinberg, Vagueness and Indecency, 3 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 221, 258 n.177 (1996) (The "due process vagueness doctrine is relatively
forgiving when no First Amendment rights are at stake.").
885. 372 U.S. 29 (1963).
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an example of this point. The defendants were charged with violating a
provision of the Robinson-Patman Act, which made it a crime to sell
goods at "unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competi-
tion or eliminating a competitor. ' 886 The defendants claimed that the
language "unreasonably low prices" was unconstitutionally vague.887 The
federal district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on this
ground, but the United States Supreme Court saw otherwise.888 The
Court began its analysis with the familiar refrain that a "strong presump-
tive validity ... attaches to an Act of Congress." 889 Here, the law merely
restricted "sales made below cost without [a] legitimate commercial ob-
jective and with specific intent to destroy competition." 89 The Court
added:
In this connection we also note that the approach to "vagueness" gov-
erning a case like this is different from that followed in cases arising
under the First Amendment. There we are concerned with the vague-
ness of the statute "on its face" because such vagueness may in itself
deter constitutionally protected and socially desirable conduct. No
such factor is present here where the statute is directed only at con-
duct designed to destroy competition, activity which is neither consti-
tutionally protected nor socially desirable.
89t
Thus, the vagueness claim failed.892
The cases in this section illustrate rule of thumb number two: where
an offense carries the possibility of inhibiting constitutional freedoms,
precision in language is the watchword; where the stricture in question
has no such potential, more general language is tolerated.
C. Circumspect Alternative Available to the Defendant?
Aside from caselaw where precision of language is a must because
of the possibility that the statute may be stepping on basic constitutional
rights, there appear questions in judicial opinions which essentially ask
whether there existed a more circumspect alternative available to the
defendant beyond engaging in questionable conduct which formed the
basis for the criminal prosecution. Justice Frankfurter, in dissent in Win-
893ters v. New York, insisted, "it is not violative of due process of law for
a legislature in framing its criminal law to cast upon the public the duty
886. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. at 29 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 13a (1958)).
887. Id. at 31.
888. Id. at 30.
889. Id. at 32.
890. Id. at 37.
891. Id. at 36 (citations omitted).
892. id.
893. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
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of care and even of caution, provided that there is sufficient warning to
one bent on obedience that he comes near the proscribed area.
8 94
In Nash v. United States, 95 the United States Supreme Court re-
viewed two convictions arising out of violations of the federal Sherman
Antitrust Act, namely, conspiracy in restraint of trade and conspiracy to
monopolize trade.896 Defendants were involved in marketing turpentine
in a manner allegedly designed to destroy competition. 897 The antitrust
law had been previously interpreted as prohibiting "only such contracts
and combinations .... by reason of intent or the inherent nature of the
contemplated acts, [that] prejudice the public interests by unduly restrict-
ing competition or unduly obstructingthe course of trade.",898 The defen-
dants argued "that the crime thus defined by the statute contains in its
definition an element of degree as to which estimates may differ, with
the result that a man might find himself in prison because his honest
judgment"899 was deemed wrong "by a jury of less competent men.'9°°
However, the Court disagreed.9°' Justice Holmes, writing for the major-
ity, in his oft-quoted passage, said, "[T]he law is full of instances where a
man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury subse-
quently estimates it, some matter of degree." 902 He then declared, 'The
criterion in such cases is to examine whether common social duty would,
under the circumstances, have suggested a more circumspect conduct."903
In other words, Justice Holmes was insisting that where defendants were
engaging in a variety of tactics to manipulate and control the marketing
of this product, perhaps consideration should have been given to pro-
ceeding a bit more cautiously by perhaps making inquiry of the official-
dom to assess the propriety of their business schemes, rather than push
their behavior to the edge of what the law permits thereby risking falling
off the edge into the realm of criminal prosecution.9°4
In Boyce v. United States, °5 the defendant was charged with violat-
ing Interstate Commerce Commission regulations that required "[d]rivers
of motor vehicles transporting any explosive, inflammable liquid, in-
flammable compressed gas, or poisonous gas [to] avoid, so far as practi-
cable, and, where feasible, by prearrangement of routes, driving into or
894. Winters, 333 U.S. at 539 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
895. 229 U.S. 373 (1913).
896. Nash, 229 U.S. at 374 (citing "act of July 2, 1890, chap. 647, 26 Stat at L. 209, U.S.
Comp Stat. 1901, p. 3200").
897. Id, at 375-76.
898. Id. at 376 (citing United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911)).
899. Id.
900. Id.
901. Id. at 377-80.
902. Id. at 377.
903. Id. (emphasis added).
904. Id. at 377-80.
905. 342 U.S. 337 (1952).
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through congested thoroughfares, places where crowds are assembled,
street car tracks, tunnels, viaducts, and dangerous crossings."906 The de-
fendant successfully moved in the federal district court to dismiss the
indictments after arguing the "so far as practicable and where feasible"
terminology was unconstitutionally vague.907 However, the United States
Court of Appeals reversed the order to dismiss and the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate ruling.90 8 The Court noted:
A criminal statute must be sufficiently definite to give notice of the
required conduct to one who would avoid its penalties, and to guide
the judge in its application and the lawyer in defending one charged
with its violation. But few words possess the precision of mathemati-
cal symbols, most statutes must deal with untold and unforeseen
variations in factual situations, and the practical necessities of dis-
charging the business of government inevitably limit the specificity
with which legislators can spell out prohibitions. Consequently, no
more than a reasonable degree of certainty can be demanded. Nor is it
unfair to require that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an
area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the
line.
909
Thus, the Boyce Court followed the teachings of Justice Holmes and
ruled that the defendant's void-for-vagueness claim had no basis.
Finally, in Columbia Natural Resources, Inc. v. Tatum,9 10 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denoted similar reasoning in
a civil RICO case.911 Here, oil and gas lessees brought an action against
oil drillers alleging that the drillers had engaged in "claim-jumping
schemes," which amounted to federal wire fraud, mail fraud, and Travel
Act violations.91 2 The plaintiffs' civil RICO claims were predicated on
these alleged federal criminal violations that were said to constitute a
"pattern of racketeering activity" violative of RICO. 913 However, the
district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims on the theory that what con-
stitutes a "pattern of racketeering activity" under federal RICO was
vague.914 The Sixth Circuit saw the matter differently; pointing out that
simply focusing on the language at issue without looking at "the rest of
the statute" was inappropriate.915 The court noted that federal RICO ex-
plicitly states that a "pattern" arises where a defendant has engaged in
906. Boyce, 342 U.S. at 338-39 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 835 (1946)).
907. Id. at 340.
908. Id.
909. Id. (emphasis added).
910. 58 F.3d 1101 (6th Cir. 1995).
911. Columbia Natural Res., 58 F.3d at 1101.
912. Id. at 1103.
913. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1994)).
914. Id. at 1104.
915. Id. at 1106.
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two predicate offenses within the last 10 years and that the offenses that
would qualify as predicate offenses were specified within the RICO stat-
ute.916 The court, in rather stinging remarks, proceeded to dismantle the
defendants' claim of vagueness.
9 17
[T]here is a clear standard of conduct initially proscribed by the pat-
tern requirement of RICO. Here the statute clearly has a core; to
avoid any possibility of falling under RICO's admittedly broad um-
brella, one need only avoid committing an enumerated crime twice
within ten years. If one can take the time to avoid committing mail or
wire fraud, or extortion, or murder, or any of the other enumerated
predicate offenses, all of which are federal or state criminal offenses
in their own right, than one can sleep safe in the knowledge that he
will not be found to have violated RICO.
The issue, bluntly and simply framed, is whether a person of or-
dinary intelligence would know that committing dozens if not hun-
dreds of acts of wire and mail fraud, over the course of almost a dec-
ade against the same victim, might constitute a pattern of racketeering
activity. Since, by its terms it only takes a minimum of two acts, it is
simply implausible for a party to claim that it was not aware that
committing numerous predicate acts would expose it to potential
RICO liability. The statute need not be exact just as price discrimina-
tion statutes and antitrust statutes are not exact. The statute must sim-
ply put the party on notice that it is entering a potentially forbidden
918
zone.
Thus, the Sixth Circuit in effect said the defendants' assertion, that they
were essentially clueless about what might constitute "a pattern of rack-
eteering activity" was preposterous. They had not inadvertently slipped
over the edge; rather, they had deliberately crossed it on numerous occa-
sions.
Hence, rule of thumb number three: if a person is determined to
walk the edge of the divide between criminal behavior and legitimate
activity, it is fair to ask as to whether this individual's decision to place
himself precariously close to the edge makes him a deserving candidate
for the bite of the criminal law. Such a person's claim of lack of notice
may be countered by a judicial response that questions that person's
judgment in choosing to put himself at the edge in the first instance.
916. Id. at 1106-08.
917. Id. at 1108-09.
918. Id. (emphasis added).
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D. Status Criminality?
Criminal statutes that punish a person because of the personal
condition9 19 or status920 of an individual rather than for one's conduct 92'
are patently unconstitutional. In the seminal case addressing status
criminality, Robinson v. California,92 2 the United States Supreme Court
ruled unconstitutional a California statute which punished "being
addicted" to narcotics. 923 The Court ruled that punishing a person for
being an addict was akin to punishing "a person for being mentally ill,
suffering leprosy or being afflicted with venereal disease"-matters over
which an individual has little or no control.924
925 2In Lanzetta v. New Jersey, discussed earlier,926 a statute was ruled
unconstitutionally vague contrary to due process in circumstances where
the stricture in question could be described as essentially penalizing little
more than one's status. 927 In this pre-Robinson ruling, the United States
Supreme Court examined a state law that made it an offense to be a
"gangster. ' '92s Specifically, the statute provided that a person "not en-
gaged in any lawful occupation" who was "known to be a member of a
gang" and had either been convicted of (1) being a disorderly person
three or more times, or (2) any crime anywhere in the United States, "is
declared to be a gangster."929 In its ruling, the Court found the meaning
of the words "gang" and "gangster" to be vague.930 In that connection,
the Court observed that "[t]he challenged provision condemns no act or
omission. ' 931 Obviously, then, this measure's criminalization, at least in
part, of a person's status contributed to the Court's finding that the stat-
ute was void for vagueness.
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
932 also discussed earlier,933
the United States Supreme Court's ruling finding a municipal "vagrancy"
919. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 661 n.1, 666 (1962) (ruling that a statute prohibiting
being addicted to narcotics constitutes cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth
Amendment).
920. Farber v. Rochford, 407 F. Supp 529, 530, 533 (N.D. IIl. 1975) (holding an ordinance
prohibiting "known prostitute's" from loitering unconstitutional).
921. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-37 (1968) (distinguishing Robinson, 370 U.S. 660,
in a case where chronic alcoholic convicted of public drunkenness, a matter involving individual
behavior and not merely punishing status).
922. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660.
923. Id. at 661 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721 (West 1955)).
924. Id. at 666.
925. 306U.S. 451 (1939).
926. See supra notes 550-59 and accompanying text.
927. Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 458.
928. Id. at 452.
929. Id. (quoting N.J. REV. STAT. § 2:136-5 (1937)).
930. Id. at 456-58.
931. Id. at 458.
932. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
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ordinance unconstitutionally vague likewise reflected status criminality
overtones.934 The statute in question explicitly stated that the likes of
"rogues and vagabonds,". "common gamblers," "common drunkards,"
"habitual loafers," and those "habitually living upon the earnings of their
wives or minor children" were to be "deemed vagrants." 935 In the opinion
of the Court, "[t]hose generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the
ordinance -- poor people, nonconformists, dissenters, idlers -- may be
required to comport themselves according to the life style deemed appro-
priate by the Jacksonville police and the courts. 9 36 This, said the Court,
was constitutionally intolerable.
937
In a case involving a Chicago municipal ordinance, Farber v.
938Rochford, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois offered a clear illustration of how due process protections con-
tained in the Fourteenth Amendment could be used to successfully attack
the constitutionality of a stricture that made it unlawful for a person who
was "known to be a narcotics addict" or "known to be a prostitute" or
previously convicted of prostitution to, among other things, either "con-
gregate" with others of the same class in a public place or "loaf or loiter"
in or about premises where alcoholic beverages were sold.939 The court
struck down the statute as being unconstitutional in the face of due proc-
ess considerations on the theory that a person's "reputation" was the ba-
sis for being subjected to criminal prosecution, rather than the person's
acts.94 Specifically, the court stated this statute "and other ordinances of
its ilk ... suffer from the basic infirmity that they look towards the status
of the suspect rather than his conduct as the determinative factor of
guilt." 941 In response to the municipality's claim that the statute was ac-
tually directed at the act of "congregating" or "loitering by these per-
sons," the court said, "There is no actus reus at all required by the ordi-
nance, only [innocent] conduct which, while occasionally an 'adjunct' to
illicit behavior, is of itself perfectly defensible. 942 Additionally, that
portion of the ordinance that outlawed known narcotics addicts or known
prostitutes from congregating was found to be contrary to the constitu-
tional right to assemble.943 As such, the ordinance was considered uncon-
stitutional on its face.944
933. See supra notes 95-120 and accompanying text.
934. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 171.
935. Id. at 157 n.1 (quoting JACKSONVILLE, FLA., ORDINANCE CODE § 26-57)).
936. Id. at 170.
937. Id. at 171.
938. 407 F. Supp. 529 (N.D. 111. 1975).
939. Farber, 407 F. Supp. at 530 (quoting CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 192-6).
940. Id. at 532.
941. Id. at 533.
942. Id.
943. Id. at 534.
944. Id. at 535.
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Another Chicago municipal ordinance was found to unconstitution-
ally focus on the status of the party. City of Chicago v. Youkhana,945 de-
cided by the Illinois Appellate Court, involved the previously discussed
Chicago ordinance that prohibited street gang members from loitering in
a public place.946 The appellate court found the ordinance unconstitu-
tional because, among other reasons, it punished a person due to his or
her status as a member of a gang, instead of for the action of illegal loi-
tering.947 The Illinois Supreme Court, in the consolidated decision of City
of Chicago v. Morales, agreed that the ordinance was unconstitutional
although it did not reach the status issue.949 Likewise, the United States
Supreme Court found the loitering stricture-"to remain in one place
with no apparent purpose"-to be unconstitutionally vague without ad-
dressing the status claim.95°
In any event, the cases in this section reflect rule of thumb number
four: where a measure is challenged on vagueness grounds, if it is largely
directed at a person's status rather than the person's conduct, that may
well tilt the balance in favor of a void for vagueness finding.
CONCLUSION
In this time in American history when the focal point of discussion
is accounting and criminal law-Enron, Arthur Andersen Accounting,
WorldCom, and even the FBI and CIA in regards to their overlooking
evidence of the impending "9/11 "-I thought I would bring this review
of vagueness, ambiguity, and other uncertainty in American criminal law
to a conclusion by momentarily examining the word accounting. My
rather dated American Heritage Dictionary defines "accounting" as
"[tihe bookkeeping methods involved in making a financial record of
business transactions and in the preparation of statements concerning the
assets, liabilities, and operating results of a business" and "account" as,
among other things, "a precise list or enumeration of monetary transac-
tions. 951 Interestingly, we now find an "accounting," (the noun) or "ac-
counting" (the verb) means many things to many people. In my brief
undergraduate excursion into the study of accounting, I was left with the
notion that accounting connoted something on the order of mathematical
certainty. Now my reading of the newspapers (as well as the vacillating
945. 660 N.E.2d 34 (I11. App. Ct.), affd sub nom., City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53
(I1. 1995), afjd, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
946. See supra notes 134-159 and accompanying text.
947. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d at 42.
948. Morales, 687 N.E.2d at 53 (I11. 995).
949. Id. at 59.
950. Morales, 527 U.S. at 65.
951. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (M. Morris, ed.,
New College ed. 1981).
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worth of my stock portfolio) suggests an accounting is whatever the ac-
countant says it is.
So too, with words and phrases in American criminal law. They
mean whatever the courts say they mean.952 Sometimes the statutory lan-
guage is seen as precise and clear and, at other times, the words being
examined are said to be vague, ambiguous, or uncertain. My effort in all
of this is to remind those studying this subject that there are never totally
clear statutory definitions-hardly any great revelation-but that these
are a smorgasbord of general principles and guidelines, interpretative
sources, and rules of thumb that appear in the caselaw from which courts
can pick and choose to uphold or strike down criminal law legislation as
they see fit.
Judicial review of criminal law is not an exact science and it never
will be. Oftentimes the debates over the meaning of the criminal law may
be contentious and, yes, sometimes the judicial outcomes unpredictable.
But these exercises, in the end, demonstrate that resolutions of these mat-
ters, however imperfect, in American society can and do occur. In an
uncertain world where resolution is often sought by terrorist bombings,
military invasions, and brutish force, thankfully we arrive at resolution of
the meaning of our law peaceably in a court of law.
952. Almost fifteen years ago, Professor Francis Allen pointed out the demise of true adherence
of the principle of legality. See generally Francis A. Allen, The Erosion of Legality in American
Criminal Justice: Some Latter Day Adventures of the Nulla Poena Principle, 29 ARiZ. L. REV. 385
(1987). He attributed this to "fear of, and outrage over, [rising] crime rates;" id. at 400, the
assignment of the criminal law to "more difficult and complex functions," such as "organized
crime," "white-collar" crime and economic regulation; id. at 402, and a misguided legislative
movement to legislate morality, id. at 406, 410-11. Recent events, within this country and outside,
can only exacerbate the situation.

